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Introduction 
 
The second volume of the Joint Master Programme in International 
Relations: Europe in the Visegrad Perspective online reader examines key 
issues in contemporary international relations with special emphasis given to 
European security complex in light of recent migration crisis and 
destabilization in Eastern Ukraine.  Central European dimension of this 
reader is present in a number of papers dealing with transformation of civil 
society, media system and cultural heritage policy in the V4 region.  
The opening chapter by Piotr Ahmad is devoted to an analysis of the 
EU actorness within international relations system. Piotr Ahmad provides an 
overview of major theoretical positions and conceptualizations of the EU as 
international actor. 
The second chapter by Marcin Rebes sheds philosophical and 
anthropological light on debate about fundamental differences between EU 
and Russia in understanding and implementing individual freedom and 
dialectics in policy-making. 
In the third chapter Maksym Beznosiuk examines Russian neo-
Eurasianism as leading geopolitical concept applied in current Russian policy 
towards Ukraine and other Russia’s neighbouring countries. 
In the fifth chapter I explore different conceptualisations of 
international security in light of asymmetric warfare discourse. I pay special 
emphasis to so called sociological turn in security studies as exemplified in 
Ulrich Beck’s, Barry Buzan’s and Dominique Moisi’s contribution to security 
studies paradigm shift. 
In the following chapter Maciej Stępka examines explanatory value of 
human security theory as applied to migration processes in Africa showing 
how does human security theory transcend main stream international 
relations research on conjunction between migration and security. 
The seventh chapter by Agata Mazurkiewcz is a case study analysis of 
international nongovernmental organisations’ involvement in tackling 
migration crisis in Rwanda and South Sudan from the perspective of human 
security theory. 
In the eight chapter Monika Eriksen provides an analysis of 
immigration policy and rhetoric of current Hungarian government towards 
migration crisis in Europe. 
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The ninth chapter by Andrea Schmidt is a complimentary analysis of 
economic transformation processes in V4 countries after 1989 from the 
perspective of international political economy. 
  The tenth chapter by László Kákai explains historical evolution of civil 
society institutionalization processes after 1989 in Central Europe as 
exemplified in transformation of Hungarian NGO sector in light of economic 
crisis. 
In the eleventh chapter Kinga Gajda explains origin and 
transformation of media system in Central European countries after 1989 
based on case study analysis of media model in the Czech Republic and 
Poland. 
In the concluding chapter Sine Wohlgemuth explores different 
interpretations and policy-making on UNESCO world heritage on local level 
based on case study of Kraków and its UNESCO world heritage policy.  
 
Grzegorz Pożarlik  
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Piotr Ahmad 
The Polish Academy of Sciences 
Europe as a Community – identity and actorship in the European 
Union. Key issues. 
 
Abstract 
The essay will explore the multidimensional phenomenon of European 
Union’s actorship as offered by Bjorn Hettne, Fredrik Soderbaum and Patrik 
Stalgren. The idea of actorship will be a recurrent theme of my work. 
According to the authors quoted, actorship is an idea comprising both 
capacity and willingness to act in relation to the external environment; 
starting from this basic tenet, I will go on to search for answers as to how 
various dimensions of actorship in practice influence the Union’s position as 
a global actor and, especially, how the idea of European identity is linked to 
actorship itself. We will take a look at certain key aspects of EU capacity as 
an actor in international  politics – with special attention to identity – and at 
limitations and problems connected with EU actorship.  
Perhaps one of the most striking features of writing about Europe 
today is the sheer ambiguity of the term. When discussing what modern 
Europe is or what it is going to become, one almost immediately becomes 
aware of the fact that when we say ‘Europe’ there is more we have in mind 
than we might be ready to admit.  
There is, of course, the geographical term, itself inconvenient, for the 
debate on Europe’s limits in these terms has been going on for decades. Do 
we include Turkey; does Russia belong to the European club or is it the 
European ‘Other’; how European are countries east of the Oder; these and 
other questions have been variously framed by sociologists, historians and 
other academics both in Europe and beyond. Europe can also be understood 
as an idea, a category to be analysed. It can be construed as a cultural 
community or a social and political one. It is the latter that will be of most 
interest to us in this essay.  
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We will be discussing the identity of Europe as embodied by the 
European Union. Having made the assumption that European community is 
somehow politically and socially expressed by the European Union I would 
nonetheless like to say that I am far from equating both; European Union 
and Europe are not yet coterminous and while the Union is in more ways 
than one a political expression of Europe, it would probably be simplistic to 
use these terms interchangeably – Europe as a term and category comprises 
more than just the EU. 
The question of how we European Union can be conceptualized in 
terms of its actual and potential actorship inevitably brings us to the subject 
of European identity – both as a constructed and ‘subjective’ identity of its 
inhabitants and collective identity of the EU as a socio-political entity. In 
recent years we could clearly observe in the EU a great push for further 
integration, not just in terms of economy and markets. Dirk Jacobs and 
Robert Maier, for example, speak of multiple projects for ‘new’ Europe; each 
project, as the authors claim, aims to construct a unique and novel identity 
for Europe. One of these projects for Europe envisages the EU becoming the 
world economic, political and even military superpower. The preconditions 
for this process are in constant state of flux; mere twenty years ago the 
world politics were shaped by a bipolar rivalry of the US, USSR and their 
respective allies. 
 Two decades later we are now faced with a multipolar world with 
rising stars of aspiring superpowers such as China, India or, to a lesser 
degree, Brazil and even Turkey. Another crucial factor in the completion of 
this European project is lack of concerted effort of all EU member states in 
the realm of foreign policy. It would seem that a step in good direction was 
made in appointing a High Representative for Foreign Policy; on the other 
hand, no single and joint command European Union armed forces have been 
created yet – which would seem a natural next step after the creation of a 
common market and common currency1. 
                                                          
1 D. Jacobs, R. Maier, European identity: construct, fact and fiction in: M. Gastelaars, A de 
Ruijter (eds), A United Europe. The  Quest for a Multifaceted Identity, Maastricht, 
www.users.belgacom.net/jacobs/europa.pdf, s. 1, retrieved: 02. 10. 2014. 
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One of the most important questions touching on the relationship 
between European identity and actorship in the European Union is how the 
EU itself can be defined as a socio-political structure, for such a definition is 
by no means a foregone conclusion. What exactly is the European Union as 
an actor of international relations? This question is all the more relevant in 
view of the fact that it seems we are moving away from looking at 
international political scene through the lens of nation states.  
Sylvia Walby, for example, writes that we should by no means define 
a state as a nation state; in today’s world there are more nations than 
states and in today’s era of increased mobility and open borders a unitary 
monoethnic nation state has become a thing of the past2.  
Moreover, there are nations which for centuries have lived in more 
than one state at the same time, such us Kurds, Basques or Palestinians, to 
name but a few.  
In today’s day and age the most influential political actors are defined 
not so much by their borders and territory as by the extent to which they 
can transcend these borders to the point they are no longer an obstacle for 
their activity. These political actors are now territorial and supraterritorial at 
the same time; they have borders but they also wipe them out; they have 
territory but it is not fixed and set in stone – for example, new members 
could be added to the structure and, at least in theory, current ones may be 
excluded or choose to opt out. Some of these organizations do not even 
have formal political power; instead, their means of exercising influence 
comes from purely economical or financial instruments as in the case of 
global transnational corporations. 
In the realm of politics, a prime example of such  non-traditional, non-
state and non-national unit which is nonetheless a major player in the 
international scene is the European Union. S. Walby classifies the EU as a 
separate political entity which she calls a polity. A polity, writes Walby, is a 
unit that exercises authority over a specific group of people, territory or a 
                                                          
2 S. Walby, The Myth of the Nation State: Theorizing Society and Polities in a Global Era, 
‘Sociology’ 37, No. 3, August 2003, pp. 530 – 532. 
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set of institutions; it displays a degree of internal coherence and centralized 
control; finally, a polity has its very own set of laws and a system of 
sanctions for members who violate these laws3.  
The above criteria could obviously be applied to the nation state as 
well; the key difference is that Walby’s definition does not mention certain 
attributes of the nation state which are inherent in its very existence – 
namely, the monopoly of coercion and a clear definition of the group living 
within its borders. In the case of the state, such group could be defined as a 
‘nation’; in case of the EU, its inhabitants are not so clearly defined, even 
though it could be argued that the introduction of the European citizenship 
is a remedy for this.  
By and large, we could say that the European Union is, therefore, not 
only different from nation state, but also that it goes beyond a state as such 
and that it constitutes a political entity of its own kind. Nevertheless, as 
Walby emphasizes, the Union does indeed have crucial features and 
prerogatives usually reserved for the state, for example: a separate and 
supranational legislative system which has primacy over the legislative and 
judicial systems of member states and institutions designed to ensure that 
this supranational law is put into practice4. 
The EU is therefore a political organization significantly different from 
the state; not being a state, however, does not prevent it from being one of 
the biggest actors of today’s politics. Bjorn Hettne, Fredrik Soderbaum and 
Patrik Stalgren define actorship as ‘willingness and capability to influence 
the external environment’5. There are various dimensions to actorship and 
each of them influences the capability to act. The first one is regionness, 
which could be translated as internal cohesion and identity. Cohesion and 
identity influence each other.  
Lack of a unified identity endangers cohesion; lack of cohesion is a 
hindrance to the fostering of identity. The authors point out what has 
                                                          
3 Ibid., p. 534. 
4 Ibid., p. 536. 
5 B. Hettne, F. Soderbaum, P. Stalgren, The EU as a Global Actor in the South, Stockholm 
2008, p. 15, http://www.sieps.se/sites/default/files/71-20088.pdf, retrieved August 2014. 
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already been indicated earlier – the creation of a true European identity is 
vital if the Union’s capability to shape the external environment is to be 
upheld and strengthened. 
Numerous approaches have been offered to the creation of EU – 
specific identity. Some of them, like the idea of fostering an identity through 
shared European culture need to be questioned in an increasingly atomized 
and multicultural society constantly reshaped by migration. Others, like the 
idea of a European civic society, seem to have a future. According to the 
‘civic’ concept of a new EU identity, a European civic society could come into 
being, thus forming a ‘European nation’ (demos). This identity could be 
formed on the basis of attachment to common European Union values 
expressed in the acquis communautaire, respecting shared civic rights and 
duties and agreement on a set of principles necessary to uphold social order 
in everyday life6. Introducing European citizenship is a political expression of 
this idea.  
We could say that the main aspect of citizenship is that it forms a 
unique relationship between an individual and the state, which is embodied 
in mutual rights and obligations between the citizen and the state7. It is 
precisely in that aspect that the citizenship of the European Union 
unfortunately remains most ineffective. First and foremost, the EU 
citizenship does not in and of itself grant any special rights – or impose 
specific obligations. Therein lies its weakness – it is not independent as it 
functions solely on the basis of national citizenship and as a sort of an add-
on to the national citizenship. Therefore, it is still national – and not the EU 
– citizenship which still forms the basis of relations between the individual 
and the political structure – the state or the Union as may be the case8. 
                                                          
6 A. M. Ruiz Jimenez, J. J. Górniak, A. Kosič, P. Kiss and M. Kandulla, European and National 
Identities In the EU’s Old and New Member States, p. 4. 
7 For more on the subject see: R. Tokarczyk, Doktrynalne podstawy społeczeństwa 
obywatelskiego, in: W. Kaute (red.), Demokracja, liberalizm, społeczeństwo obywatelskie. 
Doktryna i myśl polityczna, Katowice 2004. 
8 Cf. A. M. Nogal, Ponad prawem narodowym: konstytucyjne idee Europy, Warszawa 2009, 
pp. 161 – 162. 
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A second dimension of actorship proposed by Hettne et al. is what 
they refer to as presence – in terms of size, population and military power. 
While in terms of size, population and economy the Union is unquestionably 
one of the largest political structures in the world, her military presence is 
an area of deficiency. There is no common military force, the main burden of 
military activities is shouldered by NATO and matters related to security 
remain in the hands of national governments who are not in the least keen 
to give up any part of sovereignty in this field. 
Finally, actorship also involves actorness – that is: conscious action 
aimed at shaping external affairs. According to Hettne et al., actorness can 
only take place if the following conditions are met. There has to exist a 
broad attachment to common values; a social legitimacy of processes, 
decisions and policies and an ability to formulate and execute coherent and 
consistent policies at the central/federal level9.   
 While it could be argued that there exists a set – or a ‘catalogue’ of 
common ‘European’ values, encompassing a variety of phenomena from 
human rights, freedom and democracy to rule of law and free market 
economy, the legitimacy of processes initiated and decisions made in 
Brussels has raised reasonable concerns.  
It is a factor which should not be overplayed but nor should it be 
ignored altogether; one is justified in asking whether decisions made by a 
group of people with considerable power who are not elected in a 
democratic process and are not accountable before the voters are always in 
the people’s best interest10. This may lead to a situation where an estranged 
population is subject to rule by a complex bureaucrat run structure and the 
idea of common Europe is all but lost, thus weakening the European Union’s 
capacity to act in the global context. 
The European Union of course has its issues with actorship. One of 
them often stressed problems in relation to the future of the Union is the 
weakening of its identity or, rather, new challenges to its future identity due 
                                                          
9 See for example: B. Hettne, F. Soderbaum, P. Stalgren, The EU as a Global Actor, p. 9. 
10 A. M. Nogal, Ponad prawem narodowym, s. 167. 
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to increased mobility and migration. Recent years have shown that not all 
citizens of the Union feel European; some of them, in fact, tend to view 
themselves as foreign and choose to remain attached to old traditions and 
sources of authority. For example, there have been numerous questions 
over the future of a rapidly growing Muslim citizens of the EU; while many 
are willing to accept ‘European’ values and embrace them in their everyday 
lives, there are still those who interpret Islam and the Q’uran literally or 
seriously consider introducing Sharia law in some form into the legislation of 
European states11.  The European Union will be able to go from strength to 
strength only if its citizens will share a common European identity12. 
Another issue paramount to the Union’s ability to act as an efficient 
global actor is strictly structural; on the inside, it has a multitude of 
institutions with often divergent interests; on the outside, it cannot decide 
between intergovernmental and federalist modus operandi. Internally, the 
European Commission wields the greatest power but voices can be heard 
that perhaps more responsibility should be placed, for example, in the 
Parliament.  
Externally, governments of member-states are not willing to surrender 
what has for long been reserved for them as a hallmark of their sovereignty 
– most importantly, conducting their foreign and security affairs as they see 
fit in terms of their vested interests. This has led to the crippling of any 
substantial efforts at creating a unified and efficient common foreign policy 
and is known as the EU foreign policy complex13. One of the most recent 
examples of this could be seen in how differently various member states 
approached the subject of imposing sanctions on Russia in the wake of the 
Ukraine crisis. 
This essay strove to point out some of the primary issues touching on 
the factors which effectively expand – or limit – the European Union’s 
                                                          
11 On the various faces of Islam In Europe see for example: B. Tibi, Political Islam, World 
Politics and Europe: Democratic Peace and Euro-Islam versus Global Jihad, Routledge, New 
York 2008. 
 
12 B. Hettne, F. Soderbaum, P. Stalgren, The EU as a Global Actor, p. 25. 
13 Ibid., pp. 26 – 28. 
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capacity to be a global actor on the fast paced scene of international affairs. 
I wanted to show how various dimensions of actorship are influenced by – 
and how they can in turn shape – the identity of the European Union at the 
social and institutional level. Finally, it has to be said that this short study 
was a perspective on a problem that could be looked at from a variety of 
angles and many approaches could be useful in the exploration of presented 
themes; my perspective included ideas and topics I see as especially 
relevant for the subject and it  was only one of the many possible. 
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EU-Russia relations. A different understanding of human freedom 
and dialectics. 
 
 
Abstract :   
 
In this paper I explore EU-Russia relations in light of a discourse on 
individual freedom and dialectics. These two notions have been understood 
differently in contemporary Russian and European policy.      
Current Russian policy gets more and more neo-imperial.  
One of the instruments of this policy is containment of citizens’ 
right to freedom. Based on analysis of escape from freedom as 
exemplified in the Grand Inquisitor’s speech in the Karamazov 
Brothers as well as reflection on Hegelian dialectics  I examine the 
problem of individual freedom in current Russian-EU relations 
perspective. Russian neo- imperial reasoning is based on Hegel’ 
philosophy with the Phenomenology of the Spirit being the special 
point of reference.  
Followers of neoimperial reasoning misinterpret Hegelian dialectics. Hegelian 
dialectics is based on assumption that individual freedom once given – even 
though given up by the individual for happiness to compensate fear and 
hardships – will always be a subject of aspirations.  
Neoimperialism builds the world based on artificial value system, which is 
used to legitimate its power.  Neoimperialism does not build the world 
funded on positive values but on construction of the enemy as significant 
other. As explained by Hegel in the Phenomenology of the Spirit in his 
account on stoic thought, a struggle between master and servant on 
recognition leads to the conclusion that a servant can do without a master 
but master cannot do without a servant.   
The policy based on dialectics of struggle leads to a situation when the 
hegemon becomes dependent on those who were supposed to be 
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dominated. The policy of confrontation may result in marginalization of 
Russia on international arena. Political situation in Europe after Russia’s 
aggression on Georgia and Ukraine is that the policy of trust and 
cooperation is transformed into policy of 
aggression and competition, which ultimately leads to Russia’s 
economic and political decline. 
 
  
 
key words: neoimperialism, Russian and Western European 
policy, escape from freedom, dialectics, symmetrical 
and asymmetrical relations.  
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 
For a long time in global policy the two empires have fought for 
domination, i.e. US and Western Europe versus Soviet Union. Today the 
situation is different. There appear new actors such as China or Japan. The 
current conflict between Russia and Ukraine should be seen not only from 
Western that is to say US-European perspective but also including new 
global actors like China. This perspective is new but problem is still the 
same. It refers to political situation as well as to anthropological debates, 
which influence the policy. Therefore, I would like to focus on right to 
individual freedom and character of relationship between citizen and 
authority.  
These two aspects are analyzed from the anthropological perspective 
on the perception of international relations and neighborhood policy-making 
as exemplified in return to the cultural differences in the perception of policy 
in Russia and Europe.  
Eastern or - as main stream contemporary Russian social scientists 
would say - Russian civilization has been clinging towards authoritarianism 
and it has been conducting policy based on the dialectics which eliminates 
opposition. Politics dominates over individual freedom and disregards its 
values. In contrast, Western civilization which protects individual freedom 
have been recently loosing faith in values.  
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Value crisis is evaluated as crisis of democracy and therefore 
democracy is enemy for global policy. Democracy in Western Europe, 
concentrated on individual freedom and human rights, is useful for 
neoimperial policy which needs a contrast for interior policy. Therefore, a 
politician demands insurance policy at the expense of individual freedom 
and recognizes enemy in Western civilization.  
Neoimperial thought needs dialectics and therefore establishes bipolar 
policy which reinforces authority of the state and petrifies a return to the 
past which is recalled by citizens very positively. In this situation, all that 
happened in the past we tend to evaluate positively because we recognize 
its effects. At the same  contemporary politics is seen a serious threat and it 
triggers fears for our future. Dialectics between two empires and refusal of 
individual freedom, which is affects interior politics transforms relations 
between EU and Russia from cooperation to confrontation.  
 
 
1. Axiology and politics. 
 
What led to the change in the Russian policy? What is the cause of the 
neo-imperial tendencies? Sentiment towards the Cold War is not only about 
state infrastructure, but above all it is about thinking based on dialectics. 
Desire to dominate stems from the belief that a rivalry between two 
civilizations could lead to peace and stability in the world. Even former 
dissidents, who experienced communism while detained in the camps, 
advocate today a neo-imperial policy of Russia aiming at subjugating 
Western European culture. By the contrast to crumbling Europe there is a 
strong Russia, which is expected to restore “the right order” in the world.  
Dialectics juxtaposed with the idea of messianism, or Panslavism is the 
basis for neo-imperial thinking, which turns into politics everything which is 
the domain of ethics, for example individual moral decisions of man. The 
whole of human activity, including the world of values is reduced to politics. 
Such a thinking was called in XX-century social science a totalitarianism and 
it is related to national socialism and communism. Today, as seen from the 
past (in Marxist-Leninist doctrine) there remains a simplifying Hegelian 
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dialectics, which established policy and system of values (axiology) relying 
on antagonism and contrast. The good exists only when confronted with the 
evil. We can also overcome evil even when we use wrong methods. Ethical 
evil is getting political because the most important are political goals.  
First of all, this kind of reasoning does not deal with realization of values 
(goodness), but with antagonism, which is useful for political struggle that 
leads to victory. Supreme category of human conduct is not the good in 
itself and its implementation, but a  political victory. Positive effects of this 
policy are possible if there are two components (antagonisms) of dialectics: 
thesis and antithesis.  
The problem of building a world of values not so much on the positive 
beliefs, views, or decisions, but on the negation of the existing world was 
already examined by Friedrich Nietzsche. He showed that everyone is a 
creator of values and one must not build the world of values on reaction, but 
on affirmation. Values cannot be the answer to affirmation as its negation. 
One cannot be good because another can be bad. Values are good as such.  
No positive thinking about values makes them originated in the 
confrontation. Values are then created in the dialectics. Modern open 
societies build a world of values, embody a world of values on the basis of 
affirmation, an experience of values and a will to realize values. This turn 
towards the philosophy of the will, which is the basic element of decision-
making originates from Kant and his determination of will to do the good 
and avoid the evil.  
Bergson and Nietzsche claim that thinking is based on intuition and 
the need to build positive values. Nietzsche pays attention to the fact that in 
Judaism and Christianity values are built on the basis of contrast. I'm good, 
because you're bad. He proposes practicing of ethics based on a reflection 
on the origins of morality and notes that everyone is a creator of values. 
Nietzsche also did a huge favour to Christian theology with an attempt to 
think about the cause of the behaviour morally good because of the reward.  
The problem of Nietzsche’s philosophy, however, is the lack of 
freedom. He thinks the world is subjected to destiny. The man is a subject 
of destiny too. The crisis of values did not cause the collapse of faith in 
values, but individual longing for building a world based on free will, the 
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individual decision. Freedom, which Nietzsche denies, transforms in 
European culture into a fundamental value. Values can only be realized by 
making decisions considering our will and the will of the others. European 
thought has made freedom a place of memory. Freedom resulted in that in 
Europe today there is a place for tolerance and multiculturalism. However, 
on the eve of World War II the barrier was tendency to build a system that 
excluded diversity. European philosophers point out that otherness is 
displaced at the expense of uniformity. After the war, philosophy posed a 
question about the other and how it could be that we survived the trauma of 
concentration camps. Levinas and Derrida posed a question of the 
annihilation of humanity, which is a result of the realization of the aim 
regardless of the measures. In the present thinking, this trend is growing, 
especially it is evident in the neo-imperial ambitions. 
Today's neo-imperialist tendencies are dangerous backward steps, 
which lead to totalitarianism. The point is not to squander strong words, but 
to show that totalitarian thinking is based on the exclusion of the opponent, 
on building a world based on myself and my own thinking. Totalitarianism is 
a way of exercising the power, which subordinates all political, social 
activities, to only one political purpose, one thought. Social and cultural life 
is subordinated to the goal which is strong, expansionary policy which leads 
to a confrontation between two worlds. This neo-imperialist policy has its 
roots in the history of political doctrines in Russia and the Soviet Union. 
Each political phenomenon has its circumstances in the past, the 
present and expectations for the future, that's what happens in the case of 
neo-imperialism. 
Neo-imperialism’s trends are the result of a lack of clearing with the 
past, which is currently under strong pressure of mythologizing due to 
short-term political benefits. The roots of totalitarian thinking in the 
twentieth-century were not only in Germany and Italy, but also in the Soviet 
Union. 
At an international conference on totalitarian regimes of the twentieth-
century, one of the participants, Prof. Gustavo Corni, posed the question of 
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symbols of national socialism and bolshevism14. Why can’t we use the 
symbol of the swastika, and without much of a problem, we can use 
symbols of bolshevism in Europe? Why do not we have equal treatment of 
those totalitarianisms? There is quite right in it. National socialism was 
condemned in Germany but that could not be expected from the Soviet 
Union. Russia's joining to the coalition against Nazi Germany did not allow to 
condemn Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, as a result of which Russia has become 
one of the countries sparked the Second World War. In neo-imperial 
thinking, Russia’s invasion of Poland on September 17, 1939 is ignored. 
Neo-imperial policy of building historical memory is one of the elements of 
selective treatment of historical events, which form the conviction of 
injustice and evil. It introduces confusion in thinking, revaluation of values, 
the weakness of the state and it demoralizes the citizens. Freedom, which is 
a key concept in European culture, is the main perpetrator of the lack of 
respect for rights, eternal rules. Imperial thinking is based on an alternative 
of efficient state, keeping century-old values or individual freedom. 
Therefore, it is necessary to create strong, imperial state at the expense of 
individual freedom.  
In a speech of Grand Inquisitor in The Karamazov Brothers  there is a 
good example showing the meaning of rejection of freedom, which is a 
process of enslaving a human being. Dostoevsky criticized the Latin Church, 
what is visible today in light of neo-imperial movements in Russia. It refers 
both to human relationships and international relations. Grand Inquisitor 
wants to take over all responsibility of the citizen to the state together with 
taking away of him any dignity. Man divests of his own individual freedom to 
be able to feel happy. The phenomenon of taking the responsibility to make 
other people happy is an attempt to take away a man of his dignity15.  
Democracy exists only with authority, who takes responsibility, but 
also with a risk of fault. The only fault is the lack of obedience. Basic 
assumption in such thinking is that a man does not need freedom, but a 
happiness. Freedom is difficult, and happiness is a fundamental value. It 
                                                          
14 International conference entitled: The sources of twentieth-century totalitarianisms 
organized by Jagiellonian University in Krakow and by Hannah-Arendt Institute in Dresden 
hold 6-8 November 2007 in Cracow.  
15 Fyodor  Dostoevsky, The Karamazov Brothers, at 
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/28054/28054-h/28054-h.html, pp. 271-278. 
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appears when freedom is taken away through acceleration of fear. Freedom 
is difficult, therefore it is better to give it up. The process of giving up 
freedom goes even further. When freedom is given up, a man who received 
happiness must be thankful to someone who had taken the freedom of him 
because it is only in such situation that a man becomes happy. 
Neo-imperialism in philosophical way refers to Hegel and his dialectics. 
But it ignores a function of dialectic presentation which means self-
understanding and presentation of the process of achieving the freedom by 
the spirit. Neo-imperialism, which is based on dialectics ignores the 
fundamental content of the Phenomenology of Spirit which is the process of 
achieving freedom16. Hegel's fight is a fight to death, the effect of which is 
freedom. The confrontation has led to the elimination of opposition by 
removing one of the elements. This fight has to make people happy. It has 
to bring state of happiness and truth which is the truth already established. 
There is no individual, but the one who becomes a messiah. Romantic 
panslavic thought, messianic movements in today's world turn into neo-
imperialist movements which are fighting for happiness of a nation, an 
international community, a world. To achieve it, a scapegoat is essential. 
This may be a social group, or political party, but also Western Europe, 
which is understood in neo-imperial reasoning as a community that brings 
the world to anti-values, moral and political decay. Identification of the 
whole group with the collapse of civilization is an important element, 
because it allows classifying the group and identifying an enemy that must 
be defeated and destroyed. This identification and assignment of evil is 
necessary to give up the freedom by citizens and their support of strong, 
authoritarian power. 
Polarization is the main element of neo-imperial policy, which 
apparently is based on values. Without the dialectics leading to annihilation, 
it is impossible to force citizens to give up their own freedom. Escape from 
freedom is made on the basis of polarization, delineation of hostile values 
that destroy our plan, and assigning a value to a person, society, or even 
                                                          
16 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, Hamburg 2006, p. 136-156. 
Józef Tischner, Spowiedź rewolucjonisty. Czytając Fenomenologie ducha Hegla. Kraków 
1993. p. 32-52. 
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civilization. Simplification, generalization is very harmful and lead to 
tensions in order to strengthen power.  
Authority uses ethical and religious arguments, although they are only 
means to achieve a political objective. In this way of reasoning it is 
necessary to explain to the public that Western Europe aims at destroying 
Russia. Neo-imperial movement is in itself a serious contradiction, on the 
one hand it is believed that Western Europe brings destruction of the world 
of values, on the other it is considered powerless. Assumption that enemy is 
bad, is axiomatic. Since the civilization of Western Europe is bad, we have to 
defend ourselves from it, despite the fact that civilization is falling into 
anarchy. Evil overwhelms us, we feel fear, uncertainty, because we lose a 
sense of rationality. 
 Policy based on symmetry in the relations between the citizens and 
other countries is grounded on the induction of fear and uncertainty. Fear 
makes our behaviour irrational and leads to the conclusion that it is easier 
to give up freedom than to make effort to fight for respect for freedom. So, 
we cling to those who make us happy for the price of our freedom. When 
they conquer the freedom of others, they use unethical means to maintain 
power and slave’s belief that everything is given by the power holder. This is 
basis for neo-imperial policy. 
Respect for freedom of the individual is a fundamental value of any 
policy. Only maintaining the freedom can establish a relationship which can 
be called correlation or cooperation. When the cooperation turns into a 
confrontation, freedom is rejected. 
 
 
 
2. Symmetrical or asymmetrical model of relationship 
 
 
External policy has its basis in two types of human relationships. 
Asymmetrical movement towards the citizens translates into an 
asymmetrical relationship to the neighbourhood policy, symmetrical 
translates into cooperation and coexistence. 
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Russian model, where dominates tendency to confrontation, is based 
on an asymmetrical relationship between the individual and the whole. It's 
about conquering and maintaining power. State has its own priorities, in 
which the most important is strong, authoritarian authority, which absolves 
and incapacities citizens. 
This is particularly evident in post-communist societies which, 
although disengaged from the domination of Russia, still expect strong 
power. They blame authority for debacle without reflection, that everything 
depends on them. They expect from the state, that remedies any problems. 
This model is idealistic because assumes that there exist a state in which 
there is an complete social justice and eternal happiness. They would easily 
give up any freedom for their own happiness.  
In this idealistic view, there is a desire to be better off and better 
treated than the rest of society. Utopia carries the disparities. Giving up the 
freedom, man becomes a part of the system that works better or worse. 
Grand Inquisitor is a representative of the asymmetrical relationship. His 
power lies in submission to him. He takes the freedom of individuals and 
gives an apparent happiness. However, man must be grateful to him.  
All good comes from his hand. It is not individual man, who brings the 
world of values, but one who is created by apparent values. Gratitude is one 
of those features which make someone strictly obedient. The values are 
built on the opposition and following Nietzsche, indicate morality, which is 
based on a feeling of being better than others, and is called by Nietzsche the 
slave morality. Russia's neo-imperial movements forget lesson from history 
about the ultimate rebellion against those who divested freedom.  
Nowadays neo-imperialism differs from Stalinism in the basis of 
dialectics. It is not based on class struggle, but on domination over the 
world, and also includes moral and religious issues in order to reinforce 
the message. The internal problems of the Russian economy are covered by 
neo-imperialist, messianic vision of the world. 
Besides policy of objective, there is also the policy of coexistence, 
cooperation and building the world on positive values. A more typical for 
countries with centuries-old tradition is a model of coexistence, cooperation 
and mutual correlation. This is a symmetric relationship. Its basis is respect 
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of the individual freedom. This model in comparison with a model of policy 
of objective is less efficient, but it is safe and definitely better in the long-
term perspective. This model in Western Europe is threatened by 
extremisms and nationalisms leading to the conviction that someone must 
be bad so another can be good. Asymmetry and hostility in social 
relationships need a collective memory, a historical background, which has 
become an example of how the threat factor determines contemporary 
social relations in Europe. 
Despite of the danger, an important element is betrayal which means 
a lack of trust to the other. This ethical term is reflected in interstate 
relations, foreign policy and means failure of agreements, violating the 
treaties. If I'm betrayed, I’m not bind by any agreements which were 
previously signed. Maintaining the historical lie, initially is a kind of 
narrative, in which the one who lies does not believe in it, but must lead to 
confrontation. Over time, the lie becomes the truth, which lives its own life. 
It becomes a political myth, which is believed by those who provoked it. 
Incorporation of the feeling of fear into policy is one of the important 
elements of confrontation between the Eastern and Western policy.  
For Western Europe important values are man and his freedom, not 
absolute realization of political purpose. It seems to us that the policy is not 
very effective, but Hegel's philosophy, on which current neo-imperialist 
Russian thinking is based, takes it as frame of reference. The conclusions 
from Hegel's philosophy, from the Phenomenology of Spirit, are definitely 
different. According to Hegel, a spirit experiences freedom - despite its later 
loosing – it desires it. Therefore, transferring one’s own freedom leads to a 
longing for it. 
 
 
3. The confrontation of neo-imperialism 
 
The term which functions in philosophy as symmetrical and 
asymmetrical relationship, can mean on the level of foreign policy 
cooperation or confrontation. Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit teaches 
us that confrontation leads to opposite conclusions than we expect. Hegel 
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does it, watching the outbreak of the French Revolution and its 
consequences. Hegel presents the problem of self-consciousness on the 
basis of stoicism and shows the struggle of master and slave for acclaim.  
Any foreign policy is based on the recognition by the various parties. 
The master is the one who feels no fear, is not afraid of death, he is a 
winner, but his victory is apparent. The slave got scared, and is subjected to 
master. Finally, Hegel comes to the conclusion that in the struggle for 
acclaim appears mediation, which causes that a slave can live without 
master and master without a slave can’t. The master is addicted to one who 
serves him. Asymmetrical policy of confrontation awakening anxiety leads 
ultimately to the fact that those who frighten, are addicted to instil fear, fall 
into paranoia, creating a world of myths and isolation.  
Any policy, including foreign policy apart from the difference of views 
is based on mutual recognition. Relationship which is asymmetrical is based 
on intimidation. Cooperation is based on trust. Confrontation is based on 
artfulness, game of appearances, which ultimately leads to the conclusion 
that it does not make any sense. Using immoral means to achieving good 
aim, makes cooperation impossible. The lack of trust, of which Kant 
elaborates in the Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch17, is the reason 
that return to the way of cooperation can be less and less possible. 
 
 
Summary 
 
Comparison of two models of relationship based on confrontation and 
cooperation resulting from the Enlightenment tradition in Western Europe 
and the Eastern tradition carries a basic question about confrontation with 
these two trends. How could we ensure security? In my opinion, a policy 
based on a symmetrical relationship is the only solution to the problem. It 
does not mean acquiescence to any behaviour of partners, but the attempt 
to rebuild an open relationship, mutual cooperation between Russia and 
Europe, with respecting each party. This requires from us a consistent and 
                                                          
17 I. Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, at 
https://slought.org/media/files/perpetual_peace.pdf, 28th August 2015. 
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tough policy, but at the same time allows reaching a common point. The 
model of Russian confrontation is the least effective and leads to revolution, 
as citizens of Central Europe could convince in the 90s of the last century.  
In the twentieth century, systemic change took place by overcoming a 
policy of confrontation, which is also forgotten by the extreme right in 
Central Europe countries. Neo-Russia is at the beginning of the way of 
reflection to think that a model based on dialectical confrontation is 
ineffective. Khodorkovsky, who says that in a few years, Russia will need 
help from the West18, in my opinion is right and it is also due to 
considerations of Hegel's philosophy.  
The Hegelian dialectics with neo-imperialism and with a touch of 
messianism is unsustainable in the long term and ultimately could result in 
revolution, when people long for their freedom and understand that they 
can’t give up their freedom for apparent security. Russia in its policy moves 
away from the symmetrical relationship and becomes a hostage of its 
imperialism. It can’t build the world of relationships other than the one 
based on dialectics. Policy of instilling terror and fear needs the one of who 
is subjected to it, but what happens when people realize that they can live 
without a culture of violence? Europe and Russia need each other.  
Russia to maintain its own position needs Europe, whose heritage is 
individual freedom and transparency of rights. Europe needs Russian culture 
and the Russian economy, which enrich Europe. Cooperation between 
Europe and Russia requires abandoning Russia's neo-imperial tendencies 
and building a world on the dialectics excluding the human right to freedom. 
I hope that this dangerous trend will turn around and common relationship 
between Europe and Russia will be exemplary and based on symmetry. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
18 Wacław Radziwinowicz, Chodorkowski do zachodu: Szykujcie plan Marshalla dla Rosji po 
Putinie., In: Gazeta Wyborcza, 19 June 2015. 
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Russian neo-Eurasianism concept in redrawing borders in Europe: 
case study of Crimea19 
 
Abstract:  
Since the USSR collapse, Russia has lacked an ideological concept that 
could redefine its geopolitical position in the post-Cold War world. At the end 
of 1990s, the neo-Eurasianism ideological concept gained broad prominence 
among Russian intelligentsia and post-Soviet state officials, with its 
emphasis on the uniqueness of Russian civilization and its drastic contrasts 
with the hostile West.  
With the arrival of Putin to the Presidential office, an opportunity to 
implement neo-Eurasian ideas in practice arose, which subsequently led to 
active steps undertaken to rebuild the Russian State within the boundaries 
of the Former Soviet Union and to unify Eurasian space in security, 
economic and political terms. This paper sheds light on the origins of the 
neo-Eurasianism concept and its key fundamental elements with a view to 
understand better the theoretical core of the Kremlin neo-Eurasian agenda. 
Following this, a broad array of policy, legal and informational instruments 
used by Kremlin to implement its neo-Eurasianism agenda as to Crimea is 
thoroughly examined.  
This paper then subsequently highlights the fallacy and inadequacy of 
arguments used by the Kremlin to justify its takeover of Crimea. 
Examination of neo-Eurasianism agenda implementation in Crimea enables 
                                                          
19 This paper emanates from Euroculture Intensive Programme, Olomouc, Czech Republic, 
2015 
 
Online-Reader: Joint Second Cycle Degree in International Relations: Europe in the Visegrad Perspective             27 
 
Material under copyright protection. 
 
to understand the broad range of tactics and strategies which could be 
further used by the Kremlin to justify its geopolitical and strategic 
expansion. To this end, the possibility of future Kremlin offensive policies 
along its western borders is briefly covered. 
Keywords: Crimea annexation; neo-Eurasianism; Russia; Ukraine; borders. 
 
Introduction 
Gorbachev’s “Perestroika” and the subsequent USSR demise revived an 
old debate concerning Russia’s relationship with Europe.20  The focus of this 
debate centered on economic and democratic reforms in Russia to move it 
closer to Europe.21 At the time, Russian pro-Western liberal-minded and 
nationalistic intellectuals fiercely debated the role of Russia’s unique 
strategic and geographical location between Europe and Asia22.   
At the end of 1990s, while pro-Western Russians tended to lose their 
influence over the above debate, the nationalists exposed a neo-Eurasianism 
ideological concept that had been increasing in popularity among Russian 
intelligentsia and post-Soviet state officials. This concept followed the 
traditions of Russian nationalism which emphasized the uniqueness of 
Russia-Eurasian civilization in its struggle against the dominance of the 
West.23 Vladimir Putin, who came to power in 1999, was among those 
officials who were quite disturbed by the weaknesses of the Russian State 
                                                          
20 Alexander Woll and Harald Wydra, ed., Democracy and Myth in Russia and Eastern 
Europe (New York: Routledge, 2008), 205. 
21 Harry Broadman, Tiiu Paas, Paul Welfens, ed., Economic Liberalization and Integration 
Policy: Options for Eastern Europe and Russia (Heildeberg: Springer Berlin, 2006), 2-3. 
22 David Kotz and Fred Weir, Russia’s Path from Gorbachev to Putin: The Demise of the 
Soviet System and the New Russia (New York: Routledge, 2007), 199-200. 
23 Mark Bassin, “Eurasianism “Classical” and “Neo”: The Lines of Continuity,” in Beyond the 
Empire: Images of Russia in the Eurasian Cultural Context, ed. Tetsuo Mochizuki,  
(Sapporo: Slavic Research Center, 2007) 284, http://src-
h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no17_ses/contents.html  
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and aspired to see Russia revive its past glory and might.24 He and his close 
circle were closely tied to neo-Eurasianism ideologists led by Alexander 
Dugin, and shared both the ideas and ideals of the neo-Eurasianism 
concept.25  
Since 2000s, Putin and his entourage, influenced by neo-Eurasianism 
ideological concept, have been actively involved in reviving Russia’s previous 
image and influence in the region. Implications of their activities could be 
observed in the recent Kremlin steps as to formation of Eurasian Union and 
active usage of political and other means. These activities serve as an 
indication of ongoing geopolitical neo-Eurasianism project being 
implemented by the Kremlin to rebuild the Russian State within the 
boundaries of the Former Soviet Union (hereinafter referred to as “FSU”). 
As a result, this situation raises the issue concerning the possible 
further adverse implications of the Putin doctrine based on the neo-
Eurasianism approach with some unpredictable consequences for the FSU 
states and European continent as a whole. Most of countries of Central and 
South-Eastern Europe have been concerned with Russian activities next to 
their borders.26 They have condemned Russia’s takeover of Crimea and 
destabilizing activities in eastern parts of Ukraine due to fears of possible 
Russian aggression against them as well.27  
Russia’s recent acquisition of Crimea serves as a key example of Russia’s 
implementation of the neo-Eurasianism concept in the post-Soviet space, 
which has led to the first redrawing of borders in Europe since the end of 
                                                          
24 Anton Barbashin and Hannah Thoburn, “Putin’s Brain: Alexander Dugin and the 
Philosophy Behind Putin’s Invasion of Crimea,” Foreign Affairs, March 31, 2014, 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141080/anton-barbashin-and-hannah-
thoburn/putins-brain>. 
25 Ibid 
 
26 Mateusz Gniazdowski, “The Countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe on the crisis 
in Ukraine,” Center for Eastern Studies, May 3, 2014,  
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-03-05/countries-central-and-south-
eastern-europe-crisis-ukraine  
27 Ibid 
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World War II. This acquisition marked a shift from a universal approach to a 
selective interpretation of international legal norms by regional actors like 
Russia. As a result, it has shaken the foundations of internal legal order and 
the balance of powers in Europe. 
The Russian Government adjusted its foreign policy towards Crimea, from 
the early 1990s de jure recognition of Crimea belonging to Ukraine, to the 
acceleration of political pressure around Crimea that culminated in Crimea’s 
accession to Russia in March 2014. The primary reason for this action may 
be related to rising neo-Eurasianism. Identifying and exploring to what 
extent, however, will be the purpose of this paper as well as further 
examining the origins of neo-Eurasianism and the likelihood of the Kremlin 
conducting similar activities in the future.  
In order to achieve these above-mentioned tasks, I will resort to the use 
of primary data analysis by touching upon the relevant selective provisions 
related to foreign, military and informational aspects of security of Russia, 
contained in top strategic documents produced by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of Russia and National Security Council of Russia, responsible for 
their elaboration and overall preparation. In addition, I will engage in 
secondary data analysis by examining various think tank reports and papers 
produced in Russia and overseas, and related to neo-Eurasianism concept 
and its implementation by Russian official authorities in case of Crimea.   
2. Origins of neo-Eurasianism concept and key fundamental 
elements  
The 1789 French Revolution is one of the key historical events that 
pushed the ideas behind the emergence of Eurasianism and subsequently 
neo-Eurasianism. It laid the path towards an active debate regarding the 
relationship between Russia and Europe and subsequently led to the 
December 1825 uprising in Russia28. Conservative nationalists, who 
supported enlightened despotism preservation; and constitutionalists, who 
                                                          
28 Paul Dukes, A History of Russia: Medieval, Modern, Contemporary, c. 882-1996 (London: 
McMillan Press, 1998), 103-145. 
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stood for introduction of European economic and political models in Russia, 
were two parties to this active debate.29 
Representing constitutionalists at that time, Decembrists supported 
introducing European reforms in Russia and wanted to modify Russian 
geopolitical strategy to bring Russia closer to Europe. Nevertheless, they 
were defeated by Russian State authorities upon their failed uprising in 
1825. Consequently, they lost their influence in the debate concerning 
Russia’s and Europe’s relationship, which became fully dominated by 
conservative and Russian romantic nationalists. These nationalists supported 
an isolationist approach and Christian Orthodox moral superiority over 
Europe and strongly attacked European civilization with its western values.30 
 
The emergence of this debate led to the formation of Slav, pan-Slav, 
Eurasianism and subsequently neo-Eurasianism ideas. It must be noted that 
the first intellectuals who emphasized the unique nature of Russian’s 
national ethos, which was neither Western nor European, belonged to a 
circle called the “Russian Tendency” which wanted to shift the focus from 
introducing western reforms to the unique role of Russian spiritual and 
cultural roots.31  
This approach was adopted by Slavophiles who argued for the special 
mission of the Russian State and ethos in its struggle against European 
civilization.32 They also fiercely opposed the historical move undertaken by 
Peter the Great to implement Western economic and political reforms in 
Russia and his idea to Europeanize Russian self-image by dividing Russia 
into European and Asiatic sections.33 The latter was aimed at reorganizing 
                                                          
29 Iver Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International 
Relations (London: Routledge, 1996), 13. 
30 Ibid, 13-28. 
31 Ibid, 13-16. 
32 Ibid, 30. 
33 Mark Bassin,”Russia between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of 
Geographical Space,” Slavic Review 50, no. 1 (1991): 5, accessed May 12, 2015, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2500595?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. 
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Russia in compliance with European patterns.34 Not surprisingly, Slavophiles 
considered any attempts of Russian modernization as a new “Western 
Yoke.”35   
Later on, representatives of the pan-Slavs movement headed by 
Konstantin Leontiev believed that Russia had a Messianic mission against 
the decaying and morally inferior European civilization36. They thought that 
Russia was obliged to either take over this inferior European civilization by 
military means or to isolate itself completely from Europe.37  
 
These traits in the Slav and pan-Slav movements were absorbed by the 
emerging Eurasianism concept that became popular among many anti-
Bolshevik Russians who had fled the country after the 1917 October 
Revolution and subsequent civil war38. Eurasianism ideologists were 
emphasizing the Eurasianism perception of Russia as a unique civilization 
that combines Christian orthodox traditions, Slavic culture and Turkish 
elements39. According to them, this unique Russia-Eurasia civilization was 
always threatened by the West which aimed to undermine its geopolitical 
unity and subordinate it for the purposes of exploitation40.  
Attempts to modernize the Russian economy and introduce democratic 
reforms in Russia at the beginning of 1990s were not welcomed by some 
Russian nationalist patriotic elements which opposed de-Sovietization and 
believed the collapse of the USSR to be the greatest geopolitical catastrophe 
of the 21st century.41 Among such key leading nationalist patriotic 
intellectuals was Dugin. He became the founder and key proponent of the 
                                                          
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid, 32. 
36 Ibid, 67. 
37 Ibid 
38 Anton Barbashin and Hannah Thoburn, “Putin’s Brain: Alexander Dugin and the 
Philosophy Behind Putin’s Invasion of Crimea,” (n5)1. 
39 Alexander Dugin, Basics of Geopolitics: Geopolitical Future of Russia, (Moscow: 
Arktogeya Center, 2000), 48-52. 
40 Mark Bassin, “Eurasianism “Classical” and “Neo”: The Lines of Continuity,” in Beyond the 
Empire: Images of Russia in the Eurasian Cultural Context, ed. Tetsuo Mochizuki, (n4) 284. 
41 Anton Barbashin and Hannah Thoburn, “Putin’s Brain: Alexander Dugin and the 
Philosophy Behind Putin’s Invasion of Crimea,” (n5)3. 
Online-Reader: Joint Second Cycle Degree in International Relations: Europe in the Visegrad Perspective             32 
 
Material under copyright protection. 
 
neo-Eurasianism concept which absorbed the features of the aforementioned 
movements, adapting and modifying the overall conceptual approach.  
According to Dugin, Russia-Eurasia is a unique geographical and 
civilizational space which represents the legacy of the former Russian 
imperial and Soviet statehood.42 However, he insists on perceiving Russia-
Eurasia not only as a unified civilizational entity or geographical region but 
also as an ideological principle.43 The key role of this principle is to resist 
and fight the global unipolar dominance of the US which formed at the end 
of the Cold War. Eurasianists believe that Eurasianism should be a key 
platform in the struggle against the US-dominated West.44 
It is important to note that neo-Eurasianism as promoted by Dugin, relies 
heavily on the works of various political and military experts, such as 
McKinder, Mahan, Spykman and Haushofer, who contributed to the 
formation of the theory of geopolitics.  Proceeding from their works, he 
emphasized that there is a constant geopolitical struggle between the 
continental state or empire (tellurokratiya) and sea state or empire 
(thalassokrati)45.  Eurasianists adhere to the position that Russia represents 
tellurokratiya in its struggle against the US, thalassokrati, which tries to 
surround and pressure the most important geopolitical area called 
Heartland, the geographical area of modern Russian State.   
                                                          
42 Mark Bassin, “Eurasianism “Classical” and “Neo”: The Lines of Continuity,” in Beyond the 
Empire: Images of Russia in the Eurasian Cultural Context, ed. Tetsuo Mochizuki, (n4) 286. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Alexander Dugin, Basics of Geopolitics: Geopolitical Future of Russia, (n 18) 55. 
45 Ibid 
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Graph 1. “Anakonda” strategy. In black, the countries in the Eurasian 
continent under the strategic control of US Atlantism. According to neo-
Eurasianists, the key mission of American foreign policy is to bind its coastal 
belt (linkage doctrine) and expand its boundaries –Arrows show directions of 
geopolitical pressure of Atlantism46.   
They believe that the post-Cold War witnessed Russia’s tactical and 
strategic retreat and that that struggle has been taking place along Russia’s 
western borders and in its close neighborhood.47  
                                                          
46 Ibid 
47 Mark Bassin, “Eurasianism “Classical” and “Neo”: The Lines of Continuity,” in Beyond the 
Empire: Images of Russia in the Eurasian Cultural Context, ed. Tetsuo Mochizuki, (n4) 286. 
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Graph 2. Loss of ideological control and surrender of Russian imperial 
ambitions48 
 
 
Thus, neo-Eurasianists see it as a geopolitical imperative to counteract 
US-dominated Western actions aimed at weakening and encompassing 
Russia along its western borders and to liberate geopolitically and to expand 
what they call “Eurasian large spaces.”49  
                                                          
48 Ibid, 53. 
49 Ibid, 70. 
Online-Reader: Joint Second Cycle Degree in International Relations: Europe in the Visegrad Perspective             35 
 
Material under copyright protection. 
 
 
Graph 3. Neo-Eurasianism vectors of natural geopolitical expansion in 
Eurasianist large spaces. Three Eurasian spaces – (1) Western (EuroAfrica), 
(2) – Core (Russia-Eurasia) and Eastern(Pacific)50 
The 1825 triumph of conservatives over liberals and the end of the Cold 
War first created and then reinforced a neo-Eurasian perspective. Since 
1990s, it was followed by attempts to use neo-Eurasianism ideological 
concept to redefine Russia’s newly formed geopolitical position. At the heart 
of this neo-Eurasianism concept has been the belief in the West trying to 
encompass and diminish Russia’s role in the FSU states by simultaneously 
getting closer to its western borders.  
In order to counteract such activities along Russia’s western borders and 
regain its strategical significance in the region, the Kremlin has recently 
undertaken measures to integrate neo-Eurasianism ideas into the legislation 
and policies of Russia. These measures and their practical application as to 
Crimea are analyzed in the following chapter. 
3. Neo-Eurasianism concept and its use by the Russian political 
elites to support its ideological and geopolitical aspirations in 
Crimea 
3.1 Conceptualization and integration of neo-Eurasianism ideas into the 
legislation and policies of Russia  
 
                                                          
50 Ibid, 70. 
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Since the mid-1990s, neo-Eurasianists headed by Dugin have expanded 
their contacts and established good working relationships with Russian 
political elites.51 In the 2000s, the neo-Eurasianism concept received public 
recognition among many Russian intellectuals and political elites. It reached 
the point that some of the key figures in United Russia party openly 
acknowledged that their policy positions were mainly inspired by neo-
Eurasianism concept and the writings of Dugin.52  
Not surprising, the Kremlin worked on ideas to support its neo-
Eurasianism aspirations starting with the arrival of Vladimir Putin as 
President of the Russian Federation in 2000. Kagaranov, who served as 
Putin’s advisor, introduced a doctrine (later named after him) that implied 
the right of Russia to defend ethnic Russian minority rights in the FSU 
states.53 It also implied Russia’s ability and necessity to put pressure and 
assert influence over FSU states in which ethnic Russians could be subject to 
perceived discrimination.54  
Later on, this concept of foreign policy provided in the Kagaranov 
Doctrine was further enshrined in the Federal Law of Russia “On the State 
Policy of the Russian Federation in Relation to Compatriots Abroad” adopted 
in 1999.55 After that, the Kremlin went as far as to introduce the concept of 
the “Russian World” which has been promoted since 2006 and which has 
served as an integrative component of the above Doctrine.  
It implies the existence of a unique Russian civilization with multi-cultural 
and multi-religious features in order to weaken the national identities of 
citizens from FSU states; establish connection; and, promote the idea of 
Russia’s exclusivity and its ability to be FSU states’ natural political and 
                                                          
51 Andreas Umland, “Fascist Tendencies in Russia’s Political Establishment: The Rise of the 
International Eurasian Movement”, Russian Analytical Digest, no.60,  (2009): 13-14  
 http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-60-13-17.pdf.  
52 Paul Pryce, “Putin’s Third Term: The Triumph of Eurasianism?”Romanian Journal of 
European Affairs 13, no.1 (2013): 25,  http://ssrn.com/abstract=2233842 
53 Ibid, 33. 
54 ibid 
55 ibid 
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civilization center.56 One of the key purposes of this Kremlin approach was 
to “reintegrate the post-Soviet space under the leadership and domination 
of Russia.”57 
The Russian President Putin and his close circle were heavily influenced 
by neo-Eurasianism ideas, having actively pursued the formation of a 
Eurasian Union, which is being constructed on the basis provided by the 
cultural core of neo-Eurasianist Russia-Eurasia.58  This could be observed in 
the course of the 2012 presidential elections, when Putin began emphasizing 
the formation of a Eurasian Union with Russia and other post-Soviet states. 
Prior to his third presidential term, he was calling for the formation of a 
Eurasian Union to shape the geopolitical configuration of Eurasia, which 
could have a positive impact on a global scale.59 After his return to office in 
2012, he reiterated on several occasions this notion of a Eurasian Union 
operating at the core of the historical Eurasian space.60 
Within the last two years, neo-Eurasianism ideas regarding a Eurasian 
Economic Union and Russia’s leading role in Eurasian integration processes 
in the post-Soviet state were further incorporated into Russia’s key strategic 
documents. The central document is the Concept of Russian Foreign Policy 
adopted in 2013.61 Item 44 of the Concept sets as a top priority the goal to 
form a Eurasian Economic Union to serve as a complex integration model 
which would include all FSU states.62 In this regard, the Strategy on State 
                                                          
56 Marlene Laruelle, “The Russian World: Russia’s Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination,” 
Center on Global Interests (2015): 3-7, http://globalinterests.org/2015/05/26/the-russian-
world-russias-soft-power-and-geopolitical-imagination/.  
57 Witold Rodkiewicz and Jadwiga Rogoza, ”Potemkin Conservatism: an Ideological Tool of 
the Kremlin,”Center for Eastern Studies, no. 48 (2015): 21, 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/point-view/2015-02-03/potemkin-conservatism-
ideological-tool-kremlin 
58 Marek Menkiszak, “The Putin Doctrine: The Formation of a Conceptual Network for 
Russian Dominance in the Post-Soviet Area,” Center for Eastern Studies, no. 131 (2014): 2, 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2014-03-27/putin-doctrine-
formation-a-conceptual-framework-russian    
59 Paul Pryce, “Putin’s Third Term: The Triumph of Eurasianism?” (n 31), 27. 
60Kremlin, “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club”, last modified September 
19, 2013, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243. 
61 Security Council of the Russian Federation, “Concept of Foreign Policy of Russia”, last 
modified May 14, 2015, http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/2/25.html. 
62 Ibid 
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National Policy of the Russian Federation to 2025 and the Strategy of 
National Security of the Russian Federation to 2020, including the 
President’s Order from 7 May 2012 “On Measures of Implementation of 
Foreign Policy of Russia” contain similar provisions on the urgent need to 
deepen Eurasian integration processes and expand Russian influence in the 
post-Soviet space to counteract the US-dominated West represented by 
NATO in the region. For instance, Item 17 of the Strategy of National 
Security of Russian Federation to 2020 puts specific emphasis on the clear 
non-acceptance by Russia of NATO expansion towards its boundaries as this 
is considered a threat to the Russian strategic sphere of influence.63  
 
 
In their turn, the Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian 
Federation and Foundations of the Russian State Policy in the Sphere of 
International Information Security 2020 provide the basis for the further 
implementation of the neo-Eurasianism concept by enhancing the presence 
of Russia in the global informational space, protecting Russian informational 
space and promoting Russian cultural and spiritual values in Russia and in 
the post-Soviet space.64 At the same time, the Kremlin programs “On 
Building a Positive Image of the Russian Federation” and “Improving the 
Russian Information Security” were subsequently launched to counteract 
Western propaganda and promote neo-Eurasianism agenda of Russia being 
in the center of neo-Eurasiniasm integration processes.65 
Practical realization of these informational strategies aimed at promoting 
Russian neo-Eurasianism agenda was rested on a set of state-funded TV and 
                                                          
63 Security Council of the Russian Federation, “Strategy of National Security of Russian 
Federation to 2020”, last modified May 13, 2015, 
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/1/99.html. 
64 Security Council of the Russian Federation, “Doctrine of Information Security of the 
Russian Federation”, last modified May 13, 2015, 
http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/6/5.html. 
65 Jolanta Darczewska,”The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare,” Center for Eastern 
Studies, no. 42 (2014): 33, 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/sites/default/files/the_anatomy_of_russian_information_warfare.p
df.  
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radio channels and many online sources.66 The goal has been to mobilize 
information warfare technologies to unify the domestic public behind the 
adequacy of the new ambitious Russian foreign policy and to promote neo-
Eurasianism agenda with voiced concerns over the well-being of ethnic 
Russians in FSU states67.  
As a result, a Putin doctrine heavily based on neo-Eurasianism ideas has 
provided a “justification for efforts to restore the unity of the ‘Russian 
nation’ ”  through Eurasian integration or even through the creation of a 
single state spanning at least a part of the post-Soviet area.”68 Hence, any 
FSU state unwilling to pursue the pro-Russian neo-Eurasianism agenda was 
subjected to political and economic pressure often with, as in the case of 
Crimea, severe implications.  
3.2 Use of neo-Eurasianism concept to justify takeover of Crimea 
3.2.1 Introduction 
For a long time, Ukraine had been attempting to pursue a balanced 
geopolitical strategy, trying to satisfy both Russia and the West. However, 
when forced to choose a geopolitical path, the Ukrainian leadership chose to 
follow closer convergence with the West through pursuing an Association 
Agreement with the EU69.  
Nevertheless, under Russian pressure driven by neo-Eurasianism 
ambitions and Russia’s unwillingness to let Ukraine drift away from its 
Customs Union, former Ukrainian President Yanukovych was forced to 
suspend the signing procedure of the Association Agreement with the EU 
that had been planned for the end of November 2014.70 Such a decision 
                                                          
66 Ibid, 5. 
67 Ibid, 26.  
68 Marek Menkiszak, “The Putin Doctrine: The Formation of a Conceptual Network for 
Russian Dominance in the Post-Soviet Area,” (n36), 1. 
69 Robert Orttung, “Russia and the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement,” Russian Analytical 
Digest, no.142  (2014): 2, http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-142-2-4.pdf. 
70 Ibid 
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caused pro-European mass protests which led to ouster of former Ukrainian 
President Yanukovych and arrival of pro-Western government in Ukraine.71  
The Kremlin interpreted these developments in Ukraine as anti-
Russian sentiments which could threaten Russia’s plans in the post-Soviet 
space. As a result, relevant activities have been initiated to counteract 
drifting away of Ukraine from the Russian orbit. The most striking example 
was the onset of Russian takeover of Crimea.   
Below, the use of neo-Eurasianism instruments in Crimea will be 
demonstrated and their fallacy explained. After that, Russian 
reinterpretation of international law norms as to Crimea will be covered.  
3.2.2 Threat to Russian neo-Eurasianism agenda in Crimea posed by a 
newly elected Ukrainian government 
The arrival of a pro-Western government in Ukraine has threatened the 
implementation of Russia’s neo-Eurasianism project in the post-Soviet space 
aimed at restoring a new sort of integration structure led by Russia. The 
Ukrainian democratically-elected and pro-Western Government has also 
increased concerns among the Russian political elite worried about the 
possibility of such similar democratic scenario development in Russia72.  
In order to prevent Ukraine from pursuing closer integration with 
Europe and realizing that a newly formed Ukrainian government will conduct 
pro-Western policies, instead of participating in the Russia’s Eurasian 
project, Russia has decided to resort to indirect military force in the Crimean 
peninsula which is mostly populated by ethnic Russians73. In compliance 
with the Kremlin neo-Eurasianism strategy, this was done to prevent Crimea 
from falling within the NATO and EU sphere as Ukraine moves towards 
Europe and Euro-Atlantic associations, which was neither accepted nor 
                                                          
71 Maciej Bartkowski and Maria Stephan, “How Ukraine Ousted an Autocrat: The Logic of 
Civil Resistance,” last modified June 1, 2014, 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/en/publications/articles/how-ukraine-ousted-an-autocrat-
the-logic-of-civil-resistance. 
72 Boris Nemtsov, “Independent Expert Report Putin.War,” Putin.Itogi Reports (2015): 4 -7, 
http://www.putin-itogi.ru/putin-voina/.  
73 Janis Berzins, “Russia’s New Generation Warfare in Ukraine: Implications for Latvian 
Defense Policy,” Center for Security and Strategic Research, no.2, (2014): 3-7, 
http://www.naa.mil.lv/~/media/NAA/AZPC/Publikacijas/PP%2002-2014.ashx.  
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shared by Russia.74 The Kremlin believes that if Ukraine moves closer to the 
EU, it will also simultaneously integrate with NATO which will bring that 
organization closer to Russia’s western borders and threaten the overall 
implementation of their Eurasian project.75  
At the same time, the Kremlin refused to recognize the new pro-
Western Ukrainian government and accused it of discriminating against 
ethnic Russians in Crimea. In its position towards Crimea, the Kremlin 
resorted to the Kagaranov Doctrine on the protection of Russians who it 
purported were being threatened by the arrival of the pro-Western 
government in Ukraine. The Russian government constantly emphasized 
that the transitional Ukrainian government was dominated by nationalists 
who discriminated and threatened ethnic Russians living in Crimea and other 
parts of Ukraine.76 Through such allocations, it attempted to demonstrate 
the need to implement the Kagaranov Doctrine. 
This neo-Eurasian position did not reflect the real situation in 
Crimea.77 There were no clear indications of discrimination against ethnic 
Russians or other ethnic minorities in Crimea.78 Outside of the Russian 
informational space, there were no credible reports concerning the threat to 
both ethnic Russians and Russian-speaking population79.  
Firstly, the Kremlin emphasized that ethnic Russians and other ethnic 
groups were limited in their right to use the Russian language. This claim 
                                                          
74 Anton Bebler, “Freezing a Conflict: The Russian-Ukrainian Struggle over Crimea,” Israel 
Journal of Foreign Affairs 8, no. 3 (2014): 70, www.israelcfr.com/documents/8-3/anton-
bebler.pdf.  
75 Witold Rodkiewicz, Jadwiga Rogoza, Agata Wierzbowksa-Miazga,”Russian Policy towards 
Ukraine: Local Actions, Global Goals,” last modified August 20, 2014, 
http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2014-08-20/russian-policy-towards-
ukraine-local-actions-global-goals. 
76 Kremlin, “Address by President of the Russian Federation,” last modified March 18, 2014, 
http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603.  
77 Jasper Eitze and Michael Gleichmann,”Ten Myths to Justify Russian Policy in the Ukraine 
Crisis,” Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, no. 149 (2014): 1, 
http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_37844-1522-2-30.pdf?140612145651.  
78 Ibid, 3 
79 Ibid. 
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was greatly exaggerated and used to manipulate the population.80 Due to 
Russian-fueled support of pro-Russian Crimean separatists in the early 
1990s, the Ukrainian Parliament adopted the Law “On the Delineation of 
Power between Ukraine and the Republic of Crimea” which granted Crimea 
an autonomous state status to include comprehensive jurisdiction over a 
broad range of economic, social and other issues81. At the same time, the 
Constitution of the Republic of Crimea was adopted in 1995 and included 
provisions on equal official status and use of the Russian language in the 
Autonomy.82   
 
Graph 4. Percentage of residents who speak Russian as a native 
language in Crimea and Sevastopol83 These legal measures guaranteed the 
significance of the Russian language status in Crimea and counteracted 
Russian accusations as to the official status and the use of Russian language 
in Crimea.  Prior to Russian annexation of Crimea, Russian language status 
                                                          
80 NATO Strategic Communications Center of Excellence,”Analysis of Russia’s Information 
Campaign Against Ukraine,” NATO StratCOM COE Report, (2014): 14-15, 
http://www.stratcomcoe.org/~/media/SCCE/NATO_PETIJUMS_PUBLISKS_29_10.ashx.  
81 Elena Mizrokhi, “Russian “Separatism” in Crimea and NATO: Ukraine’s Big Hope, Russia’s 
Grand Gamble,” Quebec Institute for International Studies (2009):6, 
http://www.psi.ulaval.ca/fileadmin/psi/documents/Documents/Travaux_et_recherches/Crim
ee.pdf.  
82 Supreme Council of Ukraine, “Constitution of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea,” last 
modified December 23, 1998, http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/krym/show/rb611k002-95. 
83 Hashem Said, “Map: Russian Language Dominant in Crimea,” last modified March 15, 
2014, 
http://america.aljazeera.com/multimedia/2014/3/map-russian-the-
dominantlanguageincrimea.html. 
Online-Reader: Joint Second Cycle Degree in International Relations: Europe in the Visegrad Perspective             43 
 
Material under copyright protection. 
 
was the least concern for most Crimeans prior to the Russian annexation of 
Crimea.84  
 
Graph 5. Survey of most concerning issues in Crimea85 
Secondly, a Kremlin statement concerning the dominant position of 
extreme Ukrainian nationalists in the transitional Ukrainian government was 
false.86 There were ethnic Russian, Armenian and Jewish people in the 
Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers from various parts of Ukraine.87 Also, 
Ukrainian polls on presidential elections conducted in March and April 2014 
by IRI and GfK demonstrated that nationalist representatives enjoyed 
minimum support with less than 3 percent of potential votes.88 Such 
                                                          
84 International Republican Institute, “Public Opinion Survey Residents of the Autonomous 
Republic of Crimea: May16-30 2013,” 11, last modified May 2013, 
http://www.iri.org/sites/default/files/2013%20October%207%20Survey%20of%20Crimean
%20Public%20Opinion,%20May%2016-30,%202013.pdf .  
85 Ibid 
86 Deutsche Welle, “Far-right weighs on Ukraine government,” last modified March 26, 
2014, http://www.dw.de/far-right-weighs-on-ukraine-government/a-17519960.    
87 Ibid 
88 Ibid.  
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situation was then followed by presidential elections that took place on 25th 
May 2014 in which pro-European democratic candidate Poroshenko was 
elected president.89 
In spite of this, a broad range of information warfare technologies 
have been actively used by Russian official institutions, including Russian-
funded media, to raise awareness of the rise of Ukrainian radical nationalists 
in Kyiv after the ouster of former Ukrainian President Yanukovych.90 It was 
done to promote the neo-Eurasianism agenda of sustaining “Russian World” 
idea to keep Kremlin neo-Eurasianism project going.  
Using these techniques, the Kremlin laid the foundation for pushing 
self-determination of the Crimean people, following referendum in Crimea 
on accession to Russia, backed up by accelerating increase of Russian 
military presence in Crimea which was initially denied by Kremlin.  
Below, light will be thrown upon the brief history of separatism in 
Crimea, use of neo-Eurasianism approach towards a right to self-
determination and staged referendum that decided the fate of Crimeans in 
favor of neo-Eurasianism project of Russia.    
3.2.3 Crimean accession to Russia: referendum, self-determination and 
Russian act of aggression 
At the beginning of 1990s, one could see some early signs of Russia 
reorienting its foreign policy dominated by pro-Western Atlantic orientation 
towards a more neo-Eurasianism approach, which was reflected in the 
position on backing pro-Russian separatists in Crimea. Moscow supported 
and controlled the actions of separatists and maintained a contingent 
                                                          
89 Paul Sonne, “Poroshenko Declares Victory in Ukraine Presidential Election,” last modified 
May 25,2014,  
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304811904579583413180447156.  
90 Jolanta Darczewska,”The Anatomy of Russian Information Warfare,” (n 43) 36. 
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civilians and intelligence officers in Crimea.91 This region has always been 
under significant influence of Russian or pro-Russian officials.92  
Nevertheless, Russian authorities only started to publicize demands 
concerning the return of Crimea and Sevastopol to Russia while 
simultaneously condemning the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine in the end of 
1990s.93  
However, Russian post-Communist elites had to reduce the pressure 
due to Ukrainian concessions as to granting an autonomous status to 
Crimea and their preoccupation with stabilizing economic situation in the 
country, simultaneously addressing looming Chechen separatist crisis in the 
Russian Caucasus territories, which led to the reduction of Russian 
separatist support in Crimea and Russian aspirations to return Crimea back 
to Russia.94 It was also influenced by the fact that in 1997, Russia and 
Ukraine signed an agreement on the Black Sea Fleet lease which granted 
Russia a right to keep its naval base in Crimea and lease numerous facilities 
of Ukrainian Fleet.95  
With the arrival Putin and his intensification of neo-Eurasianism 
project in the post-Soviet space, pressure on Ukraine was increased. This 
situation was especially evident when Ukraine stated in 2008 that the Black 
Sea Fleet lease wouldn’t be renewed and that the Russian Fleet would have 
to leave Sevastopol in 2017.96  
Pro-Russian President Yanukovych had signed a 25-year prolongation 
of Black Sea Fleet lease until 2042. His departure from power threatened 
the lease agreement and triggered a subsequent intensification of the 
Kremlin’s neo-Eurasianism activities towards returning Crimea back to the 
“Russian World.” His departure has also led to active pro-Russian separatism 
                                                          
91 Anton Bebler, “Freezing a Conflict: The Russian-Ukrainian Struggle over Crimea,” (n 52) 
65.  
92 Tatiana Buda, “Russo-Ukrainian Relations: Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet,” 
International Affairs Review 19, no.1 (2010): 2, http://www.iar-gwu.org/node/183. 
93 Elena Mizrokhi, “Russian “Separatism” in Crimea and NATO: Ukraine’s Big Hope, Russia’s 
Grand Gamble,” (n58)8.  
94 Ibid,11.  
95 Tatiana Buda, “Russo-Ukrainian Relations: Sevastopol and the Black Sea Fleet,” (n 69) 4. 
96 Ibid, 2.  
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activities backed up by neo-Eurasiniasm propaganda concerning the rise to 
power of Ukrainian “fascists” in Kyiv who would want to terrorize and 
repress ethnic Russians. Kagaranov’s Doctrine was used together with 
increased rhetoric concerning the urgent need to integrate Crimea back into 
the “Russian World.” 
This Russian script served as a pretext for a covert military takeover 
of Crimea which was well-prepared and carried out over a three week 
period97. Afterwards, a referendum on Crimea’s reunification with Russia 
was hastily conducted on March 16. This voting was then followed by 
Crimea’s declaration of independence and request to join Russia on March 
17. Immediately after this request, a treaty on Crimea’s incorporation into 
the Russia Federation was signed in the Russian capital of Moscow.98   
Also, apart from relying on the use of the Kagaranov’s Doctrine, 
Russia additionally referred on numerous occasions to the principle of self-
determination embedded in Article 1(2) of the UN Charter to justify the 
referendum in Crimea99. Putin and other leading Russian political figures 
were referring to the right of self-determination of Crimea by drawing a 
correlation with Kosovo.100  
Kremlin neo-Eurasian information propaganda had been spreading 
misinformation concerning the “rise of fascism” in Kyiv, looming threat of 
repressions against ethnic Russians, including transparency and accordance 
with international and domestic law of a Crimea referendum, which was 
organized without any Russian assistance. This misinformation was 
disseminated through Russian state-funded TV, radio and newspaper and 
only served to distort information regarding the legal status of Crimea and 
the Crimean right to self-determination. Such misinformation also worked to 
cover up Russian military presence on the ground.101  
                                                          
97 Anton Bebler, “Freezing a Conflict: The Russian-Ukrainian Struggle over Crimea,” (n 52) 
66.  
98 Ibid, 68. 
99 United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” accessed May 13, 20015, 
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml. 
100 Kremlin, “Address by President of the Russian Federation,” (n 54).  
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First of all, there was no evidence of human rights violations against 
ethnic Russians or any other ethnic minorities residing in Crimea.102 This 
claim was a completely artificial assumption that would serve the annexation 
purposes within the framework of the Kagaranov Doctrine. In fact, the 
human rights situation in Crimea has significantly deteriorated since the 
Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014. Russian authorities have limited free 
expression and intimidated people who have been against any Russian 
actions in Crimea103. 
Second of all, the Crimean referendum and subsequent secession to 
Russia through the approval of Crimean annexation by the Russian 
Parliament clearly violated the Constitution of Ukraine and international law. 
Article 73 of the Constitution of Ukraine allows the matters of territory 
alterations to be decided only by an all Ukraine referendum.104 In the case 
of international law, by annexing Crimea Russia violated Article 2(4) of the 
UN Charter, Principles 1-5 of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and a set of 
bilateral agreements between Russia and Ukraine. These documents contain 
provisions on the prohibition of the threat or use of force against territorial 
integrity of other States, respect of their territorial integrity etc.105106  
Specific attention should be given to the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, 
the 1997 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the Russian 
Federation and Ukraine and the 2003 Treaty on Russian-Ukrainian border. 
The 1994 Budapest Memorandum was signed to provide security assurances 
by Russia, US, France, China and the UK in exchange for Ukraine giving up 
its nuclear arsenal.107According to Articles 2-3 of 1997 Treaty of Friendship 
                                                          
102 Jasper Eitze and Michael Gleichmann,”Ten Myths to Justify Russian Policy in the Ukraine 
Crisis,”(n55)3-5. 
103 Human Rights Watch, “Rights in Retreat in Crimea,” last modified November 17, 2014, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/11/17/crimea-human-rights-decline.  
104The United States Justice Department, “Constitution of Ukraine from December 8, 2004,” 
accessed May 13, 2015, 
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/eoir/legacy/2013/11/08/constitution_14.pdf .  
105 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, “1975 Helsinki Final Act,” accessed 
May 13, 2015, https://www.osce.org/mc/39501?download=true  
106 United Nations, “Charter of the United Nations,” (n 76). 
107 Amanda Paul, “Crimea One Year after Russian Annexation,” European Policy Centre 
(2015): 1, 
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and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and Ukraine, Russia and 
Ukraine agreed to respect the territorial integrity and inviolability of the 
borders of each country.108 In its turn, based on the 2003 Treaty on 
Russian-Ukrainian border, Russia acknowledged the fact that Crimea is an 
inseparable part of Ukraine.109  
And finally, the referendum took place with Russian military presence in 
Crimea, which meant a de facto military occupation of Crimea by Russia 
aimed at fulfilling the right of Crimean people to self-determination in the 
course of referendum.110 The presence of Russian military personnel prior to 
conducting the referendum was later publically acknowledged by Russian 
President Putin, which meant an acknowledgement of Russia’s annexation of 
Crimea and of the President’s personal involvement.111   
Additionally, it was completely inappropriate to back Crimea’s right to 
self-determination by referring to the Kosovo example.112 There was no 
comparison between former Yugoslavia and Crimea in terms of human rights 
violations as there was no ethnic cleansing of the Russian population in 
Crimea.113  
4. Further possible implications for Ukraine and other western 
neighbors of Russia 
After Crimea was annexed by Russia, the Kremlin resumed its 
activities to respond to Ukraine for not complying with the Kremlin’s neo-
Eurasianism project by destabilizing the situation in eastern Ukraine. Not 
surprisingly, neo-Eurasianism ideologists headed by Dugin, together with a 
number of leading Russian political figures, forwarded a proposal to 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
http://www.epc.eu/documents/uploads/pub_5432_crimea_one_year_after_russian_annexa
tion.pdf.  
108 Supreme Council of Ukraine, “1997 Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the 
Russian Federation and Ukraine,” accessed May 13, 2015, 
http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/643_006. 
109 Boris Nemtsov, “Independent Expert Report Putin.War,”(n 50) 15 
110 Anton Bebler, “Freezing a Conflict: The Russian-Ukrainian Struggle over Crimea,” (n 52) 
66. 
111 Boris Nemtsov, “Independent Expert Report Putin.War,”(n 50) 15 
112 Tom Nichols, “The Crimea Crisis and The Abuse of History: Why Historical Analogies Are 
Mostly Nonsense,” accessed May 12, 2015, http://thefederalist.com/2014/03/12/the-
crimea-crisis-and-the-abuse-of-history/.  
113 Ibid 
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introduce a Little Russia State (Malorussia) formed from the southern-
eastern and central parts of Ukraine, including the capital Kyiv. In the 
opinion of Russian elites, “Little Russia” would then decide its own fate 
regarding uniting with Russia and the “Russian World.”114 Incidentally, in 
2014, the term “Little Russia” appeared in Russian President Putin’s speech 
about the historical background of this territory being governed by the 
tsarist governorate under Catherine the Great in the late 18th century.115  
 
Graph 6. Malorussia (called as Little Russia) as seen by Eurasianism 
ideologists and Russian political elites116 
Russia resorted to using the Kagaranov Doctrine on protecting ethnic 
Russians to assert its power in the FSU states along its western borders in 
order to defend the “Russian World”.  In some extreme cases, like Crimea, 
Putin resorted to illegal annexation achieved by military occupation and 
                                                          
114 Novaya Gazeta, “It Seems Right to Initiate the Annexation of the Eastern Regions of 
Ukraine to Russia”, accessed May 13, 2015, http://en.novayagazeta.ru/politics/67447.html.  
115 Paul Sonne, “With “Novorossiya,” Putin Plays the Name Game With Ukraine”, last 
modified September 1, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/articles/with-novorossiya-putin-plays-
the-name-game-with-ukraine-1409588947. 
116 Independent News Portal, “Federation of Little Russia: New Entity on the Territory of 
Ukraine?” accessed  May 13, 2015, http://www.noi.md/ru/news_id/34924\.  
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justified by the need to protect ethnic Russians. However, as some experts 
note, “Russian speaking” is not the same as “Ethnic Russian”117.  
 
Graph. 7. “Russian speaking” is not the same as “Ethnic Russian”. There are 
almost no regions in Europe with a majority of Ethnic Russian population, 
including eastern Ukraine118 
There are almost no regions in Europe with a majority of Ethnic 
Russian population, including eastern Ukraine119. Nevertheless, such 
situation doesn’t prevent the Kremlin from trying to regain its influence in 
the post-Soviet space. Hence, in cases of nearby states with either European 
or Euro-Atlantic aspirations, the Kremlin attempts to put economic, political 
and even military pressure in some extreme cases of targeted states utterly 
deviating from pro-Kremlin foreign policies. Such actions are being 
undertaken to prevent FSU states from drifting away from various forms of 
post-Soviet integration, pursued by the Kremlin. 
 
                                                          
117 One Europe, “Ethnic Russian Population in Eastern Europe,” accessed May 13, 2015, 
http://one-europe.info/eurographics/ethnic-russian-population-in-eastern-europe . 
118 ibid 
119 ibid 
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5. Conclusion 
After the USSR collapse, Russia lacked an ideological concept that 
could redefine its geopolitical position in the post-Cold War world. In the end 
of 1990s, the neo-Eurasianism ideological concept gained broad prominence 
among Russian intelligentsia and post-Soviet state officials as it emphasized 
the uniqueness Russian civilization and its drastic contrasts with a perceived 
hostile West.  
With the arrival of Putin to the Russian Presidential office, an 
opportunity to implement neo-Eurasian ideas in practice arose and 
subsequently led to active steps undertaken by the Kremlin to rebuild the 
Russian State within the boundaries of the Former Soviet Union and to unify 
Eurasian space in security, economic and political terms.  
Implementation of this neo-Eurasianism concept in practice led to the 
first redrawing of the borders of Europe since the end of World War II as a 
result of the illegal annexation of Crimea. Above analysis has demonstrated 
a set of policy, legal and informational instruments used by Kremlin to 
implement its neo-Eurasianism agenda in efficient and effective manner 
within short period of time. It has also demonstrated the fallacy and 
inadequacy of arguments used by Kremlin to justify its annexation of 
Crimea.  
The Russian leadership has steadily pursued policies inspired by neo-
Eurasian ideologists to justify its intensification of geopolitical pressure in 
the post-Soviet space aimed at subordinating and controlling FSU states. 
Among these policies are the Russian military preparations against the 
illusionary threat of the US-led West’s attempting to encircle and 
subsequently destroy Russia, Kagaranov doctrine on protecting ethnical 
Russians in nearby states and strong desire to rebuild previous Russian 
might and glory within security, economic and military terms. 
Proceeding from the analysis of neo-Eurasianism concept and its 
selective application by Russian leadership, it seems that Kremlin offensive 
policies will not be limited to Crimean case. It is highly likely that it will be 
resumed in the post-Soviet space in the short-term perspective.  
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Such Russian activities have put Russia on the dangerous economic 
and political isolation track which has only adversely affected it both 
domestically and internationally. Hence, only in case of the regime change 
towards more pro-Western one, it will become possible to expect the “thaw” 
in relations with the West with the following suspension of provocative and 
offensive activities along Russian western borders that have been going on 
until the present time. It is also not clear if Crimea will be returned in case 
of Russian regime change due to rejection of such possibility on the part of 
key opposition political figures in Russia. 
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Lone wolves and cyber terrorism. 
Conceptualizing security in the era of permanent uncertainty 
 
Abstract: 
 
In this analysis I seek to examine a paradigm shift in contemporary 
international security studies. To understand and explain recently observed 
escalation of international security threats stemming from an interplay 
between rise of religious and/or ideological extremism taking form of 
transnational terrorist networks and eruption of cyber terrorism it requires a 
major paradigm shift in conceptualization of security in terms of inner-state 
rather than inter-state security complex. 
Unlike the Cold War security dilemma based on bipolar balance of fear 
founded on nuclear arms race between two opposing blocks of states we 
have been recently confronted with state-society conflict in the myriad of its 
symptoms. Consequently, an emphasis on societal dimensions of 
international security complex is indispensable. Thus, we can observe an 
ever growing interest both in scholarly debate as well as in policy-making in 
transcending state-centered, neo-realist security paradigm.        
In what follows I will outline a contemporary debate on a sociological 
turn in contemporary security studies as set against an empirical case 
studies analysis of lone wolf and cyber terrorism. 
 
Key words: international security, lone wolf terrorism, cyber terrorism, 
securitization of international relations 
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Sociological turn in international security research in times of 
paradigm confusion 
 
Sociologization of international security studies has been especially visible in 
the post 9/11 international relations theory. Neo-realist preoccupation with 
power relations between state actors, physical and rational dimensions of 
security threats have been challenged by social constructivist emphasis 
given onto study of social identity transformations, geopolitics of emotions 
and interactionist dynamics of role playing within security environment. As 
Theo Farell referring to Alexander Wendt explains in 2002 already: “The 
traditional focus on power and politics in security studies has been 
challenged robustly this decade by the development of ideational 
approaches to the subject. With some confusion, the labels ‘constructivism’ 
and ‘culturalism’ have been used to describe this ideational turn in security 
studies. Constructivism and culturalism are both concerned with the impact 
of norms on international security. Norms are intersubjective beliefs about 
social and natural world that define actors, their situations, and the 
possibilities of actions. Norms are intersubjective in they are beliefs rooted 
and reproduced through social practice.”120  
Complimentary to Farrell’s diagnosis of constructivist turn in security studies 
we find Sjösted’s account on changing nature of the research paradigm in 
security studies: “many previous studies on threat construction employ 
mono-causal and single-level forms of explanation, and generally link a 
threat-image to a particular sender (for example an antagonistic state) […] 
a structured but broad analytical framework can be applied to investigate 
different kinds of threat images and thus facilitate an analysis that better 
                                                          
120 Theo Farrell, Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program, 
International Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 (Spring, 2002), p.49 
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accounts for and explains the complexities of a threat construction 
process”121    
One of the examples of this sociological turn in security studies 
research paradigm is Martin Schatzky’s account on the invasion of non-state 
actors on international arena:   “The intrusion of the non-state actor in a 
world dominated by the rivalry between states represents a new aspect of 
worldwide reality which needs to be addressed. The incorporation of the 
non-state actor in the security dilemma, at the same time, urges an upgrade 
of the conceptualization of the enemy in International Relations. The non-
state actor transcends the classic national frontiers, and also finds its 
identity outside sovereign state limits. This may cause a newly found friction 
between states, a feature which became much too evident after the 
terrorist´s attacks of 9/11.”122 
Interestingly, we find a strong correlation between academic diagnosis 
and policy-making. Schatzky’s diagnoses that “the emergence of non-state 
actors, which resulted in new types of enemies, urges to look at the security 
dilemma thought out by the realist school in a new light.”123 Consequently, 
“current events like the so-called ‘War on Terror’ and the new international 
security agenda of different states, which now target to combat primarily 
non-state threats to their national security, forces the view of a security 
dilemma that includes the non-state actor in its dynamic.”124  
 
Similarly, we find Barack Obama urging to see importance of new 
media and rise of new terrorism:  “The high quality videos, the online 
magazines, the use of social media, terrorist Twitter accounts – it’s all 
designed to target today’s young people online, in cyberspace.”125 
                                                          
121 Roxanna Sjösted, Talking Threats. The Social Construction of National Security in Russia 
and the United States. Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis/Report Department of Peace and 
Conflict Research 2010/91, p.14 
122 Martín Schatzky, FLACSO-ISA 2014, The construction of the “other” in International 
Relations: a conceptualization of the enemy in the post 9/11 scenario and the amplified 
security dilemma, p.1 
123 Ibid. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Cited in: Adam Hofman and Yoram Schweitzer, “Cyber Jihad in the Service of the Islamic 
State (ISIS)”, Strategic Assessment, Volume 18, No. 1 April 2015/71 p.1 
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Along with this way of reasoning we may refer to the British National 
Security Strategy of 2010 specifying British priority risks: “National Security 
Council judges that currently – and for the next five years – the four higher 
priority risks are those arising from: international terrorism, including 
through the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) 
materials and of terrorism related to Northern Ireland, cyber-attack, 
including by other states and by organized crime and terrorists, international 
military crises and major accidents or natural hazards.”126 
Strong correlation between academic diagnosis and policy making 
concerning sociologization of security threats underline major paradigm shift 
in conceptualization of the very notion of security as well a notion of 
warfare. As illustrated by Bachmann and Gunneriusson referring to Lamp 
and Hoffman: “The use of cyber and the kinetic responses to international 
terrorism have increasingly blurred the traditional distinction between war 
and peace. Such a distinction was replaced by the recognition of a notion of 
new, multimodal threats, which have little in common with past examples of 
interstate aggression. These new threats to global peace and security 
seriously threaten our Western way of life within the content of the present 
‘steady state’ environment at home (and before the backdrop of the ongoing 
asymmetric conflicts in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mali, Somalia, Kenya and 
Yemen). These new wars along asymmetric lines of conflict constitute a 
dichotomous choice between counterinsurgency and conventional war and 
challenge traditional concepts of war and peace.”127 
Just like did the constructivist paradigm revolt predominantly neo-
realist discourse in security studies especially after 9/11 so it did trigger a 
massive critique. Main point of criticism has been its neopositivist research 
methodology. As noticed by Hofferberth and Weber:” the intended liberating 
move of constructivist norm research against the rationalist and materialist 
straightjacket has proven to be rather half-hearted and has ultimately not 
provided much elbow room. Committed to a neopositivist methodology, the 
approach for studying norms proposed by social constructivists 
                                                          
126 A Strong Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The National Security Strategy, 2010, 
www.official-documents.gov.uk, p.11 
 
127 Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, Hakan Gunneriusson, Hybrid Wars: 21st Century New 
Threats to Global Peace and Security, p.2  
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operationalised norms as variables in order to prove their regulative effects 
on the behaviour of states.”128  
In consequence Hofferberth and Weber underline that neopositivist 
methodology leads to inconsistency in norm research with regard to 
relations between norms and action.129 As they claim: “adherence to a 
neopositivist methodology has led constructivist norm research to 
conceptualise the relation between norms and action in a way that does not 
logically follow from its own theoretical arguments. If interests are malleable 
and subject to continuous redefinition, as argued by norm constructivists, 
one would expect that the same applies to norms too. Still, norms were 
theorised as structural givens with an unequivocal meaning. Instead of 
taking the intersubjectivity and malleability of social phenomena seriously, 
constructivist norm researchers treated norms as fixed entities existing 
independently of actors and their interpretations. If they are not mere 
prisoners of material circumstances and if reality is what they make of it, 
one has to conceive of them as being equipped with the capacity to interpret 
their surroundings and to choose different courses of action. In contrast, 
norm constructivism ultimately reduced agency to the question of whether a 
static norm had already been internalised or not.”130    
     
Key contribution to sociologization of contemporary security studies 
can be found in research on so called lone wolf terrorism along with 
research on new media and terrorism.  In what follows I will discuss some of 
the examples of recent research on the phenomena of lone wolf terrorism 
and cyberterrorism and their impact on security studies paradigm shift.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
128 Matthias Hofferberth and Christian Weber, Lost in translation: a critique of 
constructivist norm research, Journal of International Relations and Development 
(2015) 18, 75–103 
 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
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Lone wolves and cyber terrorism in security studies research 
 
Lone wolves and cyber terrorism have been recently a subject of 
extensive research, which reflects rapid growth of attention to those forms 
of security threats. As exemplified in the Polish Institute of International 
Affairs Strategic File on cyberterrorism: “If the seriousness of a given 
‘emerging security threat’ is measured by the number of recent analyses 
devoted to it or the proliferation of experts studying it, then cyber-threats 
must now surpass the dangers of offline terrorism and energy security. 
While all issues ‘cyber’ attract a high level of policymaker attention, another 
threat seems to have been forgotten and marginalized: cyberterrorism. To 
an extent, the evolution of cyberterrorism mirrors that of ‘regular’ terrorism, 
which erupted as the ‘weapon of the weak,’ and after a state-sponsored 
phase seems to be returning to its sub-state or even ‘lone wolf’ roots. 
Cyber-threats, on the other hand, originally of a sub-state nature, are now 
mostly in the domain of state entities that have not yet made the decision to 
launch state-sponsored cyberterrorism.”131 
 Gabriel Weimann explains why does lone wolf terrorism in cyberspace 
trigger so much attention: “Lone-wolf terrorism is the fastest growing form 
kind of terrorism. Before 9/11, the men who went to terrorist camps and to 
Jihadi mosques where radical Imams preached jihad were seen as 
constituting the largest terror threat. Since 9/11, a gradual change has 
occurred.  The real threat now comes from the single individual, the ‘lone 
wolf’, living next door, radicalized on the internet, and plotting strikes in the 
dark. A lone wolf is an individual or a small group of individuals who uses 
traditional terrorist tactics – including the targeting of civilians – to achieve 
explicitly political or ideological goals, but who acts without membership in, 
or cooperation with, an official or unofficial terrorist organization, cell, or 
group.”132   
                                                          
131 Andrzej Kozłowski, Kacper Rękawek, Marcin Terlikowski, Cyberterrorism: The Threat 
That Never Was, No. 4 (40), February 2014, PISM, p.1 
132 Gabriel Weimann, Lone Wolves in Cyberspace, Journal of Terrorism Research, Volume 3, 
Issue 2 (2012)  
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The importance of new media for escalation of cyberterrorism calls for 
ever more emphasis given to an interplay between lone-wolf terrorism and 
expansion of new social media. As Weimann argues in his seminal analysis 
of Lone Wolves in Cyberspace: “the gap between the perceived threat of 
lone-wolf terrorism on the one hand and the almost exclusive scholarly 
focus on group-based terrorism on the other indicates the need for more 
conceptual and empirical examinations of lone-wolf terrorism. One 
perspective highlighted in this article is the use of online communication 
platforms.  In nature, wolves do not hunt alone: they hunt in packs. As this 
study demonstrates, lone-wolf terrorists are not really alone. They are 
recruited, radicalized, taught, trained and directed by others. Analysis of all 
recent cases, reports and studies of these individual attackers reveals the 
importance to lone wolves of online platforms, ranging from websites to new 
social media (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and more).”133 
Weimann’s account on lone-wolf cyberterrorism is complimentary to  
research on cyber-jihad. The importance of cyber-jihad as major tool of 
ideological and operational activity of the ISIS has been emphasized both 
the ISIS itself and researchers. Cyber-jihad has been heralded by the Salafi-
jihadi networks especially as major propaganda and operational platform in 
the aftermath of 9/11 already. As explained by Schweitzer and Hoffman: 
“While the concept of cyber jihad has evolved over the years, the use of 
online space by jihad organizations per se is not a new phenomenon: a 
popular manual published already in 2003 extolled the ‘electronic jihad,’ 
which includes participating in forums and hacking websites with the aim of 
participating in the media battle against the West and the perceived 
enemies of Islam in the Arab world. This manual and others attest to the 
tremendous importance that Salafi-jihadi organizations attribute to online 
space, which enables them to circumvent the barriers placed before them by 
various state institutions and security organizations and disseminate the 
message calling for a violent struggle against the West and the “infidel” Arab 
                                                          
133 Ibid.  
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regimes without interruption and faster and more easily than ever 
before.”134 
  To conclude, it needs to be emphasized that rapidly changing security 
environment, especially an increasing importance of digital threats to 
security reinforces both paradigm shift and policy-making transformations 
along the lines of non-state actor security risks. 
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Human security and migration in Africa 
 
Abstract:  
With on-going humanitarian and refugee crises, migration and human 
security have become intrinsically connected. The push factors and human 
security issues, which have been stimulating uncontrolled migratory flows 
have become dangerous not only to the regional, but principally individual 
level of security. This article employs the human security concept, as a 
framework for analysis of the African insecurity environment. In doing so, it 
identifies main threats to human security and potential push factors for 
forced and irregular migration in Africa. The paper concludes that human 
security perspective on migration should first and foremost focus on security 
of migrants, as the victims of persistent threats and structural violence. 
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Introduction 
 Migration135 is a well researched phenomenon, but yet highly 
emotional. It is often associated with economic wellbeing, cultural exchange 
but also refuge from physical harm or emotional abuse. Migration is also 
associated with fear. Either on the part of the migrants or receiving 
societies, there is always a perceived element of risk or danger to collective 
or individual security.  
 This process of securitization of migration is ongoing and wieldy 
accepted. Western societies tend to subscribe all kinds of new threats to the 
African and Middle Eastern136 immigrants, who in their minds constitute the 
fifth biggest security threat to Europe. What is often missed is the root 
cause and individual dimension of this phenomenon. The fate of people that 
were forced out from their homes by unacceptable and dangerous 
situations.  
 These situations often deeply affect what is now called human 
security – a comprehensive set of conditions under which a human being 
feels secure. The African continent constitutes one of the most 
unaccommodating and dangerous environments in the world. African 
countries are regularly classified as most underdeveloped and unstable 
socio-political systems with the biggest numbers of conflict-related events 
and internally displaced persons (IDPs). African migrants operate under 
conditions, which pose a persistent threat to their individual security and 
generate a powerful push for mobility.  
 The article aims to apply human security concept in relation to 
push factors generating migratory flows in Africa. In order to do so, it will 
analyze some of the most persistent and interlocking insecurities on the 
African continent, explaining their intertwining nature and impact on 
individual well being. The article will focus not only on root causes and push 
factors, but also on the individual security of migrants. 
                                                          
135 I will use the concept of migrant as a general category including immigrants, asylum-
seekers, and refugees. 
136 European Commission, “Europe’s Attitudes towards Security”, Special Eurobarometer 
432 (2015). 
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Conceptualization of human security 
 
The end of Cold War led to emergence of previously unknown or 
disregarded challenges and threats to international security. New actors and 
interests surfaced on the arena and started to play an active role in shaping 
perceptions and approaches towards new world order. At the same time, it 
became evident that the state-centred security, as well as rational and 
traditional conceptions of threats were not sufficient to secure the existence 
of modern societies.  
This shift of paradigm called for development of new model of thinking 
about security. The one that could comprehensively respond to the changing 
nature of conflict and new threats such as terrorism, forced displacement, 
climate change, extreme poverty and intra-state wars. 
In response to this new security environment the United Nations 
Development Programme proposed a concept of human security. The 
approach emphasized the importance of physical safety, as well as 
empowerment of individuals137. This new security concept reoriented the 
focus from territoriality and integrity of borders of the state to the 
population, which lives within those borders138.  
The most straightforward definition of human security can be 
described as an absence of insecurities and threats or freedom from fear 
and want139. In that sense, to be secure is to be free from physical abuse, 
violence, persecution or death as well as social, economic and 
                                                          
137 C. Fuentes, F. R. Aravena, Promoting Human Security: Ethical, Normative and 
Educational Frameworks in Latin America and the Caribbean, UNESCO,  Paris 2005. 
138 S. Alkire, A Conceptual Framework for Human Security, Working Paper, CRISE 
(Department of International Development), University of Oxford 2003, p. 10. 
139 UNDP, Human Development Report 1994. New York 1994, at 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf, 29 
July 2015 
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environmental instability140. The concept of human security is directly 
connected to the ability to identify and mitigate any threats that could harm 
individual or societal wellbeing. It includes helping victims to deal with 
insecurities and consequences of extreme poverty and development, 
protracted conflicts, human rights violations and any sort of abuse. 
There is an extensive critical debate in the academia trying to refine 
human security as a theory and analytical tool. Over the last two decades 
the literature produced over thirty definitions of the concept reflecting upon 
its relation to sovereignty, normative and analytical values, psychological 
wellbeing, international relations, ethics, war and peace141. In 2004 Security 
Dialogue launched an influential special issue, which included voices of 21 
academics and experts, who commented on the status quo of human 
security debate, its applicability and main challenges. In his summarising 
article, Taylor Owen stated that even though human security can be 
analysed and discussed in dozens of perspectives, the dichotomy between 
narrow and broad definition of human security is still central to the debate.  
 
Narrow definition of human security calls for pragmatism, conceptual 
clarity and analytical rigour proposing a description focused on freedom 
from fear, including physical abuse and violent threats142. What is 
characteristic in the narrow conceptualization is its focus on violence and 
traditional security threats.  
                                                          
140 D. Chandler, “Resilience and human security: The post-interventionist paradigm”, 
Security Dialogue vol. 43 no. 3 (2012). 
141 Human Security Centre, Human Security Report 2005: War and Peace in the 21st 
Century, Oxford University Press 2005; R. Paris,“Human security: Paradigm shift or hot 
air?”, International security vol. 26 no. 2 (2001); A. Suhrke, “Human security and the 
interests of states”, Security Dialogue vol. 30 no. 3 (1999).; L. Axworthy. “Canada and 
human security: the need for leadership”. International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global 
Policy Analysis vol. 52 no. 2 (1997); C. Thomas, P. Wilkin (eds.), Globalization, Human 
Security, and the African Experience, Lynne Rienner Publishers 1999; S. Tadjbakhsh,  A. 
Chenoy, Human security: Concepts and implications, Routledge 2007.; M. Kaldor, Human 
security, Polity 2007. 
142 S. Alkire, A Conceptual Framework for Human Security, Working Paper, CRISE 
(Department of International Development), University of Oxford 200. 
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According to Keith Krause human security theoreticians need to 
establish the lowest common denominator of individual insecurities and 
vulnerabilities that can be commonly associated with the term security143. In 
his view, the broad definition of human security is ultimately nothing more 
than a shopping list or a catalogue of bad things that can happen144. With 
lack of normative rigour everyone can put a label of security on every issue 
that has a potential to harm individuals145.  
Building on that view, Neil MacFarlane points out that broadening the 
scope of human security is inefficient. It stretches the concept beyond its 
practical applicability146. He argues in favour of the narrow 
conceptualization, suggesting that it allows for prioritization of actions that 
actually enhance security of individuals who are living in dangerous 
conditions147.  Following this line of though Fen Hampson recommends that 
human security should be defined as an absence of threat to core human 
values, including physical safety of the individual, basic liberties, needs and 
interests148.  
 
On the other hand, supporters of the broad understanding of human 
security argue that security means more safety from harm and freedom 
from violent conflicts. Here, the main argument is that human security 
should push towards thinking beyond physical threats, comprehensively 
focusing on interlinked issues that affect or have a potential to affect 
wellbeing of individuals (i.e. cultural security, identity security, psychological 
wellbeing etc.)  
                                                          
143 K. Krause, “The key to a powerful agenda, if properly delimited”, Security Dialogue vol. 
35 no. 3 (2004) p. 368. 
144 Ibid. 
145 T. Owen, “Human security-Conflict, critique and consensus: colloquium remarks and a 
proposal for a threshold-based definition”, Security Dialogue vol. 35 no. 3 (2004). 
146 S.N. MacFarlane, “A useful concept that risks losing its political salience”, Security 
Dialogue vol. 35 no. 3 (2004). 
147 Ibid. 
148 O.F. Hampson, “A concept in need of a global policy response”, Security Dialogue vol. 35 
no. 3 (2004). 
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Alkire suggest that the concept should include the social, 
psychological, economic aspects of human vulnerabilities, including all 
critical and pervasive threats to the vital core and long term flourishing149. 
However, even advocates of the broad understanding of human security 
recognize potential dangers of such conceptual stretching. Some of the 
academics propose criteria, which suggest that human security should be 
restricted to those that present a crisis scenario. Thakur and Bajpai argue 
that floods, famine, disease and massive refugee flows should be concerned 
as a security issue as long as they warrant any sort of crisis response150.  
 In response to this debate, Taylor Owen proposes a consensus 
between the narrow and broad conceptualization of human security, 
emphasising the role of severity of particular threat and its impact on 
individual wellbeing. If we accept that certain conditions surpass a threshold 
of severity and become not simply human rights violations, environmental 
problems, or isolated violent acts, but also threats to human security, then 
we must have a very clear idea about what these threats are and where 
they exist151.  
 He argues that certain threats should be included in human 
security catalogue not because they fall under one of the established 
categories, but because they actually affect people in a harmful way. Thus, 
only those threats, which pass the threshold of severity, should be 
considered as a threat to human security.  
 As there is a vast array of threats that could affect human 
wellbeing, only those that are critical and seriously threaten human lives 
should be included in the scope of human security. That is why, Owen 
proposes a compromise definition, which describes human security as the 
                                                          
149 T. Owen, “Human security…”, 2004, p. 376. 
150 R. Thakur, “Human security regimes”, Asia’s Emerging Regional Order: Reconciling 
Traditional and Human Security (2007); K.P. Bajpai, Human security: concept and 
measurement. Joan B. Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre 
Dame 2000. 
151 T. Owen, “Human security…”, 2004, p. 384. 
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protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive 
environmental, economic, food, health, personal and political threats152. 
 This balanced approach gains additional meaning in situations, 
where the severity of human condition and insecurities is a constant 
characteristic of security environment. That of course applies to African 
security, which is often described as a network of pervasive threats to 
human safety and wellbeing. That is why, Owen’s definition also allows to 
analyse such an environment with no prejudice to particular threat, taking 
on a comprehensive approach to human security without danger of 
conceptual stretching.  
 
Human insecurity as a “push factor” in African migration  
 
 Migration is often analysed in reference to the so called push 
and pull model. Push factors refer to a broad spectrum of conditions that 
drive people out of their own localities. Pull factors, on the other hand, 
indicate the conditions that attract migrants to specific societies. These 
factors determine human mobility and come into play, regardless of whether 
the purpose of migration is to escape from oppressive regime or improve 
economic situation153. In that sense, human security as a comprehensive set 
of condition in which individuals can feel secure can be a powerful 
determinant of migration154.  
 The literature on the subject focuses on several elements, 
indicating the role of violent conflicts, poverty and climate change as some 
of the most powerful push factors in the African migration. However, human 
security is more than a catalogue of threats to individual security. 
                                                          
152 T. Owen, “Human security…”, 2004, p. 383. 
153 M. J. Greenwood, “Human migration: Theory, models, and empirical studies”, Journal of 
Regional Science vol. 25 no. 4 (1985). 
154 I. Sirkeci, “Human Insecurity and Streams of Conflict for a Re-conceptualization of 
International Migration”, Population Review vol. 46 no. 2 (2007). 
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 It is a network of interlocking issues that are not easy to 
escape from. Threats to human security are persistent, contagious and not 
limited to one locality or even region. African insecurity environment 
represents a whole eco-system of threats that generate a powerful push for 
migration. 
 Applying Owen’s definition of human security, threats in Africa 
have long surpassed the threshold of severity. The scale of persistent 
security threats and developmental issues is unparalleled in its scale with 
any other continent155.  
 In 2014 African countries were situated on the bottom of the 
Human Development Index, at the same time occupying highest positions in 
state fragility and numbers of violent conflicts156. Regrettably, Africa has 
become an example of insecure environment with multitude of factors and 
intertwining issues affecting every aspect of individual security. The 
literature on the subject presents an extensive catalogue of threats that 
contribute to the problem of insecurity. 
  There is no denying that violent conflicts constitute one of 
the most powerful push factor and a grave danger to human security. 
African conflicts are in that sense unique in terms of their intensity and 
scale. The literature points out towards three distinctive features of the 
African conflicts: violence, intra-state character and persistent nature157. On 
average, an African conflict lasts 16 years and has medium or high 
intensity158.  
 In 2014, Africa continued to be the most conflict prone 
continent with 64 violent crises and over 8600 conflict-related events 
                                                          
155 P.D. Williams, “Thinking about security in Africa”, International Affairs vol. 83 no. 6 
(2007). 
156 Human Development Report, 2014, at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-
report-en-1.pdf; Fragile State Index, 2015, Fund for Peace, at http://fsi.fundforpeace.org, 
29 July 2015 
157 A.B. Bozeman. Conflict in Africa: Concepts and realities. Princeton University Press 2015. 
158 Conflict Barometer, 2014, Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research, at 
http://www.hiik.de/en/konfliktbarometer/pdf/ConflictBarometer_2014.pdf, 
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recorded in 2014-15 alone159. It is not an exaggeration that human 
insecurity takes the most severe shape in Africa, with billions of people 
living in potentially life threating situations and a small chance of averting, 
let alone reversing, this situation.  
 It could be argued that due to intra-state nature of African 
conflicts, human insecurities flow from the very weakness of the state and 
its inability to keep control, safety and order over its own territories160. 
While undermining physical security, conflicts often paralyze and 
incapacitate states contributing not only to physical threats but also 
diminishing economic development, governance, and delivery of all basic 
public services161.  
 Today, most of the African states are considered failed or 
fragile, run by elites who employ self-interest and clientelistic practices for 
the preservation of their own political power, with no regard for human 
security of their citizens. Such politics often leads to criminalization of the 
state, turning it into hands of warlords, criminals and predatory militia 
groups, which benefit from violent conflicts, poverty and political 
instability162. One of the most known examples of such groups is Uganda’s 
Lords Resistant Army, which became known for its violent practices and 
abductions of children, then incorporated into the forces fighting against the 
government in Kampala163. Terror, abuses of civilian population, 
destabilization of internal and regional stability have become the hallmark of 
the African intra-sate conflicts. In such a situation, internal turmoil coupled 
with pathologies of the state creates a perfect condition for proliferation of 
the whole range of threats to human insecurity. 
 Even though, conflict presents the most evident danger to the 
African population, it is not the only factor affecting its well-being. Extreme 
                                                          
159 Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), 2015, at 
http://www.acleddata.com, 30 July 2015 
160 J. Cilliers, Human Security in Africa. A conceptual framework for review, Pretoria 2004. 
161 P.D. Williams, War and conflict in Africa, John Wiley & Sons 2013. 
162 C. Newbury, “States at war: confronting conflict in Africa”, African Studies Review vol. 
45 no. 01 (2002). 
163 R. Jackson, “Violent internal conflict and the African state: towards a framework of 
analysis”, Journal of Contemporary African studies vol. 20 no. 1 (2002). 
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poverty is still the most persistent issue affecting close to 47% of population 
in Africa164. The gravity of the problem is illustrated in nearly every Human 
Development Report since the 1990s, where African countries have been 
traditionally listed as the most underdeveloped in nearly every aspect of 
human development165.  
  There is no doubt that poverty causes extreme tensions 
and insecurities in African societies. Without economic security, that is 
access to employment and the earning of the basic income on sustained 
basis, people become extremely vulnerable to abuses and violations166. In 
many African countries, poverty fuels intra-state conflicts and drives 
individuals, especially youth, to various forms of criminal behaviour, such as 
drugs, prostitutions, organized crime, and trafficking.  
 Poverty is also identified as one of the main driving forces 
behind food insecurity. According to Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO) in 2014 about 200 million people in Africa were 
undernourished or deprived of physical and economic access to sufficient, 
safe and nutritious food167.  
 With more than 70% of African population living in 
impoverished rural areas, food and agriculture infrastructure has become 
one of the most vulnerable sectors in terms of human and state security168. 
African hunger and malnutrition is a complex problem deeply rooted in the 
agricultural infrastructure as well as climate change.  
 African farmers, beside economic and infrastructural barriers, 
face harsh realities of erratic weather, low soil fertility, and reoccurring 
                                                          
164 World Bank Open Data, 2015, at http://data.worldbank.org, 30 July 2015 
165 R. Draman, Poverty and Conflict in Africa: Explaining a complex relationship, Expert 
Group meeting on Africa-Canada Parliamentary Strengthening Program, Addis Ababa May 
2013. 
166 J. K. Akokpari. The Political Economy of Human Insecurity in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Institute of Developing Economies-Japan External Trade Organization 2007, p. 8. 
167 Food and Agriculture Organizations (FAO), 2015, Regional Overview of Food Insecurity 
in Africa 2015, at http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4635e.pdf, 
168 World Bank Open Data, 2015, at http://data.worldbank.org, 31 July 2015 
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droughts and floods169. This causes a very insecure situation, which affects 
not only the African agriculture economy, but also food production and 
distribution patterns on the whole continent. 
 Hunger and malnutrition has a direct impact on health security. 
Undernourishment and insufficient food consumption increases vulnerability 
to infectious diseases and causes a whole array of threats to human safety 
and wellbeing. Taking into account extremely limited access to healthcare 
(with only 1,15 health worker for 1000 people), poor sanitation system and 
access to water, Africa faces cycles of health risks beyond control170.  
 Except structural, protracted health issues such as HIV or 
malaria, which affect Africa every day, harming and putting in distress 
millions of lives, African insecurity environment becomes an arena for risks 
that have a powerful spill-over effect. In March 2014 Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa became a global scale threat within weeks, affecting not only 
individual security, but financial markets, housing prices, food security and 
political stability on the whole region171.  
 African insecurity environment shows how threats to human life 
and wellbeing reinforce and feed on each other creating powerful push 
factors for migratory flows. Structural insecurities and prolonged conflicts 
are a traditional starting point for discussion on the root causes of migration 
in Africa. One of the most evident push factors is a risk of physical harm and 
structural violence.  
 Conflicts generously contribute to both of these threats, 
producing millions of forced migrants, internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
and refugees, who seek freedom from fear in different countries or regions. 
According to Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, in 2014 Africa 
generated 12,5 million violence-induced IDPs, what amounts to more than 
                                                          
169 J. Clover, “Food security in sub-Saharan Africa”, African Security Studies vol. 12 no. 1 
(2003). 
170 World Bank Open Data, 2015, at http://data.worldbank.org, 31 July 2015 
171 T. Inglesby, J.E. Fischer, “Moving ahead on the global health security agenda”, 
Biosecurity and bioterrorism: biodefense strategy, practice, and science vol. 12 no. 2 
(2014). 
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30% of the global total172. Forced migration is also pushed by socio-political 
destabilization and consequent absence of statecraft. In African case, the 
state itself often becomes a source of economic and political insecurities. In 
order to protect its power, African governments turn to clientelistic 
practices, abuse of human rights, corruption and ill-willed public policies, 
which in a long-term turn into structural violence.  
 
 Migration represents an important response to poverty and 
deterioration of socio-economic security. However, there is a number of 
ways in which poverty can relate to migration. As Draman pointed out, 
poverty can be at the same time a driving force and obstacle for 
migration173. The turning point is when disadvantaged communities slowly 
increase their income and become aware of opportunities outside their own 
localities174. According to the United Nations Development Programme, the 
emerging concerns of security are more often related to economic, health 
and environmental aspects of human wellbeing. In that sense insecurities 
arise more from worries about daily life than from some cataclysmic world 
event175.  
 The first impulse can be survival, but after satisfying this basic 
need, people choose to seek to sustain this state of physical safety. This 
means developing or becoming a part of an infrastructure, which provides 
sustainable public services, including health, shelter, food, etc. This basic 
existential security is often a stepping-stone to other aspirations, which 
potentially become a stimulant for further migration. According to de Haas 
these aspirations become the most powerful driving force behind African 
                                                          
172 International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 2015, at http://www.internal-
displacement.org, 31 July 2015 
173 R. Draman, Poverty and Conflict in Africa: Explaining a complex relationship, Expert 
Group meeting on Africa-Canada Parliamentary Strengthening Program, Addis Ababa May 
2013, p. 21. 
174 See: A.M Kim, A. M. “An introduction to international migration studies: European 
perspectives”. Ethnic and Racial Studies vol. 38 no. 3 (2015). 
175 Human Development Report, 2014, at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-
report-en-1.pdf, 1 August 2015 
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migration176. However, the context of human security should not be 
sidelined in the analysis of causes of migration. The scope of insecurities 
and threats to vital core of human development will always be a factor in 
migratory flows in Africa.  
 
Migration as a source of insecurities 
 
When talking migration and security it is necessary to clarify whose 
security we are taking under consideration. There are two main dimensions 
that can serve as a framework for discussion about the impact of migration 
on human security: collective and individual. The collective security 
paradigm treats migrants as a reference object for security of the socio-
economic infrastructure and potential spillover of civil wars and 
destabilization to other countries. The individual perspective focuses on 
wellbeing of the migrants and potential threats they face during and after 
their mobility. 
In recent years, especially in Western Europe, migration has been 
securitized and framed as a threat to collective security177. In numerous 
media reports, migratory flows have been depicted as an attack on 
sovereignty and local way of life, putting in question states ability to control 
its own border regions and spatial domains178.  
 Collective wellbeing of the receiving communities has been put 
in the center of the debate also in Africa. One the most evident issues 
affecting collective security are protracted refugee crises. These sort of 
crises create direct and indirect risks that mainly arise from conflicts 
between immigrants and the local population, especially in the border 
regions were most of the refugee camps are being located. In 2015 14,9 
                                                          
176 H. De Haas, “The myth of invasion: the inconvenient realities of African migration to 
Europe”, Third World Quarterly vol. 29 no. 7 (2008). 
177 T. Faist, “The migration–security nexus: International migration and security before and 
after 9/11”, Migration, citizenship, ethnos (2006). 
178 A.J. Innes, “When the threatened become the threat: The construction of asylum 
seekers in British media narratives”, International Relations vol. 24 no. 4 (2010). 
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million displaced people have been relocated to refugees or temporary 
camps in whole of Africa, mostly in Kenya (565 thousand), Ethiopia (376 
thousand) and Chad (374 thousand)179.  
 Due to resource scarcity, inefficient food and health 
infrastructure, displaced people generate further destabilization and 
economic costs in the hosting countries increasing its proneness to fragility. 
Imported conflicts and health insecurity contribute even more to this issue, 
spilling over civil wars and creating additional vulnerabilities180.  
  On the other hand, there is a whole dimension of security that 
skips most of the official reports and mainstream analysis - the security of 
the migrants. African migration poses a great deal of threats to the very 
core of human security. En route to the receiving country, migrants often 
experience extreme hardship due to inhumane travelling conditions and the 
whole range of abuses from the part of the state officials, rebels or 
smugglers181.  
 Most journeys of African migrants take months, depending on 
their starting point, funds and smuggling contacts. When traveling through 
Sahara from countries such as Sudan or Niger, migrants often use services 
of smugglers who “facilitate” their transportation across the desert182. The 
trip across Sahara is extremely dangerous primarily not due to long 
                                                          
179 International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), 2015, at http://www.internal-
displacement.org, 2 August 2015 
180 Negative consequences do not only apply to the receiving societies. Brain drain and 
emigration of skilled and highly trained professionals, especially medical works, lowering 
human security in the sending communities (See: M.A. El-Khawas, “Brain drain: Putting 
Africa between a rock and a hard place”, Mediterranean Quarterly vol. 15 no. 4 (2004); D. 
Dovlo, “The brain drain in Africa: An emerging challenge to health professionals’ education”, 
Journal of Higher Education in Africa vol. 2 no. 3 (2004).) 
181 D. Lutterbeck, “Policing the EU’s Mediterranean Borders: The Human Security 
Implications”, in Seeberg, Peter (ed.). EU and the Mediterranean. Foreign Policy and 
Security, University Press of Southern Denmark 2007. 
182 D. Lutterbeck, “Across the Desert, Across the Sea: Human Smuggling into and from 
Libya”, in: Seeberg Peter and Eyadat Zaid (eds), Migration, Security, and Citizenship in the 
Middle East, New York 2013. 
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distances, but harsh weather conditions, lack of food and water and frequent 
abuses from smugglers183.  
 The numbers of migrants dying from dehydration, injuries and 
heat strokes are estimated in thousands a year. Another extremely 
dangerous route is the Mediterranean Sea, which annually claims over 75% 
of the global migration death rates184. Only in 2014 the number of missing 
or dead migrants amounted to 4 thousand. Most of the deaths occur during 
the passage in the open sea. The smugglers usually use vessels unfit to 
carry hundreds of people over the Mediterranean, resulting in frequent 
shipwrecks and deaths. Between 2013 and 2014 EU border guards rescued 
and intercepted over 140 thousand illegal migrants185. 
 Not only the dangers of the journey but also the abuses of 
migrants by smugglers and state officials create a serious threat to human 
security. Migrants, who are detained by the border guards or the police, are 
sold to human traffickers and smugglers as a commodity186. Refugee camps 
and detention centers, especially located in North Africa are often extremely 
overcrowded and lack essential sanitation, sufficient food rations and basic 
health care187. Migrants often experience even more severe abuses in such 
government-run establishments than in their home countries, which they 
fled in fear for their lives.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
183 J. Carling, “Migration control and migrant fatalities at the Spanish-African borders”. 
International Migration Review vol. 41 no. 3 (2007). 
184 A. M. Kim, “An introduction to international migration studies: European perspectives”, 
Ethnic and Racial Studies vol. 38 no. 3 (2015). 
185 FRONTEX, 2015, Annual Risk Analysis 2015, at 
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2015.pdf
, 
186 D. Lutterbeck, “Policing…”. 
187 D. Lutterbeck, “Across the Desert…”. 
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Conclusions 
African human insecurity environment is without a doubt a powerful 
push factor for the African continental and intercontinental migratory flows. 
It constitutes a network of intertwining persistent threats that reinforce and 
feed on each other. Under these conditions migration is a solution and 
challenge to human security. It is a natural impulse to run and relocate 
upon feeling insecure. In this sense, migrants seek for refuge and conditions 
under which they can find stability and safety. In other words, migration is a 
coping mechanism that allows millions of people in Africa to survive. On the 
other hand, migration is a destabilising factor in several African regions. It 
often contributes to civil unrest and spills over ethnic conflict to other 
localities. Refugees are often associated with extreme poverty and criminal 
activities. But they are first and foremost the victims: of violent conflicts, 
extreme poverty, health insecurity and hardship during their journey. 
Human security creates a narrative, which explains this phenomenon in all 
its complexity and multidimensionality. 
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INGOs as a Contributor to Human Security: A Case Study of Rwanda 
and South Sudan 
 
Abstract:  
The concept of human security, introduced in 1994, influenced the 
way in which politicians and scholars think of human security. It shifted the 
referent of security to individual level and started to consider issues related 
to health, environment, inequality, food and the conditions of living as 
potential threats. In consequence, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and international organisations (IOs), working within those areas became 
involved in responding to security threats. The following article examines 
the way NGOs affect human security in Africa, taking Rwanda and South 
Sudan as examples and focusing on food insecurity and poverty as 
important risks to human security. 
Key words: human security, Rwanda, South Sudan, NGO, IO 
 
 
Since the 1990’s we have observed an unprecedented growth in 
number and scope of non-governmental organisations (NGOs). The number 
of NGOs with consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council 
went from 180 in 1968 to 724 in 1992 and to 3,382 in 2010188.  
The missions and goals of non-governmental organisations also 
expanded and nowadays cover specialised interests in different parts of the 
globe. Apart from the beginning of the expansion of NGOs, the 1990’s also 
witnessed the initiation of the debate on the referent of security. In 1994 
                                                          
188 Statistics Portal, at http://www.statista.com/statistics/268357/changes-in-the-number-
of-ngos-worldwide-since-1948/, 18 July 2015. 
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the traditional concept, which placed states in the centre of the security 
paradigm was undermined by an idea that drew the attention to human 
level. This human approach to security encompassed not only violent threats 
such as wars, riots and crime, but also included risks related to health, 
environment, inequality, food and the conditions of living.  
The wide range of problems related to human security is clearly visible 
in Africa. Every year this continent faces war, drought, diseases, crime and 
corruption. As a consequence, it is also the subject of interest of thousands 
of NGOs. This paper aims at answering the question of how non-
governmental organisations affect human security in Africa. It focuses on 
Rwanda and South Sudan as two relatively close countries on different 
stages of development. Due to the broad scope of human security, the 
paper concentrates on the activities of NGOs aiming at fighting poverty and 
food insecurity. 
The following paper consists of five main parts. The focus of the first 
part is on the theoretical aspects of human security and different definitions 
of the concept. The next section provides a brief overview of some of the 
most pressing problems related to human security in Africa. The third part 
reflects on the function of non-governmental organisations in the context of 
human security in Africa. Finally, the last two parts of the paper are case 
studies of the activities of NGOs addressing food security and poverty in 
Rwanda and South Sudan. The paper is closed with conclusions on the 
predominant types of efforts of NGOs to increase human security in those 
two countries. 
 
 
 
Human security 
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The concept of human security was introduced by the Human 
Development Report in 1994. The main assumption of the Report is that 
next to the world’s conflicts and emergencies there is also a ‘silent crisis’ 
endangering the security of the people189. It consists of underdevelopment, 
poverty, food shortages and degradation of environment. As long as those 
problems are not eradicated, it is impossible to talk about peace in the 
world.  
As a consequence, the Report proposes a new approach to security 
which stresses the importance of threats in daily lives of the people. 
Although some threats to individual security depend on the situation, it is 
also possible to establish a universal catalogue of insecurities. In this sense, 
human security is equally relevant to different social groups all over the 
world. What is more, [w]hen the security of people is attacked in any corner 
of the world, all nations are likely to get involved190.  
In a globalised world, the consequences of pollution, famine and 
diseases cannot be restricted to only one area. Finally, the Report notes that 
human security cannot be achieved with short-term humanitarian 
assistance. Instead, it requires  long-term sustainable development which 
would empower the people rather than marginalise them. 
The 1994 Human Development Report started a debate on the human 
approach to security. For its proponents, the traditional state-centred 
security paradigm was no longer suitable for the post-Cold War world. 
Instead, they advocated that the object of security studies should be shifted 
to human level.  
According to the critics, the concept of human security was too broad, 
and therefore useless in terms of analytical and policy consequences. As a 
result of this discussion, scholars produced numerous definitions of human 
security. The easiest typology groups them into narrow and broad 
                                                          
189 UNDP, Human Development Report 1994. New York 1994, at 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf, p. 
iii. 
190 Ibid. p. 3.  
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conceptualisations. Narrow definitions of human security focus on violent 
threats induced by both state and non-state actors.  
In other words, they reflect the position that human security should 
concentrate on such problems as terrorism, crime, ethnic conflicts and non-
peaceful transfer of power. According to some scholars, this 
conceptualisation allows for analytic clarity and obtaining significant 
normative results191. On the other hand, the advocates of the broad 
conceptualisation argue that the concept of human security includes a wider 
range of issues. According to them, individual security is equally affected by 
poverty, disease and environmental disasters. Thus, a legitimate study of 
human security should take account of social, psychological, economic and 
political vulnerabilities192. 
Many authors attempted to create definitions of human security, which 
would retain a possibly broad perspective, but at the same time appease the 
critics. One of such definitions was created by Kanti Bajpai, who noted that 
[h]uman security refers to threats to the life and liberty of individuals and 
communities, balanced by capacities to deal with those threats (security = 
threats minus capacities)193. Human security depends on time and space, 
therefore, it should take into consideration threats that are specific to a 
given situation. Unfortunately, by making the concept of human security 
dependant on the context, Bajpai did not manage to render it more tangible. 
King and Murray194 offer different approach to human security, which 
at the first glance seems to be more clear and restricted. According to their 
definition, human security can be measured as the expected number of 
years of future life spent outside the state of “generalized poverty”195. In 
their theory, human security depends on the prospects of avoiding states of 
                                                          
191 See: K. Krause, “The Key to a Powerful Agenda, If Properly Delimited”, Security 
Dialogue vol. 35 no. 3 (2004); S. N. Macfarlane, “A Useful Concept That Risks Losing Its 
Political Salience”, Security Dialogue vol. 35 no. 3 (2004), pp. 368–69; T. Owen, “Human 
Security - Conflict, Critique and Consensus: Colloquium Remarks and a Proposal for a 
Threshold-Based Definition”, Security Dialogue vol. 35 no. 3 (2004), pp. 373–87. 
192 T. Owen, “Human Security…”, p.375.  
193 K. Bajpai, “An Expression of Threats Versus Capabilities Across Time and Space”, 
Security Dialogue vol. 35 no. 3 (2004), p. 360 
194 G. King, C. Murray, “Rethinking Human Security”, Political Science Quarterly vol. 116 no. 
4 (2001), pp. 585–610. 
195 Ibid. p. 586.  
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great deprivation in such domains of well-being that have been important 
enough for human beings to fight over or to put their lives or property at 
great risk196. Also this definition uses concepts that are difficult to 
determine, such as the domains of well-being and the threshold of 
generalised poverty. Nevertheless, King and Murray’s definition underlines 
an important future-oriented perspective of human security.  
Similar, forward-looking understanding of the concept was proposed 
by Sabina Alkire197. According to her, [t]he objective of human security is to 
safeguard the vital core of all human lives from critical pervasive threats, in 
a way that is consistent with long-term human fulfilment198.  
This definition limits the scope of the concept in two ways. Firstly, it 
refers to the core of people’s lives: their survival, livelihood and dignity. 
Alkire’s definition focuses on the most fundamental human rights and needs 
that have to be protected. Secondly, it takes into account only critical and 
pervasive threats.  
This means that the definition includes threats which endanger the 
core activities and functions of human lives, but also have a significant scale 
or are recurrent. At the same time, it does not embrace threats for which a 
strategic preparation is possible. Importantly, according to Alkire, measures 
taken to achieve human security must be consistent with long-term human 
fulfilment. In other words, they must not undermine the ability of the people 
to lead a secure and free life in the future. 
 
Human Security in Africa 
 
Africa constitutes an unfortunate example of the wide range of 
problems related to human security. According to the 2015 Fragile State 
                                                          
196 Ibid. p. 593.  
197 S. Alkire, A Conceptual Framework for Human Security, Oxford 2003. 
198 Ibid. p. 2. 
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Index, seven out of ten most fragile states are located on this continent199. 
The records of the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project show over 
8,650 violent events in Africa only in 2014 and 2015200. Also, as noted by 
the 2015 Freedom House Report, five out of ten most oppressive regimes 
are in Africa201.  
But the threats to human security in Africa are not only violence-
related. Africa is constantly exposed to health threats such as the recent 
out-brake of Ebola in the western part of the continent, HIV/AIDS epidemic, 
continuous high number of deaths by other contagious diseases and 
extremely low numbers of physicians.  
In this context, it is no surprise that in 2013 the average life 
expectancy for Sub-Saharan Africa was approximately 57 years202. 
Another cluster of threats to Africa’s people is rooted in environmental 
issues. According to the data of FAO Global Forest Resources Assessment 
2010, since 1990 the forest area in Africa has reduced by over 10% (as of 
2010)203.  
It is also estimated that since 1990 1,6% of total renewable water 
resources has withdrawn from Sub-Saharan Africa204. This means not only 
increasing scarcity of drinking water, but also desertification and 
degradation of soil. 
The situation of human security is additionally worsened by nearly 
1,770 million refugees (in 2012)205 and risks related to migration and 
internally displaced persons. Sub-Saharan Africa is also on the inglorious 
                                                          
199 In descending order: South Sudan, Somalia, Central African Republic, Sudan, DRC, 
Chad, Yemen, Syria Afghanistan, Guinea. Fragile State Index Webpage at 
http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/, 24 July, 2015. 
200 Those events include battles, remote violence, violence and protests, as well as violence 
against civilians. Realtime Data (2015) | ACLED at 
http://www.acleddata.com/data/realtime-data-2015/, 24 July 2015.  
201 In descending order: Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, North Korea, 
Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Freedom House Report 
202 UNDP, Human Development Report 2014. Sustaining Human Progress: Reducing 
Vulnerabilities and Building Resilience (2014) at 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/hdr14-report-en-1.pdf, 22 July 2015.  
203 Food and Agriculture Organisation, “Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010”, 2010 at 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/013/i1757e/i1757e.pdf, 18 July 2015. 
204 UNDP, Human… (2014). 
205 Ibid. 
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last position when it comes to mortality rates among children and adults, 
literacy rates and the level of GDP per capita206. 
When talking about human security in Africa, it is definitely difficult to 
point out a single, most pressing problem. However, this paper will focus 
predominantly on poverty and food insecurity. Sub-Saharan Africa has the 
lowest Human Development Index in the world and the lowest gross 
national income per capita. According to the estimates of the World Bank 
approximately 415 million people in this region suffer from extreme 
poverty207.  
Moreover, nearly 38% of children under the age of 5 are chronically 
malnourished208 and 214 million people are undernourished209. Indeed, 
poverty and hunger constitute important threats to human security in Africa. 
 
NGOs as Actors of Human Security 
 
As a consequence of the complexity of human security, it is not 
possible for a single actor (be it state or non-state entity) to promote it. 
Even though governments continue to be important stakeholders, a role and 
profile has to be given to those in business, civil society, and NGOs210. In 
order to answer the threats of globalised world there is a need of 
partnership between them and it is especially meaningful as severe threats 
to human security are not confined to single communities211. An important 
place among the actors that are capable of answering to the needs of the 
people belongs to non-governmental organisations. 
                                                          
206 Ibid. 
207 World Bank Group, Poverty Overview (2011), at 
http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/poverty/overview, 24 July 2015. 
208 UNDP, Human… (2014).  
209 UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, The State of Food Insecurity in the World. 
Strengthening the Enabling Environment for Food Security and Nutrition. Rome, 2014 at 
http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4030e.pdf, 24 July 2015. 
210 L. Axworthy, “Human Security and Global Governance: Putting People First”, Global 
Governance, vol. 7 no. 1 (2001), p. 20. 
211 E. Newman, “Human Security and Constructivism”, International Studies Perspectives 
vol. 2 (2001) p. 243. 
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According to the definition presented by Clarke, NGOs are private, 
non-profit, professional organizations, with a distinctive legal character, 
concerned with public welfare goals. In the developing world, NGOs include 
philanthropic foundations, church development agencies, academic think-
tanks and other organizations focusing on issues such as human rights, 
gender, health, agricultural development, social welfare, the environment, 
and indigenous peoples212.  
In the databases of the World Association of Non-Governmental 
Organizations (WANGO), there are currently over 4600 NGOs operating in 
Africa213. The NGO Branch of the UN Department of Economic and Social 
Affairs gives an even bigger number of 7419 non-governmental 
organisations in Africa214. Over 3400 of them contribute to the Millennium 
Development Goal to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. 
Another strong group that works in the environment of humanitarian 
and development aid is the UN agencies, which even though they belong to 
the international organisations’ domain, work in a close proximity and 
complementarity with NGOs. The UN creates the entire framework for 
cooperation between its agencies and NGOs, trying to create a specific 
domain, which would be interlocking not interblocking in its activities and 
mandates215. Because of that in the following analysis UN agencies will be 
treated as a part of the NGO environment.  
Bearing in mind the complexity of human security King and Murray’s216 
suggested a catalogue of four categories of efforts enhancing human 
security. According to the catalogue, the first type is risk assessment, which 
consists of gaining knowledge regarding threats to human security. 
                                                          
212 G. Clarke, “Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and Politics in the Developing 
World”, Political Studies vol. 46 no. 1 (1998), pp. 36-37.  
213 219 in North Africa, 2238 in Western Africa, 540 in Middle Africa, 1180 in Eastern Africa, 
433 in Southern Africa. World Association of Non-Governmental Organizations Webpage, at 
http://www.wango.org/resources.aspx?section=ngodir, 18 July 2015. 
214 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, NGO Branch Webpage, at 
http://esango.un.org/civilsociety/login.do, 21 July 2015. 
215 UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service, UN System Engagement with NGOs, Civil 
Society, the Private Sector and Other Actors. A Compendium, New York and Geneva 2005. 
216 G. King, C. Murray, “Rethinking…”.  
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Prevention, which is the second category, is based on reducing the 
probability of occurrence of those risks.  
The objective of the third category – protection – is to decrease the 
harm after it was done. Finally, the fourth type is compensation, meaning 
providing payments after the harm217. These categories allow for 
constructing and deconstructing operational strategies of states and 
organisations for increasing human security.  
Of course they do not form sharp divisions and some activities will 
correspond with more than one category. This catalogue will now be used to 
analyse the activities of NGOs in Rwanda and South Sudan. 
 
Case study of Rwanda 
 
The food security in Rwanda is an important issue. It is a 
predominantly rural country with 90% of population working in agriculture, 
creating 32% of GDP218. Since 1994 Rwandan economy has made a 
substantial progress. However, still approximately 63% of the population 
lives below the poverty line, with over 34% living in severe poverty219. The 
production of food is too slow in comparison to the demand and the import 
of food to Rwanda is required.  
Since 2012, Rwanda has ranked 151 (out of 187) in the Human 
Development Index, which places it in the group of countries with low level 
of human development. Interestingly, according to the Human Development 
Report 2014, 66% of Rwandans are satisfied with their government’s efforts 
to deal with the poor. As stated by the Rwanda Governance Board, in 2014 
                                                          
217 Ibid., p. 604. 
218
 CIA World Factbook Rwanda, at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/, 20 July 2015. 
219 UNDP, Human… (2014). 
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there were 245 NGOs with legal personality in Rwanda and 380 NGOs with 
temporary certificates220.  
One of those organisations is the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD), a specialized agency of the UN established in 1977. It 
was created as a response to the realization that the causes of food 
insecurity and famine were not so much failures in food production but 
structural problems relating to poverty221. IFAD’s current involvement in 
Rwanda revolves around three projects designed to alleviate poverty and 
food insecurity.  
The principal goal of the first project is to increase producers’ incomes 
and food security by shifting from subsistence to intensified market-based 
agriculture. The second project focuses on smallholder farmers (especially 
woman-headed) specialising in producing coffee, tea and horticulture, and 
aims at raising their income. The third project includes business coaching for 
poorest farmers and supports agribusiness investment in post-harvest 
processes. Altogether, IFAD projects in Rwanda amount to 239 million USD 
and directly benefit 534,300 households222.  
IFAD projects in Rwanda assume such activities as creating strong 
local institutions for the sustainable management of resources, empowering 
small-scale and landless farmers, strengthening producer cooperatives, 
developing irrigated land and rehabilitating roads. All those undertakings 
have a clear common aim, which is to reduce the risk of famine and 
decrease poverty in the region. In other words, they belong to the second 
category of King and Murray’s catalogue – prevention of human insecurity. 
Also the World Food Programme (WFP) focuses on addressing the 
poorest and most vulnerable groups of the society of Rwanda. WFP was 
established in 1961 as a UN agency responsible for providing food aid. Its 
involvement in Rwanda is two-fold. Firstly, it provides food for registered 
refugees in camps and Rwandan returnees.  
                                                          
220 Rwanda Governance Board, at http://www.rgb.rw/services/ngo-registration-rbo-online/, 
22 July 2015. 
221 International Fund for Agricultural Development Webpage, at http://www.ifad.org/, 19 
July 2015. 
222 Ibid. 
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The food and nutrition needs of refugees in camps are fully covered by 
WFP, while returnees receive food assistance packages for three months 
after their return. Furthermore, the World Food Programme funds additional 
food programs for vulnerable groups in Rwanda, such as school feeding and 
nutrition support for people living with HIV223.  
This type of actions clearly belongs to protective efforts to enhance 
human security. The second kind of WFP actions focuses on increasing 
Rwandan government’s capacity to design and manage nationally owned 
solutions to hunger. By assisting in linking smallholder farmers to markets 
and by providing trainings, WFP contributes to preventing future suffering 
from hunger and poverty. This way, the actions of the World Food 
Programme respond to two categories of King and Murray’s catalogue. Only 
in the last three months of 2014, WFP has helped 100,000 people through 
cash and food assistance224. 
An example of a smaller-scale NGO working in Rwanda is the One Acre 
Fund (OAF) established in 2006. It offers training to smallholder farmers on 
agricultural techniques, as well as loans for seeds and fertilizers. Since 
2013, OAF has been working with the Rwanda’s Ministry of Agriculture on 
designing training materials for an agriculture extension network that 
reaches every village in the country. It also facilitates harvest sales in an 
attempt to maximise farmers’ profit225.  
 
In 2014 One Acre Fund served 86,650 households, with a 67% gain in 
farm income (per farmer) in Rwanda226. Same as the bigger international 
agencies, OAF undertakes mainly preventive efforts of the King and Murray’s 
catalogue. It focuses on providing a set of services that in the long run allow 
to reduce the risk of famine and minimise poverty. 
                                                          
223 UN World Food Programme Webpage, at http://www.wfp.org/, 22 July 2015. 
224 J. P. De Margerie, World Food Programme Rwanda Brief, 2014 at 
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ep/wfp270017.pdf, 25 July 
2015.  
225 One Acre Fund Webpage, at http://www.oneacrefund.org/, 19 July 2015. 
226 One Acre Fund Annual Report, 2014 at http://www.oneacrefund.org/uploads/all-
files/2014_Annual_Report_One_Acre_Fund_.pdf, 21 July 2015.  
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Much more comprehensive approach is presented by Concern 
Worldwide, an international NGO established in 1968. It addresses extreme 
poverty using a five-step ‘graduation model’. It includes assessment of 
needs of future participants of the programme, transfers of money for 
consumption, training and regular coaching, exposure to microfinance and 
transfers of assets227.  
In 2014 Concern Worldwide spent nearly 2,3 million EUR for projects 
in Rwanda and trained over 15,000 farmers in rural field schools228. Using 
King and Murray’s classification, Concern Worldwide contributes to at least 
three categories.  
In order to identify extreme poor households, it first conducts an 
assessment, thus increasing the knowledge of risks and poverty patterns in 
the area. Secondly, by organising trainings and enabling profitable economic 
activities, Concern Worldwide contributes to prevention of extreme poverty 
and famine. Finally, thanks to monthly cash transfers, it addresses the most 
basic needs of the participants of the project, thus decreasing the harm and 
applying the ‘protection’ category. 
 
Case study of South Sudan 
 
Similarly as in Rwanda, South Sudan suffers from high levels of 
poverty and food insecurity. Despite being rather rich in resources, the 
country belongs to the most underdeveloped group in the world. Due to 
long-lasting conflicts, the economy, industry and infrastructure of South 
Sudan are in a poor condition.  
                                                          
227 Concern Worldwide Webpage, at https://www.concern.net/, 20 July 2015. 
228 Concern Worldwide Annual Report and Accounts, 2014, p. 16, 29, at 
https://www.concern.net/sites/default/files/media/page/concern_annual_report_2014.pdf, 
21 July 2015. 
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Potable water is scarce and subsistence agriculture provides a living 
for the vast majority of the population229. Still, only 9% of GDP is created by 
agriculture, hunting, forestry and fisheries230. It is estimated that 50% of 
the population lives below poverty line 231 and 31% of children under the 
age of 5 is underweight232. Nationwide, some 41% of the population are 
food insecure233. According to the South Sudan NGO Forum, there are 
approximately 160 national and 142 international NGOs operating in this 
country234. 
The International Fund for Agricultural Development has been active 
on the territory of South Sudan since 2009. Its aim is to maximise the 
contribution of agriculture to economic growth in South Sudan. In order to 
achieve it, IFAD works on improving smallholder famers' productivity and 
access to markets, and on bolstering distribution systems235. However, the 
organisation notes that before setting right priorities for investment, it is 
necessary to collect more information on farms and production practices. 
Thus, by co-financing research and analyses of rural resilience, livelihoods 
and poverty in South Sudan, IFAD supports risk assessment of human 
security. Currently, IFAD conducts one on-going project in South Sudan, 
focusing on reducing rural poverty236.  
The project addresses both preventive and protective efforts to 
enhance human security. In accordance with the former category, its aim is 
to improve the productivity and marketing skills of farmers. This way, it 
contributes to preventing and reducing the risk of deepening poverty and 
food insecurity. However, it is also directed to the poorest and most 
                                                          
229 CIA World Factbook South Sudan, at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/, 20 July 2015. 
230 UNDP, Human… (2014). 
231 CIA World Factbook South Sudan, at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/, 20 July 2015. 
232 UNDP, Human… (2014). 
233 Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System, South Sudan Food Security and Nutrition 
Monitoring, 2015, at 
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp275187.pdf, 23 July 
2015. 
234 South Sudan NGO Forum Webpage, at http://southsudanngoforum.org/, 23 July 2015. 
235 International Fund for Agricultural Development Webpage, at http://www.ifad.org/, 19 
July 2015. 
236 Ibid. 
Online-Reader: Joint Second Cycle Degree in International Relations: Europe in the Visegrad Perspective             
100 
 
Material under copyright protection. 
 
vulnerable rural populations and thus focuses on protecting and decreasing 
the harm. The total of IFAD financing in South Sudan amounts to 13,5 
million USD and directly benefits 38,000 households237. 
Another UN agency that is involved in South Sudan is the Food and 
Agriculture Organisation (FAO). It was established in 1945 with a goal to 
eradicate hunger, eliminate poverty and promote sustainable management 
of natural resources. Similarly to IFAD, FAO was engaged on the territories 
of South Sudan long before the country proclaimed its independence.  
Initially, it focused on agricultural production projects, however the 
protracted civil war forced a shift to humanitarian assistance. The latest FAO 
project focuses on providing emergency food security support to conflict-
affected populations. In this sense it undertakes protective and 
compensatory measures to enhance human security. By the end of 2014, 
with a budget of 108 million USD, FAO assisted over 2,9 million people in 
South Sudan by delivering livelihood kits and animal health interventions238.  
Moreover, in cooperation with IFAD, FAO conducts research and 
analyses in order to gather more information on poverty and food insecurity 
in South Sudan. This way, it also addresses the ‘risk assessment’ category 
in Kind and Murray’s catalogue. 
The involvement of the World Food Programme in South Sudan is 
three-fold. Firstly, it gives out regular food rations to the people affected by 
conflict and supports the poorest in more stable areas of the country. 
Secondly, WFP manages an aviation team dedicated to moving food and 
humanitarian supplies.  
Last but not least, in cooperation with the Government of South 
Sudan, it helps to construct feeder roads to link remote, agriculturally 
productive areas to main roads and markets239. The World Food Programme, 
                                                          
237 International Fund for Agricultural Development Webpage, at http://www.ifad.org/, 19 
July 2015. 
238 UN Food and Agriculture Organisation, “South Sudan and FAO. Building Resilience and 
Sustainable Food and Nutrition Security” (2015) at http://www.fao.org/3/a-ax462e.pdf, 23 
July 2015.  
239 UN World Food Programme Webpage, at http://www.wfp.org/, 22 July 2015. 
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in accordance with its mission, focuses on protection from and compensation 
for food insecurity and poverty. It seeks to reduce the harm to human 
security and provides payments to those affected by poverty and famine. 
Another prominent non-governmental international organisation active 
in South Sudan is Oxfam. It originates from the Oxford Committee for 
Famine Relief, founded in 1942 with a goal to reduce poverty and injustice. 
Oxfam has been active on the territory of South Sudan since 1983. It 
supports refugees and provides humanitarian aid, emergency food supplies 
and basic household goods.  
The organisation estimates that since the outbreak of the conflict it 
has helped over 120,000 people in South Sudan240 and in 2013-2014 it 
spent over 19 million EUR to help South Sudanese241. In accordance with its 
mission, Oxfam concentrates its efforts mainly on protecting the people 
suffering from poverty and food insecurity and on providing them with a 
compensation. 
 
Summary 
 
There is little agreement on how to operationalize human security and 
what the concept should include. However, without a doubt, poverty and 
lack of food pose great threats to human lives, especially in Africa. A big 
part of the efforts to enhance food security and fight poverty belongs to 
non-governmental organisations. Their activities can be divided into four 
categories: risk assessment, prevention, protection and compensation. 
For the last two decades Rwanda has been a peaceful country, 
strongly focused on reconstruction and development. Therefore, NGOs in 
this country predominantly undertake preventive measures to enhance 
                                                          
240 Oxfam Annual Report 2013-2014, 2014, at 
https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/file_attachments/story/oxfam_annual_r
eport_2013_-_2014_final.pdf, 23 July 2015, p. 35.  
241 Ibid., p. 71.  
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human security. They focus on activities that will reduce the extent of 
poverty and hunger in the future. In this sense, they provide know-how and 
trainings, deliver tools, plants and animals, and help to create infrastructure 
linking farmers with markets. All those actions are aimed at increasing the 
income of small-holder farmers and facilitating the growth of sustainable 
businesses. Of course, there are also projects that are specifically designed 
to protect the most vulnerable groups in Rwanda and provide them with 
direct help. 
The population of South Sudan has different, more complex needs 
when it comes to food security. Because of long-lasting conflicts and recent 
proclamation of independence, there is still a need to collect more 
information on specific requirements and patterns of poverty in this country. 
In this situation, more efforts of NGOs are directed to risk assessment. Still, 
the majority of NGOs’ projects in South Sudan are designed to protect 
people from hunger and poverty and to compensate those who are 
suffering. Because of the unstable situation in the country humanitarian 
assistance is projected to remain the only viable remedy for majority of 
vulnerable households242. 
NGOs in Africa tailor their activities to the needs of the local 
population. Depending on the situation, they address the most necessary 
requirements with direct aid or enable people to become self-sustainable. 
Both those types of activities are undoubtedly necessary and beneficial. 
However, it seems that creating conditions for sustainable development is 
the most future-oriented option of efforts enhancing human security. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
242 Food Security and Nutrition Monitoring System. South Sudan Food Security and Nutrition 
Monitoring. 2015 at 
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/ena/wfp275187.pdf, 23 July 
2015. 
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Abstract: 
 
The European Union in recent years has been engulfed in a migration crisis 
of unprecedented magnitude. As a result of conflicts in Syria, Africa and 
Afghanistan, the influx of illegal migrants to Europe has contributed to an 
enormous socio-political and economic challenge for the Member States. In 
an effort to outline viable solutions to the inflow of refugees, the European 
Union has introduced a plethora of initiatives and policies which require 
considerable inter-state collaboration and burden-sharing among Member 
States. Hungary, under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, has 
opted not to adhere to any EU-proposed agenda, including the refugee 
quota-based redistribution schemes as means of alleviating the most 
affected countries, such as Italy and France. Furthermore, Orbán’s anti-
immigration rhetoric has been met by considerable backlash, as many of the 
EU Member States deem Hungary’s policies objectionable. The article aims 
to illustrate the recent ideological clash between EU and Hungary over 
migration policies, and attempt to shed light on Hungary’s historical and 
political legacies in order to supplement the country’s nationalist and 
undeniably controversial stance.  
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 A Conceptual Introduction 
 
With the onset of an undisputable migrant crisis which has engulfed 
Europe in recent months, the debate on viable solutions has flared up a 
plethora of standpoints. Surely, those EU nation states that are 
geographically more susceptible to a larger influx of illegal migrants -
seeking refuge from the ongoing turmoil in Africa and the Middle East, are in 
a position to express a heightened sense of concern.  
The EU in recent years has been facing considerable internal challenges, 
both political and economic, which have resulted in often contentious inter-
Member State relations. Immigration is certainly an issue that has 
dominated the agenda, notably in the UK, France and Italy. Although the EU 
has outlined a scheme with regards to migration policy that all Member 
States must adhere to, in light of increased weak economic growth and 
fractured national politics, the aforementioned ‘obligation’ is becoming more 
of a burden.  
The consequential spillover as a result of the fighting and persecution 
beyond Europe’s borders, poses complex challenges for policymakers 
dealing with the both pressures from Brussels and from within their own 
countries. Thus far, collective response to this increasing migrant crisis has 
exposed the vulnerability of the system that is currently in place, and 
caused a considerable upheaval amongst Member States as to how to best 
address this difficult, politically and ethically sensitive issue. Most affected 
countries have urged for the EU to engage in responsible burden-sharing 
within a framework of a migrant distribution scheme through a quota 
system.  This in turn has produced unintended consequences. Instead of 
securing the protection of refugees and asylum seekers, many Member 
States are actually focusing on securing and closing-off their borders.  
The uneasiness of this situation has certainly failed to bypass the 
Visegrad countries, and has had a considerable and highly problematic effect 
on Hungary in particular. After all, the stakes are high and inter-State 
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tension mounting, as the heated debate encompasses all 28 Member States. 
Hungary illustrated a contentious stance with its overtly adamant opposition 
to EU-mandated admission of thousands of migrants, along with the EU-
proposed quota system. It is important however, to first briefly 
contextualize the source of the contention between Member States. 
Subsequently, the article will examine the case of Hungary and the 
government’s harsh stance on the aforementioned EU-wide policies towards 
the ever increasing migration crisis.   
 
Contextualizing migration as a pan-European dilemma 
 
The recent impetus of the EU to formulate an efficient response stems 
from a crisis that began as a result of tremendous political upheaval in the 
Middle East and Africa. Migration trends are a social phenomenon that have 
been a part of human history virtually forever. Certainly in the framework of 
the European Union, the aspect of cross-border mobility is a privilege that 
has long been taken for granted. Multiculturalism and the notion of 
‘welcomed’ immigration has been, up until recently, a relatively positive 
aspect of EU membership. Why then has the sudden flow of migrants on 
Europe’s shores created such chaos and backlash among Member States? 
The answer is both simple and complicated. In an attempt to find an 
answer, it is perhaps wise to briefly remind ourselves of Europe’s political 
and historical legacy. In light of this, the perplexing aspect is the fact that 
Europeans are having a difficult time accepting the notion of other non-
European ‘outsiders’ flooding its continent, while only one hundred years 
ago it was the Europeans who were flooding the shores of these very same 
non-European trespassers. Moreover, Europe’s history has been defined by 
migration, with merchants, sailors, craftsmen, intellectuals crossing 
continents to practice their trade and start life over, centuries ago.  
But even more recently, large-scale migration was nothing new, 
especially in the late 1980s and 1990’s, following the end of the Cold War 
Online-Reader: Joint Second Cycle Degree in International Relations: Europe in the Visegrad Perspective             
109 
 
Material under copyright protection. 
 
era and a dissolution of the Soviet Union. The changes in political ideology 
gave rise to ethno- nationalist movements not only across Southeast 
Europe, but in other parts of the world consequently prompting conflict and 
war. The decade of ethnic cleaning in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo resulted 
in altered migration trends which documented thousands of prosecuted 
migrants to seek refuge within European borders. More than a decade later, 
new conflicts are once again bringing forth tensions with regards to 
migration patterns. The resulting backlash is more than just economic 
concerns, but equally important are socio-political considerations.  
Migration is indeed an emblematic issue for the West, because it also 
overlaps with value-oriented aspects which include issues of ethnicity, 
identity, tolerance, homogeneity and the like. It means more than just 
absorbing the financial burden for newcomers with respect to healthcare, 
education, employment and social welfare; it also means an absorption of 
individuals whose cultural, linguistic, religious traditions often are 
substantially different. In today’s world, with the ever increasing fear over 
terrorism, an open door policy, especially to those coming from Muslim 
countries is seen as risky and highly discouraged. Migration is undoubtedly a 
pan-European dilemma, and so is the subsequent sentiments on how to 
coalesce ethics, social responsibility with unwillingness or in some cases, 
inability to host thousands of refugees. A more complicated task is also an 
ability to decipher an ‘authentic’ asylum seeker from what British 
government has referred to as ‘bogus’ asylum seekers, or those are not in 
fact escaping their home countries from fear of persecution, but rather as 
means to improve their socio-economic standing. But then again, how 
should nation-states characterize an individual’s reasons for seeking 
asylum? Does the need to detach oneself from a cycle of poverty not good 
enough of a reason? After all, for majority who endure often lengthy and 
dangerous journeys abroad, doing so is a result of circumstances that do not 
afford them a real choice; but let us leave moral considerations aside.  
Without venturing into a debate on what justifies migrants’ right to 
seek refuge in another country, we can however establish that the overall 
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sentiment and socio-political reception of most EU countries has been 
inimical. Part of the reason is in the numbers. In other words, the number of 
illegal border-crossings, whether by land, air or more recently by sea (as 
exemplified by frequent crossing of the Mediterranean Sea from Africa) has 
increased considerably. Countries whose geographic position grants them 
access to the sea are among those most affected. Certainly Italy has been 
on the forefront on dealing with massive inflow of illegal migrants- the 2007 
Malta shipwreck incident and more recently the Mediterranean shipwrecks 
just this past year. France and Spain are among other Western countries 
who tackle the issue of mass migration. EU in general has seen an increase 
in illegal border crossings in recent years, mostly following the onset of the 
Arab Spring, or refugees from Sub-Saharan African countries such as Libya, 
whose asylum seekers fled conflict in the post-Qaddafi era.  And certainly 
the conflicts in Syria have had a tremendous impact on migration flows. 
The means to tackle these challenges are no easy task and although 
the EU has a general guideline in place, this issue has been for the most 
part dealt with internally by respective Member States. Certain countries 
have adopted various policies such as for example Germany’s ‘safe third 
country’ rule (although Germany is not the only MS to enforce it) as a result 
of the influx of migrants stemming out of war torn Balkans in the 1990’s. 
This rule is a ‘ procedural mechanism for shuttling asylum seekers to other 
States said to have primary responsibility for them, thereby avoiding the 
necessity to make a decision on the merits because another country is 
deemed or imagined to be secure’243.  
In laymen terms, it means sending the refugee back whence they 
came from. Other EU-based regulation such as the Dublin regulation 
stipulate that only one Member State is responsible for examining an asylum 
application, usually based on a hierarchical criteria244. But due to the 
                                                          
243 G.S. Goodwin-Gill and J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 
Oxford University Press, 2010 pp. 392. 
 
244 “Country Responsible for Asylum Application (Dublin)”, European Commission, 23 June 
2015, at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/asylum/examination-
of-applicants/index_en.htm, 29 June, 2015. 
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overwhelming scope of the problem and irregularity of sound immigration 
policies across Member States, the EU made an attempt to outline a 
comprehensive common immigration policy back in 2008. The European 
Commission’s Communication entitled “A Common immigration policy for 
Europe: principles, actions and tools"245, in conjunction with already 
previously implemented common programs, outlined ten principals related 
to immigration, grouped under the following three strands: 
Strand 1: Prosperity: 1) clear rules; 2) linking skills with demand 3) 
integration as a key 
Strand 2: Solidarity: 4) transparency, trust and cooperation among MS; 5) 
effective use of available means; 6) third-country partnership and dialogue 
on related issues. 
Strand 3: Security: 7) visa policies congruent with EU interest and bona 
fide travelers; 8) Schengen area IBM (Integrated Border Management); 9) 
increasing means to combat illegal immigration and zero-tolerance for 
human trafficking, and finally; 10) sustainable return policies. 
 
In light of our discussion, the second strand within the EU immigration 
policy is of most interest. Ii is within this parameter that we can deduct the 
concept of ‘burden-sharing’.  Certainly this burden-sharing carries a 
particularly difficult connotation, since it isn’t unilaterally applied. Meaning, 
in theory this shared responsibility is an argument that fails to provoke 
apprehension and unwillingness to cooperate among Member States, but in 
practice, this is a far different circumstance.  
Carrying the load of mass migration is more critical for some States 
than for others, due to reasons already mentioned. Virtually all countries 
deal with some sort of immigration, both legal and illegal, but what about 
those countries whose geo-political circumstances grant them a relief from 
an overwhelming challenge, like that of currently taking place in Italy?  
                                                          
245 “A Common Immigration Policy for Europe”, European Commission, Memo/08/402, 17 
June 2008, at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-08-402_en.htm, 29 June, 2015. 
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Should certain issues be prioritized and thusly dealt with accordingly by 
each individual Member States, or should all countries adhere to unilateral 
policies and standards? Should Member States have the right to deny full 
collaboration in EU’s common immigration policies in favor of internally 
designed schemes? How just this theoretical concept of burden-sharing 
should be implemented across the EU? These aforementioned 
contemplations aren’t clear cut nor easily addressed, for after all, 
immigration is very complex and multifaceted phenomena, which evokes 
economic, social, political and emotive consideration. Undoubtedly, an 
immigration policy is a delicate issue requiring a coalescence of wide-
ranging policy issues, national-EU coordination as well inter-state 
partnership.  
The EU just earlier this year has awarded over 13 million euros to Italy 
from its Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund (AMIF) to assist the 
country in coping with its enormous migratory pressures246. Let us keep in 
mind however, EU is a sum of its parts, and regardless of how much support 
Brussels guarantees, without securing comprehensive acquiescence among 
all Member States, the current migration policy is unsustainable. Mutual 
collaboration and overall willingness to concede to sometimes undesired 
measures in the spirit of greater good should in fact be the very essence of 
European Union.  
Unfortunately as history, especially in recent times, has clearly 
illustrated, this isn’t always the case. In an attempt to conceptualize the 
dichotomy of the EU’s position with regards to its current migration crisis, 
we will turn our discussion towards the east, and explore how one Visegrad 
country exercises its rights to safeguard its national interest against its 
presumed obligations towards its fellow Member States and the EU. 
 
 
                                                          
246 “European Commission Stands by Italy on Coping with Migratory Pressure on 
Lampedusa”, European Commission Press Release, 19 February 2015, at 
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 Contextualizing Hungary’s migratory legacy 
 
As already established, the migrant crisis has certainly placed a strain 
on an already exhausted EU. From a Visegrad perspective, several of its 
member countries have also been personally touched by the magnitude of 
the issue involved.  Hungary, in particular, due to its geo-political location 
has witnessed an influx of migrants and asylum seekers in the last few 
months, and consequently has been under considerable pressures both 
within and from Brussels to address this phenomenon. Just from the 
beginning of this year alone, Hungary has noted at least 61,000 migrants 
who have entered its borders, with the numbers increasing at an alarming 
rate247. In addition, the number of illegal border crossings in the Western 
Balkans has witnessed a 65% increase between 2013 and 2014248. These 
figures inevitably have a deep impact on neighboring Hungary, whose close 
physical proximity marks it as a transit country, and in some cases a final 
destination as a window to Europe from thousands of fleeing asylum 
seekers.  
A vast majority of them originate in the Western Balkans. According to 
a report published by Frontex, there was tenfold increase of illegal border 
crossings, mostly between Serbia and Hungary, of Kosovo nationals, as well 
as Syrians and Afghans traveling from Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria.249 Due 
to the aforementioned EU regulations stipulating that the first country of 
contact takes on the responsibility to process any claims of asylum, many 
countries such as Hungary are confronted with challenging task. Receiving 
people who have faced incredible ordeals, persecution, poverty is undeniably 
an ethical obligation of any developed nation, but it does carry a price tag. 
                                                          
247 “EU states at odds on eve of summit on migration crisis”, Reuters Online, 25 June. 2015 
at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/06/24/uk-europe-migrants-hungary-
idUKKBN0P412620150624?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews, 25 June 2015. 
248 A. Lista, “How Many Illegal Border Crossings in the Western Balkans, West Online, 13 
May, 2015 at http://www.west-info.eu/how-many-illegal-border-crossings-in-the-western-
balkans/, 1 July, 2015. 
249 “Situational Update on Migratory Flows in February 2015”, Frontex, 24 March, 2015, at 
http://frontex.europa.eu/news/situational-update-on-migratory-flows-in-february-2015-
R7HeSD, 1 July, 2015.  
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Naturally entails considerable inner economic, political, and quite often 
societal pressures, especially in countries where immigration is already a 
delicate and controversial issue (this brings to mind UK for example).  
Among all Visegrad countries, Hungary’s present-day characteristics 
make it unique in the context of the migration discourse. To understand its 
role requires us to consider its past. Part of the reason stems from its 
historical legacy of the Hungarian state as it underwent geo-political 
changes from being part of a monarchy during the Hapsburg Empire, and 
then later on a part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Because the Austro-
Hungarian Empire functioned as one unified political entity, naturally 
allowing for a fluid and unrestricted flow of people to be commonplace. 
Following the Empire’s collapse, Hungary as part of the losing Axis powers 
during World War I, had lost almost two-thirds of its land as a result of the 
Treaty of Trianon (1920). With the reconfiguration of borders, it also lost a 
considerable portion of ethnic Hungarians, who chose to settle in the 
neighboring newly established countries.  
These circumstances once again gave sustenance to the country’s 
questions on migration and equally important, national minorities. These 
migratory patterns and subsequent socio-political changes certainly became 
exacerbated in the framework of world events, notably the end of World War 
II, which again caused significant migratory shifts, due to evictions, 
resettlements and the ‘population exchange’.  
In the decades that followed under Soviet control, the country’s 
borders were closed off and rigorously controlled, as was the case in other 
Soviet satellites. As it is known, life under Soviet control was anything but 
easy, and certainly many people, including Hungarians made desperate 
attempts to cross the borders in search of political freedom. Hence, we could 
presume that a country whose historical legacy has been deeply entrenched 
in its own struggle for freedom, economic and political stability, would tread 
around the delicate issue of migration with a sense of understanding and 
even compassion.  
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Its people’s unique experiences can certainly help us understand 
Hungary’s role in treating migration as a socio-economic issue seriously. The 
aforementioned changes in the political map of eastern and central Europe 
in the twentieth century helped shape Hungary as a migratory hub- rooted 
in the history of its fluid borders. In addition, as already mentioned, 
Hungary’s location serves as a ‘gateway’ to Europe, especially to its Balkan 
neighbors who for centuries have been deemed as non-Europeans. With the 
conflicts of the 1990’s in Bosnia and Kosovo, thousands of refugees flooded 
northward. 
 The breakup of Yugoslavia was also a pivotal event that greatly 
influenced migratory trends, making Hungary a transient country to the 
West. An additional appeal stems from the fact that Hungary, - a member of 
the United Nations, NATO and most notably of course the European Union, 
as well as regional leader as part of the Visegrad Group, - has a resumè of 
considerably sound economic growth, and is a country undergoing 
transition. Certainly these factors make Hungary an attractive country for 
migrants who are in desperate search of a better life.  
 
Hungary’s Hardliner Response to the EU Migration Crisis 
 
In light of the aforementioned brief outline of Hungary’s historical 
legacy with regards to migration, all the more contributes to the 
bewilderment of its current stance on immigration. Despite Hungary’s own 
past experience and its commitment to EU values, its policies on 
immigration are very stern. To put it bluntly, the country under the current 
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, a member of the national conservative ruling 
party Fidesz, sees immigration as a wrong. In fact, Orbán is quoted saying 
that the goal is to not even limit immigration but “cease [it] whatsoever”,  
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calling the current liberal policies of the EU  although ‘considered obvious 
and morally based, … hypocrite”250. 
 Furthermore, Hungary’s stance goes beyond than just rhetoric. In 
fact, in light of the recent summit meetings between EU leaders on ways to 
tackle the ever increasing migration crisis, Orbán openly expressed his 
dissatisfaction with the proposed quota system, by halting the transfer of 
asylum seekers. The Prime Minister has also vowed to go as far as erecting 
a fence along the Hungarian-Serbian border to deter illegal migration251. 
This particular move evokes considerable condemnation as well as awe, 
since Hungary not very long ago was itself behind an ideological wall - the 
Iron Curtain. Orbán’s anti-immigration machinery utilized other 
unconventional tactics, one of which was placing government- sponsored 
billboards around Budapest that feature slogans such as: "If you come to 
Hungary, you cannot take away Hungarians' jobs" and "If you come to 
Hungary, you have to respect our culture!"252. 
The EU since the late 1990’s, following the plethora of political 
changes taking place and consequently shaping migration trends across the 
continent, made considerable efforts to create and implement a Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS)253. The aim of this initiative was to firstly 
improve on the already existing legislative framework with regards to 
migration, but also to address what was already mentioned- the all-
important but sensitive concept of ‘burden-sharing’ illustrated in Strand 2 of 
the EU’s common immigration policy. Under this framework, the EU calls for 
all Member States to share “responsibility to welcome asylum seekers in a 
                                                          
250
 V. Gulyas, “Hungary’s Orban Bashes Liberal Immigration Policy”, The Wall Street Journal Online, 25 August 
2014, at http://blogs.wsj.com/emergingeurope/2014/08/25/hungarys-orban-bashes-liberal-immigration-policy/, 1 
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 D. Bilefsky, “Hungary’s Plan to Build a Fence to Deter Migrants is Criticized”, The New York Times Online, 18 
June 2015, at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/19/world/europe/hungarys-plan-to-build-fence-to-deter-migrants-is-
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 “Hungary’s Anti-Immigration Campaign Sparks Up Controversy”, AFP, 8 June 2015, at 
http://news.yahoo.com/hungarys-anti-immigration-campaign-sparks-controversy-174317745.html, 2 July 2015. 
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 “Common European Asylum System”, European Commission, June 23, 2015, available at 
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dignified manner, ensuring they are treated fairly”, calling asylum a 
fundamental right and an “international obligation”.254  
The very same message was reiterated in its Communication entitled 
“On the Work of the Task Force Mediterranean”, outlining, among others, 
solidarity among Member States facing migratory pressures255. In addition, 
other measures undertaken by the EU to deal with the inflow of migrants 
and asylum seekers is to create Regional Protection Programmes (RPPs), 
which are “designed to enhance the protection capacity of the regions 
involved and to improve refugee protection through durable solutions, 
namely return , local integration,  and resettlement in a third country.“256  
What makes this particular initiative interesting is that considerable 
portion of its funding in fact comes from the Asylum, Migration and 
Integration Fund (AMIF), which generates its resources from Member 
States, which of course includes Hungary. Furthermore, the AMIF, with its 
overall budget of staggering 3.317 billion euros for a seven year period 
(2013-2020) stipulates that all Member States must allocate the funds on 
measures supporting legal migration, effective integration of third country 
nationals, and be obligated to- a significant point for Hungary- allocate at 
least additional 20% of the funds to asylum measures257. 
 
In light of the outlined EU measures and initiatives, it seems 
appropriate to ask, where does that place a country like Hungary with its 
unyielding stance on immigration? There is something intrinsically alarming 
                                                          
254 Ibidem. 
255 “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
the Work of the Task Force Mediterranean”, European Commission (COM) 2013, 12 April 
2013, at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-is-
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anean_en.pdf, 2 July 2015. 
256 Commission Communication to the Council and the European Parliament of 
1 September 2005 on Regional Protection Programmes”, European Commission, 1 
September 2005, at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l33222, 
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257 K. Babicka, “Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund”, Migration Online, at 
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with the current position undertaken by Orbán’s government, and not 
necessarily for the fact that curbing immigration is a favorable issue.  
In fact there are many Member States whose views on immigration 
aren’t exactly subtle, Hungary however theoretically seems to secure its 
commitment to collaborate on issues that affect the entire EU by 
participating in various initiatives and programs, and is in fact a signatory to 
various treaties, but under the presumption that these issues do not collide 
with internal agenda. However, Hungary’s stance on migration and more 
importantly its failure to accept its share of the burden, is in fact an 
illustration of selective participation.  
Being a member of the European Union comes with considerable 
benefits and privileges but it also means actively participating in burden-
sharing initiatives. The European Union places enormous emphasis on 
mutual collaboration in tackling challenging situations, such as the current 
migration crisis. Since 2014 alone, an estimated 11 million people were 
uprooted by violence, stemming mostly from conflicts in Syria, Afghanistan, 
Iraq and Ukraine258. Such staggering figures require a comprehensive, 
efficient and most importantly collaborative effort.  
Although Hungary’s current stance on immigration may seem 
surprising and even to some unexpected, the country’s lukewarm reception 
of foreigners stretches back two decades. Hungary’s strict migration policy 
however, has developed gradually. With the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
Hungary becoming once again a free nation, like many of its Eastern 
European counterparts, it abolished all obstacles to free movement. In the 
mid 1990’s, this slowly began to chance and Hungary’s ‘open doors’ began 
to slowly close to prospective migrants with the introduction of the  Act on 
Hungarian Citizenship and the Act on the Entry, Stay, and Immigration of 
Foreigners in Hungary, or the Act LV of 1993 on Hungarian Citizenship. 
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 This law tightened the requirements necessary for a foreign national 
to acquire Hungarian citizenship by stipulating a minimum 8 year residence, 
linguistic competence, employment verification and security, and a clean 
criminal record259. The aforementioned requirements meant to deter and 
limit the amount of outsiders seeking asylum. The country’s shift from 
simply controlling who and why a foreign national chose to settle in Hungary 
to how – by extensively addressing the issue of illegal border crossings.  
This was most notably outlined in its 1997 Act on Protecting the 
Borders and the Border Guard, which allocated considerably more power 
and resources to border guards, in an attempt to even further limit 
immigration260. Undoubtedly, all these measures certainly set the tone for 
present-day migration policies, but the country’s recent suspension to the 
adherence of the Dublin Regulation – which stipulates that asylum-seekers’ 
claims must be processed in the first country they reach -  can categorically 
confirm Hungary’s once open doors to be firmly shut.  
 
In an effort to balance out the argument, let us briefly consider some 
of the underlying reasons for Hungary’s harsh stance on immigration. 
Surely, the reception of thousands of foreigners is indubitably very 
challenging especially since many of them, more often than not, are in 
desperate need of medical attention; possess children that require 
education; whose skills and knowledge are sometimes deemed too limited 
for employability; whose linguistic, religious and cultural traditions often are 
very different than that of its host country.  
These factors are an inevitable part of the migration debate every host 
country has to come to terms with –economically, politically and socially- 
thusly, it isn’t too surprising that the reception is often less than affable. The 
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USA online, at 
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country justified its recent decisions as absolutely necessary to help it meet 
a serious migration challenge. According to data from Eurostat, Hungary has 
received 44, 775 asylum applications in 2014 alone 261 and in two years 
prior the country had the highest naturalization rate in the EU (12.8 
acquisitions per 100 foreign residents). Majority of these asylum-seekers 
result from illegal border crossings from the neighboring Kosovo, and war-
torn Syria and Afghanistan- thusly strengthening its case to construct a 
fence at the most vulnerable borders.  
A necessary digression is appropriate here with regards to Hungary’s 
border fence construction. United States has implemented a similar tactic 
along its borders with Mexico, producing variable results. Namely, although 
border enhancements have decreased since the fence was erected, but with 
regards to overall immigration trends however, it has failed to produce long-
term results. The undocumented population has in fact tripled in over a 
decade, from 3.9 million in 1995 to 12 million262.  
Furthermore, the PM Orbán’s argument is reasonably strengthened by 
his claims that illegal immigrants can be potentially linked to terrorism, 
accounting for a large number of migrants coming from Islamic countries. 
Undeniably, the proliferation and the magnitude of terrorist activities around 
the world in recent times is a fact that every country must unfortunately 
come to terms with.  
Controversial and challenging issues such as immigration never exist 
in a vacuum, and are subject to internal socio-political debate. Often, the 
greatest scrutiny over an issue is manifested in national politics, where 
political parties possess tremendous influence over the course of policy 
development. In the case of Hungary, the current Prime Minister Viktor 
Orbán’s political party affiliation is with the country’s ruling conservative 
party, Fidesz, only solidifies how truthful the previous statement really is. 
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Fidesz has been notorious for its ultra-nationalist and often anti-EU 
views, repeatedly undermining the checks and balances in the Hungarian 
politics in order to transform the country in its image and according to its 
ideology. It is no secret that this party has radical views on many issues, 
which of course includes immigration. The party’s tactics have included re-
writing of the Constitution in 2011 and changing electoral rules to its 
advantage263.  
What this of course illustrates is how a country’s policies are not 
necessary reflecting the overall sentiment of its citizenry, but rather are a 
product of political parties who, as clearly demonstrated by Hungary’s 
Fidesz, can display authoritarian tendencies. 
Every controversial stance, decision, policy is always met by its share 
of criticism. With regards to the aforementioned factors aimed at justifying 
the country’s migration policies, it is appropriate to consider some opposing 
arguments. Foremost, let us examine Hungary’s position from an ideological 
standpoint. Namely, one of Hungary’s justifications is the economic, political 
and social price tag associated with migrant reception, discounting the moral 
and ethical considerations.  
Thusly, one counter argument in particular, centers on a country and 
the international community’s moral obligation to assist those individuals 
who flee war, persecution, and poverty. After all, as the United Nations’ 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights clearly states that all persons, 
regardless of sex, color, ethnicity or creed “[have] the right to life, liberty 
and security of person”, freedom of being “ held in slavery”, nor be “ 
subjected to torture, or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment”264. Hungary being a member of the United Nations, inextricably 
must adhere to these principals, which sadly quite often remain relevant 
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Guardian Online, 9 April, 2014, at 
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only on paper. Which, as many would probably agree, is a reason in itself 
for the current migration crisis.   
Moreover, persecuted and often desperate individuals often have 
nothing to lose, making their determination to flee their worn-torn and 
poverty stricken homelands that much more decisive. As demonstrated in a 
similar case regarding US-Mexico border, construction of a fence, regardless 
of how well monitored, is not a guaranteed deterrent. In fact, documented 
data has shown that border fences have not stopped illegal immigration, but 
rather displaced it. Simply put, if asylum seekers are determined to reach a 
‘better life’, border fence will only force them to try crossing in more 
dangerous or remote areas, or through near-by bodies of water. This reality, 
from a humanitarian standpoint, should be taken under serious 
consideration by Member States, as although it might decrease border 
apprehensions, it will most likely contribute to increased death toll. Lastly, it 
is important to point out however, that several countries closer to home 
(Hungary) have implemented similar ideas with regards to border fences, 
Bulgaria and Slovakia are among the few.  
Furthermore, Hungary’s expressed fears over the link between 
immigrants and the threat of terrorism in essence only stems from 
xenophobic sentiments rather than actual facts, because there is no 
indisputable data yet available, illustrating a direct correlation between 
immigrants who profess Muslim faith as a prerequisite for terrorist activities. 
In fact, majority of Muslim immigrants who seek asylum in EU, do so in 
order to escape often extreme and oppressive Islamic regimes and terrorist 
groups such as ISIS for example. The notion that individuals who oppose 
terrorism on their own home-turf would risk a lengthy and often dangerous 
journey with their families to commit acts of terrorism elsewhere, just does 
not hold much validity. Furthermore, recent developments around the world 
have demonstrated that a considerable portion of terrorist activity in a given 
country is often undertaken by its very own nationals, rather than 
foreigners. 
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One of Orbán’s commentaries in recent months merits considerable 
reflection nonetheless, and in itself gives his country’s position ample credit. 
Namely, the Prime Minister expressed his view that EU’s current approach is 
faulty and the entire system is broken. Few could argue against this 
statement. Consequently, he proposed that instead of financing further the 
current EU immigration policy, Member States should improve development 
in the immigrants’ home countries, by focus on increasing the birth rate, or 
implement back-to-work programs for Europe’s 10 million Romani 
population265,266. Hungary is certainly following its own advice, especially 
with regards to increasing birth rates. The government has implemented a 
series of tactics that by some, maybe deemed as pure propaganda with a 
despotic touch. Namely, every time a Hungarian couple is married, the state 
sends out a ‘congratulatory’ card, which includes poetry and statements 
promoting childbirth as a way to ensure the continuation of the Hungarian 
nation. For example, “If your love for one another becomes the source of a 
new life, that’s the greatest gift to your family. A child is a blessing, and the 
pledge of survival of the family and our nation”267.  Although setting national 
agenda, which of course includes encouraging childbirth, is of course the 
right of every Member States, it is however unsurprising why some would 
deem Orbán’s approach a bit authoritarian for EU standards. For starters, 
Orbán has ruled Hungary for 8 years now, longer than any other politician 
and his party’s nationalist rhetoric is alarming. Moreover, Zsolt Bayer, a 
Fidesz party co-founder and good friend of Viktor Orbán, has been recorded 
as making shockingly racist comments about Roma, Hungary’s biggest 
minority, in a right-wing newspaper Magyar Hirlap. He wrote that “a 
significant part of the Roma are unfit for coexistence … they are not fit to 
live among people”268 . Thus, taking in account that Hungary, being a 
member of the EU whose foundations are built upon liberal democracy, open 
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and free society, tolerance, multicultural ideals, makes the country’s right-
wing extremism, anti-Semitism, anti-ziganism, and anti-immigration 
tendencies very alarming indeed. Critical views regarding Orbán, on behalf 
of other EU HoS seem to definitely solidify this sentiment. In an EU summit 
held in Riga earlier this year, the head of the European Commission Jean-
Claud Juncker went as far as jokingly greeting the Hungarian Prime Minster 
as a ‘dictator’269. Although the gesture was accompanied by a bit of humor, 
the overall sentiments among Member States are quite solemn, 
characterizing Orbán and his ‘illiberal democracy’ views as authoritarian. 
With regards to Orbán’s most recent clash with Brussels over his refusal to 
participate in the EU-proposed schemes aimed at addressing the current 
migration crisis, the Austrian Interior Minister Johanna Mikl-Leitner found its 
“decision completely unacceptable”270. Furthermore, as means of opposition 
Austria responded with significant outrage to Orbán’s refusal to cooperate 
on EU burden-sharing initiatives. The country warned it will reinstate 
controls on the Hungarian border or even reinstate passport checks on its 
passport-free borders. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
The European migration crisis is undoubtedly an issue that 
encompasses a plethora of considerations. The article aimed to illustrate the 
dichotic nature of EU-based initiatives, and as the case of Hungary clearly 
exemplifies that coalescing commitments on issues affecting the entire 
Union with national agenda and policies can be very challenging and 
controversial. Taking aside the aforementioned criticism and concerns over 
Orbán’s ultra-nationalist and anti-democratic migration policies, it is 
                                                          
269 “Juncker greets Orban as ‘hello dictator’”, EurActive, 22 May 2015, at 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eu-priorities-2020/juncker-greets-orban-hello-dictator-
314812, 4 July 2015. 
270 A. MacDonald, “EU States at Odds on Eve of Summit on Migration Crisis”, Reuters, 25 
June 2015, at http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/06/24/uk-europe-migrants-hungary-
idUKKBN0P412620150624?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews, 5 July, 2015.  
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appropriate to foremost admit that addressing the root of this crisis must 
foremost take center-stage, and only then can we objectively comment on 
migration policies of each Member State. Furthermore, despite the overall 
critical response to Hungary’s stance on immigration, Orbán’s proposals of 
initiating long-term responses such as boosting socio-economic development 
in places like Africa, require further consideration by the European Union. 
The EU  as part of its agenda in future summits has outlined the need to 
place further emphasis on boosting aid to countries where emigrants leave 
from, thusly discouraging economic migrants from leaving their home lands, 
and accelerating the return of failed asylum seekers. Undoubtedly, Europe 
faces a myriad of immigration challenges and opportunities: Demographic 
pressures as many European societies age, an often difficult political debate 
over questions of identity and immigrant integration, and a unique 
environment that has combined 28 European countries together with 
regards to the management of outer borders, asylum, and other 
immigration-related topics. Certainly, in such a complex and multicultural 
environment securing agreement among all Member States in accordance 
with their own national agendas, will sure be a challenge. Hungary is an 
illustrated case point of the scope of varying views within the European 
Union. Moreover, despite the influence of Brussels, we must be mindful that 
nationalist parties within each Member States exert the most power which 
ultimately sway a country to adopt certain policies. Today more than ever, 
with terrorism looming large across the continent, it remains unclear if 
political headwinds will facilitate a new climate of immigration reform. 
Undeniably, Hungary’s stance touched a nerve among Member States, but 
does is necessarily negate its right to adhere to policies as it sees fit, just 
because of its membership in the European Union? Outside of moral 
considerations that place a heavy burden on its anti-immigration policies, 
there are inevitably some countries who perhaps support Orbán’s policies, in 
the name of safeguarding national interests. Economically, politically and 
culturally sensitive debates among Member States on issues such as 
migration policy, are ones that seldom offer any real mutually satisfying 
conclusions. Lastly, with regards to Hungary, let us conclude with a hopeful 
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but a bit paradoxical point nonetheless, expressed a long time ago by 
Hungary’s first king, who said to his countrymen: "Therefore I command you 
… to extend a benevolent protection and respect towards newcomers, so 
that they would rather stay with you instead of settling somewhere else"271. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
271
 “Brief History of Hungary”, Visegrad Group Online, at 
http://www.visegradgroup.eu/basic-facts-about/hungary/brief-history-of-hungary, 6 July 
2015. 
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International Political Economy – the V4 States and the Economic 
Transformation 
 
The historical past 
The economic crisis of 2008 raised old fears and questions to be solved. The 
stability and integrity of the European Union were questioned as the 
problems seemed to be somewhat similar, but the reasons and the heritage 
were different among the old, as well as the new member states. It is woth 
to examine the reasons of this different reaction.  
It is a part of historical legacy that the European continent cannot be 
considered a homogeneous entity; there are cleavages which are either 
cultural or economic. It is not surprising that these cleavages are located 
more or less at the same places.272 Among others, the Wallerstein’s 
model273 that characterised the triple-divided construction was accepted by 
the Hungarian historians as well.  
Central and Eastern Europe can be identified as a special type of transitional 
zone. It is a special transitional and civilisational zone. Examining the 
consequences of this division it is also important to explore the reasons of 
these dinamic changes. The European continent of the 18th century can be 
characterized as a triple-divided construcion (Wallerstein, 1983): A more 
developed epicentre—a central core or plateau, the developed countries with 
the appearance of capitalism, the free market, global division of labour, 
including the existence of independent political units (in this case, states) at 
the same time. There is no political centre, compared to global empires. 
                                                          
272
 It is very popular to deal with the division of Europe. The core and periphery theory by Wallerstein is based on 
the same ideology that was also described by the Hungarian historian Szűcs Jenő in his work: Vázlat Európa három 
történeti régiójáról in the early 1980s. Szűcs Jenő: Vázlat Európa három történeti régiójáról. In. Történelmi Szemle, 
1981/3. 313–359 The importance of this essay – apart from the intention to write a synthesis comparing the 
different regions of Europe – was its delicate timing. The essay was published in the early 1980s and claimed that 
there was no homogenious Eastern Europe.  
273
 Wallerstein, I: A modern világgazdasági rendszer kialakulása: A tőkés mezőgazdaság és az európai világgazdaság 
eredete a XVI. században, Budapest, Gondolat, 1983 
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1. A more developed epicentre—a central core or plateau, the developed 
countries with the appearance of capitalism, the free market, global 
division of labour, including the existence of independent political units 
(in this case, states) at the same time. There is no political centre, 
compared to global empires. 
2. A periphery—a synonym for the dependent developing countries. The 
main reason for the position of the developed countries is economic 
power. 
3. A semi-periphery—states that are located between the core and the 
periphery. They catch influence from the core area, but there are 
characteristic features that make them similar to the periphery, too. 
 
It can be said that this division survived for centuries. This historic heritage 
remained in Europe as a dual structure. The difference can be caught in the 
following issues: nation state versus global governance, representation of 
the local or global interests, federalism or strong nation state. The questions 
of the role of religion and the national language are also remarkable. There 
is a difference in the question of the role of the state. The revival of nation 
states after transition was very often accompanied by strong centralisation 
efforts, which resulted in the total absence or a weakness of the 
decentralised institutional system and autonomies of the regions. The 
judgement of 1989, or the transition process itself differs according to the 
judges. It can be described as the ‘annus mirabilis’when a great political and 
economic transformation appeared without violence (Kornai, 2005). On the 
other hand, there is a perception that as the change was so rapid and 
covered all spheres it can be called revolution. According to rather sceptical 
Jürgen Habermas, it can be described rather as a “repairing revolution” 
instead of a regenerative revolution. There is another phenomenon 
frequently used to characterize this region. As the assistance of the state, or 
the government is determinative the initiatives usually come from above. 
The word is “refolution”, which is a compositon of two words: reform 
phenomenon ‘Europe’ can be identified, from which angles we can speak 
about a homogeneous Europe, and where cleavages can be pointed out. If 
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such cleavages exist, can they serve as inner borders of the continent? What 
can be said about their origin, historical background?  
The change of the regime brought the remapping of the European continent 
as the post-socialist states also expressed their claim for acknowledgment 
as the full members of Europe. European integration was the final proof of 
the fact that the borders of Europe are not equal with the line of the iron 
curtain, however several doubts arose in connection this issue.  
There is an other element of transformation that is related to the economic 
issue. It is strongly conencted not only with the economy itself but it 
requires a much greater effort to undertake the essential policy reforms, 
too. The centrally planned economic systems chose a painful way of 
reconstruction that were leading to market economy. As there was no 
reason to speak about a homogenious Soviet sphere of interest there is no 
possiblity to speak about unifrormed transition and equal consequences 
either. Whereas some countries expanded quickly and could catch up with 
their developed neighbours within a generation, others experienced sluggish 
economic growth and a relatively low standard of livings. 
Different scenarios of reforms 
The Hungarian economic and political transformation was based mostly on 
the principles of the debt trap. However, it is worth to examine the reasons 
why the debt trap became so typical in the Soviet bloc and why it obtained 
such a determining influence and consequence in the Hungarian economy. 
Naturally, it can be explained by several ways. It was a consequence of the 
reaction of the Hungarian political elite after the revolution and war of 
independence. The representatives of the political elite tried to avoid any 
violence after the collapse of the 1956 revolution and war of independence. 
It was much easier to concentrate on consumption and if there was lack of 
inner resources, it was the easiest way to ask for a loan from the banks. 
Based on the invisible compromise between the politicians and the 
inhabitants the so-called ’Kadarism’ was not glorified by the society, as it 
was rather considered as an acceptable agreement based on the attempt 
from the state to meet the needs of the nation and to limit the level of the 
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dictatorship in political aspect and in the cultural sphere. If there was 
anything that could threaten the balance, the danger of losing legitimacy 
emerged.274 
The troubles the Hungarian economy had to face were not the consequence 
of the oil crisis from 1973. The small adjustments became necessary much 
earlier. In the 1960s, the world was still far enough from the oil crisis. In 
order to get a more precise outline of the history of the Hungarian economy 
we have to go to the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Until the twilight of 
the Habsburg Monarchy, the Hungarian economy was functioning as a part 
of an economic integration and common currency zone.275 Since 1920, as a 
consequence of the birth of the independent but truncated state, the 
Hungarian economy transformed from the status of a part of an empire into 
a small and internationally open economy that brought about a significant 
dependency on the trade partners both in export and import activities. That 
was the reason why it was essential for the Hungarian economy to find 
adequate international trade partners, even if it meant the opening towards 
the fascist Italian economy or the sympathy towards the German 
Grossraumwirtschaft or later, after 1945, the thrust towards the Comecom. 
This latter sympathy resulted in an unilateral dependence on the Soviet 
Union that gradually became less and less tolerable.  
It was pointless to speak about the socialist region as politically 
homogeneous, but economic and social differences particularly emerged 
right in the late 1940s. According to several views, the reason of the 
collapse of communism can also be explained by this unequal heritage and 
development. Communism failed because it was based on a model, in some 
sense inappropriate, or the particular Soviet incarnation was at fault. The 
model served not too badly in special circumstances, such as the economic 
take-off in the terminology of Rostow, but it failed hopelessly in a mature 
economy. It was widely recognisable in the case of Czechoslovakia that, 
                                                          
274
 As Romsics explains it in his essay dealing with the threats of the Hungarian political legitimacy. In: Romsics 
Ignác: A Kádár-rendszer legitimitásvesztése az 1980-as években, In: Rubicon, 2009/7-8  
275
 However, there were several attempts to create the Hungarian monetary independence it became realistic only 
once, when the Hungarian prime minister and minister of finance, Sándor Wekerle hindered the attempt that 
would have led to the leaving of the common currency and economic zone. (Vígvári, 2008)  
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thanks to its historical and geographical background, it can be characterised 
as the most industrialised and most urbanised state within the communist 
bloc. 
During the economic transition, the following principles were kept in mind. 
1. The transition to market economy was accompanied with the 
urgent demand of adaptation to a completely different environment of 
world economy 
2. There was an inappropriate development trend of economy 
based on depressing structure of obsolete industry and stagnating 
service sector 
3. There was a significant deficiency in domestic capital funds with 
high foreign debts276 
 
The main argument in favor of transition was a desire to put the countries in 
question on the path of sustainable growth. It was assumed that the shift of 
porperty rights from state to private hands and the shift of allocation 
mechanism from state to free market would soon enhance saving rates and 
capital formation, as well as allocative efficiency. (Kołodko, 2000) 
The expectetions of the outcomes of these reforms seemed to be too 
optimistic as in all transition economies, before growth has occured (an it 
some countries there was not growth at all in the first ten years after 
transition) there has been several contraction, ranging from 20 % over 
three years in Poland to over 60% in nine years in Ukraine. These 
unfortunate results, as Kołodko remarks, were the consequence of both the 
legacy of the previous system and the policies exercised during transition, 
however it is obvious that the policies had the major importance.  
The rapid growth of the previous decades came to a stop: in 1979 and 
1980, Hungary’s growth rate declined to 1.6% and 0.0%, respectively. 
Poland, in 1981 and 1982, experienced a severe decline, -10% and -4.8% 
                                                          
276
 Gál and Rácz write about this in ’Gál, Z: Rácz, Sz: Socio- Economic Analysis of the Carpathian Area, Discussion 
Papers Special, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Pécs, 2008, pp. 4-7 
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respectively. It became obvious that growth policy of the Soviet bloc had to 
be changed and the economy slowed significantly – from the annual 3.9% 
increase of the GDP between 1950 and 1973 to 1.2% between 1973 and 
1989.277 The economic crisis in the socialist world increased the necessity of 
transformation. It was strongly connected with the oil crisis which began in 
1973. However, the real causes lay much deeper.278 The reserves of the 
extensive import-substituting industrialisation dried up around the late 
1960s. As the economic policy of the Soviet bloc concentrated on the self-
sufficiency within the Comecon member states, the foreign trade with the 
market economies were neglected until the 1960s. Unfortunately for the 
members of the Comecon, the symbols of the new technology were seldom 
used, partly because of political and security purposes – were used mainly in 
the military industry.279 Raw material prices, on the other hand, increased. 
In case of Hungary, it had a negative effect on the balance of trade between 
Hungary and the Soviet Union, because for the same amount of raw 
material, the state had to pay with 3 to 5 times more products. Sometimes 
raw materials had to imported from the world market and that also brought 
the painful recognition of the difference between the competitive world 
market and the isolated world of Comecon member states. The roots of this 
issue are based on the insufficiency of modernisation. 
The countries of import-substituting industrialisation could not follow the 
technological revolution and experienced devastating trade deficits. The lack 
of adjustment in building new modern export sectors based on the 
achievements of the technological revolution exacerbated the crisis. 
According to Berend's vision280 of the Schumpeterian structural crisis (the 
                                                          
277
 Here it is essential to make some remarks. As it is visible from the statistical data that both Berend (Berend Op. 
cit, 2006) and Janos (Janos, A. C. : haladás, hanyatlás hegemónia 2004), it turns out that the most dynamic region 
was the Soviet bloc from 1945 to 1973. Their annual growth of GDP exceeded the annual growth of the Western 
European region. The reason of this can be explained with the fact that thanks to the rapid industrialisation, an 
enormously great part of the national income was spent to investments that resulted a significant economic 
growth. However, this policy concluded with harmful consequences; the development of heavy industry was in 
the centre of the investments and the light industry, the supplier of the consumption of the population was 
neglected such as life circumstances. On the other hand, the resources of the rapid growth concentrated in 
extensive elements that resulted in a slow process of the depletion of resources. 
278
 Berend (2006) Op. cit. 
279
 On the other hand, the existence of the so-called COCOM list (Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export 
Controls) prevented the Socialist bloc from being acquainted with the tools of the newest technology. 
280
 Berend (2006) Op. cit. 
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decline of the old and the rise of the new leading sectors as a consequence 
of technological revolution, which generated a 1-2 decade stagnation or slow 
growth) of the 1970s-1980s hit the socialist countries especially hard; they 
were unable to introduce competitive new technology and export sectors. 
The opening of the economies brought the fear of inflation, and the ever-
increasing trade deficit. It was functioning as a double-edged sword. The 
Kádár regime in Hungary and the acceptance, or at least tolerance of 
socialism was based on a moderate level of the standards of living. It was 
called socialist market economy, although, in fact, it obtained some 
elements of the market economy. However, it was still isolated and the 
requirements towards the Comecon membership obstructed the acceptance 
of the principles of the market economy. The system of rationing was over, 
most of the goods were available in shops.281 This was the basis of the calm 
and boring everyday life of the Hungarian population. Consumption was 
guaranteed at a moderate level, the possibility of extra work was also 
acceptable especially from the early 1980s, when the germs of the private 
sector were already widespread. People had the right to organise small 
enterprises, so-called communities of works and they could earn extra 
money and to concentrate on consumption. 
The faith towards the state was the basis of the socialist Hungary. It was 
assumed that the individual didn’t have the possibility (even didn’t have the 
reason) to involve himself or herself in decisions belonging to the political 
sphere. It was commonly accepted that the individual didn’t have the 
possibility to do anything against decisions harmful for the inhabitants, 
furthermore, the paternalistic political system did everything to convince 
them that the state would make every effort to let the citizens to meet their 
needs and the only thing that was expected from them was not to argue 
                                                          
281
 Of course, this can be examined in two ways. If we compare the level of consumption in Hungary with the 
Western European standards, we can see how deep the Hungarian level was. But on the other hand, if the level of 
Hungarian consumption was compared with other Socialist states which still had the system of rationing, like e.g. 
Poland in case of meat or the Soviet Union where a lot of goods from sugar to washing powder could be bought 
only in limited amounts, Hungary found itself in a distinguished position. This is why the Hungarian system was 
called ’fridge socialism’ together with ’goulash communism’. 
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against them.282 This behaviour towards the state survived and transformed 
at a moderate way. Because of the change of the regime, the convulsive 
behaviour of the inhabitants previously shown towards the policemen, 
tollers, or frontier-guards almost disappeared, but on the other hand the 
fear of economic vulnerability increased. It is recognisable in the conviction 
that every entrepreneur was swindler and the price of their success was paid 
by the losing average inhabitant. These two decades of the political and 
economic transformation still couldn’t erase this type of conviction and the 
consequences of the economic crisis of 2008, the decline in the living 
conditions of a great part of the population amplified this feeling.  
 
Per capita GDP as a percentage of Western Europe 
 1950 1973 1989 1990 
Albania 21.9 19.9 15.6 15.6 
Bulgaria 36.1 46.3 39.2 35.1 
Czechoslovakia 76.5 61.7 55.3 53.3 
Hungary 54.2 49.0 43.5 40.5 
Poland 53.4 46.8 35.8 32.0 
Romania 25.8 30.5 24.9 22.0 
Yugoslavia 33.9 38.2 39.4 36.2 
Total 7 Eastern 
European 
countries 
46.1 43.7 37.3 34.1 
USSR 62.1 53.1 44.8 43.1 
Source: Maddison 
 
The problems of international integration 
 
The aim of the central planned systems was to achieve balance within the 
system they controlled, and external relations were a compoilation to this. 
                                                          
282
 This is the opinion belonging to Elemér Hankiss and László Bruszt, the famous Hungarian sociologists quoted in 
Figyelő/ 2007/ September 
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(Myant, Drahokoupil, 2011, 23) As the system envolved, it took on two 
particular pecularities.  
 
1. The first was that negotiation over foreign trade between the 
state Socialist countries was conducted to a substantial extent in 
quantity terms, offering surplus products in exchange goods that were 
needed for the domestic economy. Prices then could be negotiated to 
ensure bilateral balance.  
 
2. The second was a system of foreign trade prices that bore no 
necessary relations to domestic prices. There was no single exchange 
rate and certainly no currency convertibility. Hard currency was strictly 
rationed and centrally allocated. The economic logic behind this was 
the implicit assumption that convertibility and gree trde would lead to 
balance-of payments deficits, while the central controls were also seen 
as protection against the influence of instabilities in the world 
economy.  
 
 
The problems with the system of international trade had three important 
consequences. 
 
1. To limit access to modern technology and innovations. 
2. The limit scope for specialization and economies of scale in 
manufacturing 
3. To protect inefficient and uncompetitive enterprises 
 
State socialist countries needed to export to earn hard currency – none 
could be self-sufficient, nor could the bloc as a whole produce all its needs – 
but for this, they had to rely on exports of raw materials or 
semimanufactures.  
The core of the reforms (named New Economic Mechanism) consisted in 
decentralization of the decision-making process in the economy that was 
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shifted from the centre to the companies. Hoiwever the main decisions still 
remained in the hands of the government. On the other hand, companies in 
Hungary were relatively independent – in contrast to their counterparts in 
Czechoslovakia. (Zidek, 2014, 57) 
Hungary unified its exchange rate in 1981 already and following 1988, all 
enterprises were allowed to pursue international trade in convertible 
currencies after gaining a (vistrually automatic) registration with the 
Ministry of Trade. Hungary became the member of the IMF already in 1982, 
while Poland joined only in 1986283, Czechoslovakia in 1990, while after the 
dissolution of Czechoslovakia both Czech Republic and Slovakia joined 
separately in 1993.284  
In 1990 many scholars doubted that „the seeds of capitalist democracy 
would ever take root in postsocialist soil.” (Bohle-Gerskovits, 2012) 
What was the reason of this scepticism and how could the economic and 
political transition be characterized?  
1. There were some preconditions missing to successful 
transformation. Among others we can list the following ones: lack of 
adequate institutions on the field of political institutions, cultural 
background and econimc sphere.  
2. The doubtful experts also mentioned the impossibility of 
building markets and democracy simulatenaously. 
3. The end of the cold war caused several doubts and problems 
in the Central an Eastern European region. Once there was a general 
pessimism visible however the fragile nature of the central region and 
the political and economic vaccum, the instabile vison of the future of 
the region also increased uncertainty of the populaton of the referred 
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 Poland originally became a member of the Fund on January 10, 1946 and withdrew from membership, effective 
March 14, 1950. Poland was readmitted as a member of the Fund on June 12, 1986. 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/memdate.htm 
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 Czechoslovakia became a member of the Fund on December 27, 1945 and ceased to be a member, effective 
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membership of Czechoslovakia on January 1, 1993. http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/memdate.htm 
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region such as the politicians from the Central and eastern European 
region and the international sphere.  
4. Since the 1980s there was a general instability in the world 
economy too. The global economy however left the postsocialist 
newcomers little room for emulating the Western demcracies’ postwar 
pattern of fast growth with equality and political stability.  
 
As Bohle and Gerskovits explain there were various methods how to analyze 
the problems of transformations. Polanyi (Polanyi) explained this question 
focusing to the conflicts the transformation generated. He described the 
conflicts at the following speheres: 
1. market economy 
2. social cohesion 
3. political legitimacy 
He also added a forth one to this triple conflict mentioning that the whole 
transformation process took part in Europe’s less advanced periphery that 
could cause a more complicated situation and less opportunity to get over 
the difficulties in a more single way.  
There were several ways to interprete the models of economic 
transformations. The most acceptable version calculates with five varieties 
accross Russia, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. Based on different forms 
of international integration and domestic state structures, Martin Myant and 
Jan Drahokoupil have distinguished the following types of capilatism: 
1. foreign direct investment –based  
2. peripherial market economies 
3. oligarchic-clientelistic 
4. order states 
5. remittance- or aid-based capitalisms285  
                                                          
285
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Hungary was the first country in the region that incorporated value added 
tax into the tax system, which occurred in 1988 (Zidek, 2014, 58). By the 
end of 1989 at least two-third of the prices became liberalized. Value added 
tax appeared in Poland only in 1993, while in Czechoslovakia the economic 
reforms began as a consequence of the vlvet revolution in 1989. Signs of 
economic intervention were in accordance with the initiatives of the 
International Monetary Fund labelled “big bang” of January 1991. After the 
acceptance of recommendation initiated by the IMF Czechoslovakia 
underwent a rapid economic reform that resulted the liberalization of 95% of 
the prices by 1995 and the convertibility of the Czech crown by the same 
year.286 
The lack of the adequate economic and political institutions led to the 
challenges of the global pressure the postsocialist economies had to face. 
Therefore, their emergence and consolidation have been much more 
influenced by international and transnational factors and actors than was 
usual in Western cases.  
There is still a debate among scholars if the economic transformation the 
East Central European states underwent can be considered as a story of 
success. There are also arguments that focus on the fact that transformation 
into capitalist economic system created a harsher environment for the 
newcomers’ return to capitalism than the postwar system would have done. 
The end of the Cold War both prepared by and resulted in new 
circumstances marked by a revival of nineteenth century economic 
liberalism as neoliberalism which, according to critical accounts, has put the 
system’s postwar dynamics “into reverse gear”.  
In the new era, volatile global finance became replaced by Bretton Woods 
system. Monetarist coordination replaced by Keynesian demand 
management, flexible specialization took over from Fordist mass production. 
From its birth, postsocialist capitalism became part and parcel of new global 
environment that was called the expansion of “markets within states” but 
squeezed “states within markets”. As a consequence, social protection 
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1995 while Slovakia accepted its own fiscal and monetary policy with the creation of the new state.  
Online-Reader: Joint Second Cycle Degree in International Relations: Europe in the Visegrad Perspective             
142 
 
Material under copyright protection. 
 
became subordinates to the cause of global competitiveness. The formal 
socialist states have had to cope with the risks and threats of an ideological 
climate, too.  
Transition to a market economy can be considered as a lengthy process 
comprised of various spheres of economic activites. (Kołodko, 2000) As 
Kołodko pointed out new institutional arrangements are of key importance 
for successful transformation and market economy requires not only liberal 
regulation and private ownership, but also adequate institutions. This 
institutional building process can last for several months even years. Apart 
from building new institutions new organizations, new laws and the 
changing behavior of various economic entities is also required. There is a 
generally accepted belief that a market economy can be introduced by shock 
therapy however it proved to be wrong and in most cases, this attempt 
caused more problems than it has solved. The speed of transformation, the 
“level of shock” depends on the scope of financial destabilization and is only 
possible under certain political conditions.  
A very good example of “shock therapy” is the rapid reconstruction and 
economic reform related to the formal Minister of Finance and Deputy Prime 
Minister of Poland, Leszek Balcerowicz and his team. In 1989 a commission 
of expert was formed under his presidency. Among the members of the 
commission there were Polish and foreign experts, like Jeffrey Sachs, Stefan 
Kawalec and Wojciech Misiag. The programme itself had a general change in 
the inflation rate of Poland as well as the stagnation of unemployment rate. 
It also stimulated the economy by pulling the economy out of crisis. In 1990 
the annual growth of Polish GDP was approximately 10 percent below zero. 
The same tendency was recognisable the next year, too. However from the 
early 1990s a dynamic annual growth broke the previous trends and this 
dynamism was not changed into stagnation in the following 20 years, too.  
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Source: http://www.dziennik.com/wiadomosci/artykul/plan-balcerowicza-
po-20-latach-poczatek-wielkiego-przelomu 
 
Although this reform proved to be rather painful and radical, the outcomes 
of it helped in the reconstruction of the Polish economy. In 2010, around 20 
years after the announcement of the programme the Polish society had the 
chance to evaluate its success. As it turned out from the result of the 
surwey only around 5 percent of the population had negative opinion about 
the programme itself.  
Effectiveness of Balcerowicz’s reforms 
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source: http://www.mojeopinie.pl/img/zoom0/kolodko.jpg 
 
From the graph the datas also represent the annual growth of GDP in Poland 
in accordance with the change of the unemployment rate. Note, that the 
European integration in 2004 didn’t bring the positive effect in 2005, but 
since 2006 Poland became one of the most dynamic state of the EU10s.287 
 
The Poles themselves were sceptical about their future position even after 
joining the European Union, but the rapid growth and the success they 
reached in absorbing the different supports from the European Union and 
their new possibilities for cooperating with other states and participating in 
joint projects gradually changed their opinion, too. Nowadays Poland can be 
evaluated as one of the most successful example of European integration. 
The annual growth of GDP was never gone below zero despite the economic 
crisis in 2008.  
 
The Hungarian shock therapy – the “Bokros package” 
The Hungarian government was hesitating in the implementation of the 
necessary reforms related to the restructuralization of economy. As it is 
readable from the memoirs of leading Hungarian economists288 the first 
freely elected government did not take so seriously the stagnation of 
eceonomy as the Poles. As Surányi remarks the economic decline in 
Hungary reached 22 percent of GDP between 1989 and 1992 however it was 
far the most moderate decline within the Central and Eastern European 
region. (Lengyel-Surányi, 2013, p. 156) Although inflation rate in Hungary 
reached 36 percent it was also the lowest within the postsocialist region 
comparing with 640 percent in Poland and 62 percent in Czechoslovakia. 
The rest of transforming countries measured even higher percentages than 
in Czechoslovakia and Hungary. The unemployment rates in these three 
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 Or as they are called nowadays: EU13. 
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 Oplatka András – Németh Mikós: Mert ez az ország érdeke, Helikon, Budapest, 2014, and Lengyel, László – 
Surányi, György: Határátkelés, Kalligram, 2013. 
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countries were almost at the same level calculating around 14 percent. The 
first half of the 1990s Hungarian parliament accepted a sequence of acts 
relating to the economic transformation. The following isues belonged to 
them: bankruptcy Law, Winding-up and Restructuring Act, Act on 
Companies, Act on Banks and a new Accounting Act. These Hungarian acts 
caused all together almost the same effect as the Shock therapy in Poland, 
however unlike the Polish case the Hungarian acts were focusing on the 
changes in microeconomy instead of the Polish ones which had to include 
the reforms related to macroeconomic stability. According to Surányi, the 
formal president of the Hungarian National Bank in the early 1990s the 
Hungarian economy didn’t require such a comprehensive reform.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
The annual inflation at the transition 
 
Source: http://www.inflation.eu/inflation-rates/czech-republic/historic-
inflation/cpi-inflation-czech-republic.aspx 
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The consequence of the new acts in Hungary appeared at first on the 
microeconomic field. The increase in the unemployment rate and the 
number of bankruptcies led to the decrease in the amount of the incomes of 
the state budget already in 1992. By the same year budget deficit in 
Hungary was extremely high while the monetary policy was not in 
accordance with the fiscal policy as its main aim was to avoid the high 
inflation rate taking the exchange rate of Hungarian forint extremely high. 
Between 1991 and 1993 there was a 22 percent decrease in the real wages 
that also required intervention from the state. The new reform package, 
accepted in March, 1995 and named “Bokros package” after Bokros, Lajos 
the Minister of Finance in Hungary provoked several arguments pro and 
contra. It reduced a group of social benefints but it pushed the Hungarian 
eceonomy to an extraordinary growth path that lasted until 2001.  
According to Surányi (Lengyel-Surányi, 2013, p. 189) the Hungarian growth 
prospects were outstanding especially in compare with the neighobouring 
postsocialist countries. The public dept decreased from the 95 percent of 
GDP to 51-52 percent. The annual economic growth reached 6.5 percent in 
the first half of 2000, the Hungarian society graduall realized a solig growth 
in the real wages, too.  
 
Change of the Hungarian inflation from 1989 
 
Source: http://www.inflation.eu/inflation-rates/cpi-inflation-2015.aspx 
edited by the author 
-5 
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
1989 1995 1998 2002 2006 2008 2010 2014 2015 
annual inflation 
Online-Reader: Joint Second Cycle Degree in International Relations: Europe in the Visegrad Perspective             
147 
 
Material under copyright protection. 
 
 
 
It is also generally accepted that as the socialist world was not homogenious 
the capitalist transformation also became various.  
Following the theories related to Bohle and Gerskovits and Myant and 
Drahokoupil the following three ways of transformation can be distinguished 
in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
1. Neoliberal way – that was the typical way of transformation in the 
Baltic states 
2. Embedded Neoliberal way – the Visegrad Group’s transformation can 
be mentioned here 
3. Neocorporatist – this was the typical form of transition in Slovenia 
 
The Baltic neoliberal capitalism can be characterized as the combination of 
market radicalism with meager compensation for transformation costs. 
There was severe limitation of citizens’ and organized groups’ influence in 
democratic politics and policy making. The capitalism of Visegrad member 
states can be characterized as a permanent search for compromise between 
market transformation and social cohesion in mire inclusive, but not 
alwaysefficient systems of democratic governments. The Slovenian way of 
transformation was a so-called radical strategy of marketization with the 
region’s most generous efforts to compensate transformation loosers. It can 
be described as a model of democratic neocorporatist polity, the negotiated 
multilevel relationships among business, labor and the state oriented 
political rivals towards compromise solutions.  
Analyzing the statistical data and the levels of indeptedness it was obvious 
that the entire region needed some kind of support or at least assistance 
coming from abroad as these countries were not strong enough to carry out 
the essential reforms by themselves. On the other hand some kind of 
financial assistance was also needed.  
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As the last Hungarian prime minister from the Socialist era, Miklós Németh, 
the future vice president of the European Bank of Reconstruction and 
Development remarks in his biography the Hungarian preparedness for the 
economic transition was only one-sided. (Németh, 2014)  
As most of the transition countries struggled with their inbalance in state 
budget and the low level of competitveness and labour productivity it was 
essential to get some kind off assistance in the restructuralization of their 
economy.  
In 1989 there was an international initiative to assist and to help the 
financially the Central and Eastern European transitional economies by 
establishing a special bank for reconstruction and development of the region 
however the amount of money concentrated to this aid was only a fraction 
of the original sum of the Marshall aid. The Marshall Aid beneficiant 
countries, as Németh argues, did not feel any moral responsibility of helping 
the less developed Eastern neighbours to minimalize the difference between 
the two groups of states (Németh, 2014, 345). According to Németh’s 
statement these Central and Eastern European countries were even worse 
position than the West-European ones as besides the ruined econ imies their 
civil society was also became terminated. The relative backwardness of 
Central and Estern European countries and the lack of adequate social 
groups led together economic and moral stability of the region. According to 
Németh’s standpoint the Western European developed states were alone 
strong enough to assist in the transformation of the entire region however 
they were sure that some kind of assistance would be indispensable. There 
was a discussion concerning the question which countries were in such 
position that their democratic institutions were already set up, what kind of 
efforts they had already done on the way of transiton into market economy, 
what kind of political institutions the had previously established. Finally 
there was no Marshall aid accepted, instead of that there was an initiative to 
establish a European Bank of Reconstruction and Development with the 
participation of Japan, Canada, the USA and Australia and the Western 
European countries. This was the essence of the speech held by Mitterand, 
the French president in Strasbourg in 1989 October.  
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However the politicians and experts from the funding states were aware of 
the economic conditions of the potentioan beneficiant states the original 
amount of money they wanted to invest in the economic reconstruction of 
the Central and Eastern European region reached only 20 billion USD. They 
wanted to distribute it among seven countries. With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union the number of the target countries multiplied however there 
was no significant change in the amount of the financial sources of the 
European Bank of Reconstrution and Development. Later this amount grew 
by 50 percent, so the EBRD could distribute approximately 30 billion USD 
among the countries of the region. 
The main difference between the practice of the Marshall aid beneficient 
countries and the states eligible to the EBRD was that the Marshall aid was a 
non-refundable financial aid while the loan the EBRD could distribute among 
the recipient countries had to be repaid with relatively limited interenst rate.  
1. In the case of the Baltic states a new wave of nationalism 
and neoliberalism was visible. If we note that these countries were the 
parts of the Soviet Union the target group of the idea of nationalism 
were the members of Russian ethnic minority groups. There was a 
debate on giving citizenship them. 
2. On the case of the Visegrad Group states the main challenge 
was the search for balance in costy and contradictory objectives of 
foreign-led reindustrialization and bloade welfare states financed by by 
a handful of taxpayers and social security contributors.  
3. In Slovenia the first years of transformation can be evaluate 
as a part of a successful story, while in Romania and Bulgaria the first 
steps of tranfsformation was full of contradictions focusing on the 
weakness of the economy itself.  
The 1990s and early 2000s can be considered as the golden age of 
transformation. A relatively widespread optimism was visible in most 
newborn capitalist states. The transforming states could experience the fast 
economic expansion as there was an increasing foreign and domestic 
demand for their products. A large foreign captal inflow was also noticeable, 
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the standards of livings were also increasing. The new democracies were 
looking forwards to joining European Union with great expectations. These 
years were the age of flourishing transnational capitalism. Transnational 
capitalism was the key element of the successful transformation and it 
seemed to function remarkably well until late 2000s.  
Analyzing the different approaches of transformation Eyal, Szelényi and 
Townsley points out in their work289 that the entire Central and Eastern 
European region can e described as the typical example of manager’s 
capitalism. They also tried to distinguish some elements that were 
characteristic features of different regions within the postsocialist states. 
While the Central and Eastern European countries can be analyzed as the 
example of manager’s capitalism where the previous members of the 
management of the state owned firms had a special choice to assist in 
transformation and to remain either in th similar position within the new 
circumstances or to get retired if they did not manage to transform their 
previous knowledge and social capital to take part at the new capitalist 
system. 290 
The post-Soviet state however experienced a different type of transition. 
There new capitalists expropriated state property without capitalism right 
before all the core institutions of a market economy were put in place. The 
inherited elite fractions and their new coalitions could follow two different 
ways of tradition. Path dependency also played an important role however in 
the case of Commonwealth of Independent States291 where “patrimonial 
variety depended on raw material exports which produces involution and a 
liberal variety that is dependent on capital imports and manufactured 
exports, and leads to some development.” (Bohle-Gerskovits, 2012,) In the 
Commonwealth of Independent States the natural resource dependence is 
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 Eyal, Szelényi,Townsley: Making Capitalists without Capitalism…. 
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 Kornai also cam  to the same consequence in his speech at the University of Pécs in 2005 after receiving the 
Doctor Honoris Causa title when he had the chance to make an overview about the effectiveness of the 
transformation in the postsocialist world. 
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 The group of CIS consisted nine member states from the formal Soviet Union. The Baltic states didn’t join that 
regional cooperation while Ukraine and Turkmenistan was among the funding nations however their activity is 
quite limited. Georgia itself left the commonwealth in 2008. 
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still remarkable. The balance of the state budget is almost entirely based on 
the prices of raw materials at international markets.  
 
The characteristic features of the Visegrad Group states  
After socialism broke down, the East and Central European societies and 
their political elites were united in their wish to “leave the East” and to 
“return to Europe” which have emerged as the two largely uncontroversial 
main interpretive frames of transformation. Economic reforms took place in 
the region’s disentaglement from the East. (Bohle- Gerskovits, 2012,) This 
was not by chance as the acceptance of socialist regime was based on its 
capacity to bring aout economic progress and social cohesion. As it had been 
already mentioned in the previous chapters Socialism was introduced in the 
semi-peripherial and peripherieal region of Europe and especially from the 
late 1970s more and more people began to look at Western Europe as the 
basis of comparison of the economic growth and social cohesion. Blueprints 
of economic reforms arrived in accordamce with the principles of neoliberal 
policy paradigm. Keep up with the aims of neoliberalism was a great trial for 
all centrally planned economies. Its agenda of a radically altered relationship 
between states and markets fell on fertile ground in countries that had 
struggled with reforming the socialist system without ever being able to 
prevent its deepening economic crisis.  
Liberalism was emphasized several times. As Bohle and Gerskovits remark 
in the first Transition Report of the EBRD the following sentences were 
composed: “The market economy gives, in principle, the individual the right 
to basic choices over aspects of his or her life. The right to these choices 
may be seen as a basic liberty and as a fundamental aspect of standerd of 
living.  
Foreign advisers also had political reasons to urge the new democratic 
governments to put market economies in place witout delay. There was a 
fear that populist communist bureaucracies, and the managers and the 
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workers of state-owned enterprises to bloc marketization.292 The Polish 
shock therapy was the proof that several recommendations were not exactly 
defined before introduction and knowledge about the consequences 
concentrated only to the level of dreams.  
Over the 1990s the neoliberal paradigm scored a major victory in the region 
and played a formative role in the emergence of postsocialist capitalisms. 
(Bohle- Gerskovits, 2012) The early liberal thinker, Adam Smith, as well as 
their influential followers Friedrich von Hayek and Milton Friedmann, became 
rhe acclaimed heroes of many reformers. Almost every East and Central 
European countries did embrace some variant of economic neoliberalism. 
Although the inhabitants of the region welcome transformation as a whole 
as the East Europeans gradually realized the contradiction between “desire 
for opportunity and need for security”, they rapidly changed their political 
loyalties. The postsocialist countermovements had a common origin in the 
uncertainty and insecurity in general, the demand for protection was 
advanced under the most varied slogans, with very different motivations by 
a multitude of parties and social strata in a series of countries. (Bohle-
Gerskovits, 2012) 
Summarizing the heritage of the precious regime there are several common 
feautres that blocked the smooth transformation. They can be mentioned as 
unfinished tasks. 
1. Unfinished and conflict- ridden nation-states – the nationalist 
ideology was very popular in this region as in the past centuries 
most of the states found itself under the supremacy of great 
powers (Ottoman, Habsburg, Russian). It means that as these 
territories composed the peripheries of the old empries the 
inhabitants of these regions felt a dual feeling of inferiority. 
Their attempts for unification therefore could be characterizd 
rather an attempt of creating a nation-state than to concentrate 
on the civic rights. Most of these states were built up on the 
ruins of the collapsing Habsburg Monarchy and after a three 
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decade-long independency they gradually became subordinated 
at first the Nazi German Empire and since 1945 they had 
become semisivereign nation states. During the age of socialism 
there was no discussion about ethnic problem however the 
transformation brought the nation-based conflict to the surface. 
Some coutries had the chance first time to reestablish or 
establish themselves for the first time as independent nation-
states. The unfinished legacy of nation-state building was thus 
the frist to create constraints and opportunities for postsocialist 
states. (Bohle-Gerskovits, 2012) 
2. Belated foreign-led industrialization. Apart from the Czech 
Republic the entire Central and Eastern European region was still 
predominantely agricultural in the 1930s, with industrial 
employment rates mostly below 20 percent. In contrast to 
Western Europe, domestic social groups on which to base 
industrialization was also largely absent. The social structure of 
the region was similar to the late feudal systems in Western 
Europe the abolition of serfdom became widespread only in the 
second half of the 19th century. The pioneers of the 
industrializations were either the members of aristocracy or 
came from different nations from abroad. The age of socialism 
and the rapid industrialization with the emphasize on the heavy 
industry, the development of iron, steel and traditional 
engineering sectors, thereby copying the Western model of the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries helped in the 
restructurialization in the share of the agriculture and industry in 
most cases. This process provoked some major social changes, 
too. Masses of peasants were forced or chosed the moving to 
the towns that caused significant changes in the share of urban 
population, too. As most peasants belonged to the non-skilled 
workers this deficiency also influenced the incompetitiveness of 
the lack of competitveness of the socialist industrial production. 
Socialism thus left behind an outdated and distorted industrial 
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infrastructure, and its breakdown reproduced the historical 
challenge how to substitute for absent domestic capitalist. The 
entire region was waiting for foreign investors and the 
appearance of the capital cased on the FDI (Foreign Direct 
Investment) seemed to solve ghe lack of capital and initiatives 
in the region.  
3. Paternalist welfare states – in contrast to its lag in 
industrialization, East-Central Europe kept pace with the 
development of welfare staes in the rest of Europe – at least to 
some degree. The Habsburg Empre was among the first to follow 
the Bismarckian reforms of the late 19th century. As a part of 
Germany Poland’ Western region also followed these reforms. 
During the interwar period, welfare stae development became 
an integral part of nation-state building project across the 
region. An important characteristic of interwar East Central 
European welfare systems was their state-paternalist character. 
After World War II, socialism emphasized the protection of 
pension, sickness, disability and generous family policies. As full 
employment was a major pillar of the socialist system of 
welfare, social insurance reached nearly universal coverage. In 
addition, governments heavily subsidized consumption of food, 
housing and energy. However, as Bohel and gerskovits remark, 
social assistance and unemployment insurance were practicaly 
nonexistent.293  
Apart from the institutions of social welfare the enterprieses 
themselves helped in social welfare as direct providers of health 
services, kindergartens, vocational education and vacation homes. The 
transformation revealed a number of problems on the field of social 
welfare. These institutions had to be adapted to a new set of 
problems, such as massive unemployment and the emergence of 
powerty. Secondly, similar to the advanced capitalist states, the 
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unemployment, or if it existed it was hidden and evaluated as „unemployment within the gates.  
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transforming countries faced financial constraints on their major social 
programs, especially pension systems. Finally, as East Central 
Europeans were strongly attached to the public peovision of social 
security, politicians had to take this feeling into account.  
Transformation emerged in the Central and Eastern European states in a 
very special way. As they were not homogenious during the age of 
socialism the transformations also differed from each other. Apart from 
different scenarios, methods and reactions, a group of postsocialist states 
had to face with the double challenge; how to handle the problem of 
transformation and nation building. In the case of dissoluting Yugoslavia 
and Czechoslovakia this was a quite complex issue. The same could be 
mentioned in the case of Baltic states that left the collapsing Soviet Union 
and after half a century they had to retirn back the principles of 
souvereignty. As for Slovakia, Czech Republic, Croatia and Slovenia the 
Western orientation was obvious, the Baltic states had to fight for the 
independence, to establish the most important institutions, to reckon with 
the problems of nationalism and to get rid of the fear of Eastern 
dominance. They simply had to return back to the roots.  
These perspectives differed in the extent to which and forms in which 
they integrated the socialist past into the flow of national history. Tese 
perceptions also served as interpretive frames for many concrete 
elements of inheritance: witness the sharply conflicting views of 
performance of the socialist economy and of the skills and social status of 
its workers and pensioners.  
The transformation had a double effect. As the political elite that payed 
great role in this process was not well informed about the potential 
consequences, they shared different types of preconditions. The 
Czechoslovakian politicians felt the economic performance in their home 
country rather tolerable and unpromising. (Bohle- Gerskovits, 2012) They 
emphasized that their inhabitants gradually became the beneficients of 
automobilism and adopted a weekend-house culture rather than the 
perception of the members of civil society. They complained about the lack 
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of high labour effectiveness and shared an even more pessimistic future of 
the Czechoslovakian transformation than it was in reality.  
The Hungarians also had to face the challenge of transformation and its 
effect to the every day life. Transition to a market economy seemed to be 
painfiul for the population, at least the survey made in 2007, almost 
twenty years after political and economic transition proved there is still a 
feeling of nostalgy towards the previous regime, at least in the case of 
the social security. The Hungarian welfare state that was acting like a 
“benevolent uncle”, managed to keep the costs of the welfare 
expenditures in its hand even at the price of increasing indebtedness.  
Sharing the costs of welfare expenditure between the state and the 
citizens was and remained a crutial question in the transforming state. 
The situation after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia prove that there was 
no uniformed standpoint concerning the principles of the socialism. As the 
Czechs were rather the followers of liberalism that Slovakians remained 
the friends of socialism.  
The decision on accepting or rejecting the socialist economy as an 
integral part of the region’s past development also crystallized in rather 
divergent perceptions of the skills, status and general social standing of 
its emploxess – ethether still active or already retired. As in the socialism 
there was practically no unemployment the non-skilled workers could also 
be employed by the socialist firms even if the labour productivity was far 
from the West-European standards. On the other hand there was a fear 
in the transition countries if their abilities would be good enough to 
participate at the competition at the world market. In the amount of 
salries they could reain at least calm.  
This distinction of the socialist states is based on the perception made by 
Bohle and Gerkovits that apart from Slovenia all the other postsocialist 
states followed some elements of neoliberalism. They characterize Slovenia 
as a typical example of neocorporativist states while the other postsocialist 
states can be gathered into two big different groups.  They consider 
Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic states to the group of states defined as 
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neoliberal way, while the Visegrad group states are defined as the states of 
embedded neoliberalism.  
A further building bloc in the regime formation and consolidation in Central 
and Eastern Europe is the key importance of the role played by 
transnational actors, institutions and markets. The transforming countries 
got several forms of helping from abroad including the role of the European 
Bank of Reconstruction and Development to the financial supprts and loans 
based on bilateral agreements. The European Union also generated a special 
aid for the transforming countries in 1989, the so-called PHARE programme. 
This is the abbreviation of the first beneficient countries, Hungary and 
Poland.294 They later covered all the Central and Eastern European states 
that joined the European Union in 2004 and in 2007. The aims of the 
programme were the following: 
1. Strengthen public administrations and institutions to function 
effectively inside the European Union. 
2. Promote convergence with the European Union’s extensive 
legislation and reduce the need for transition periods. 
3. Promote Economic and Social Cohesion. 
 
Later, after the acceptance of the invitation to join European Unipn the aims 
of the PHARE programme became modified as they concentrated mostly on 
the infrastructural investments. Via economic liberalization and market-
oriented institution building, the postsocialist countries have also integrated 
into the systems of production, commerce and finance of global and 
European capital, while their return to Europe has made them part and 
parcel of a broader regional integration project.  
The same year a 1 billion USD aid was given by the United States of 
America assisting in the transformation of Poland and Hungary. (Berend, 
2009, p. 109) According to the opponents of a new Marshall Plan program, 
the IMF, the World Bank and most of all private investors provided the 
necessary financial resources. Indeed, annual global foreign direct 
                                                          
294
 PHARE means: Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies.  
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investment dramatically increased round the turn of the century; from 60 
billion USD in 1985 to 800 billion by 2000.  
There were several components of integration which seemed to be very 
practical for the reconstruction of the postsocialist economies, but later they 
seemed a bit controversial at least as it turned out from the critical 
arguments of the scientists from the target region and out of it.  
From the second half of the 1990s, the European Union stepped in as a 
central actor with a strong influence on the region’s reform processes.  
The purpose of investing in Central and Eastern Europe can be expalining 
upon the following circumstances: 
1. Market-seeing investments. This case investors are searching new 
market to buy important raw materials and sell products or services of 
the multinational company, without investment into processing or 
production. The danger of this kind of investment is that the extracting 
industry remains an enclave in the host country without generating 
spin-off effect. (Berend, 2009, p. 119) The investor country or some of 
the multinational companies control and extract the host country’s 
resources, and perpetuate the uneven division of labour and 
distribution of profit. This kind of capital inflow characterized 
multinational investments in some of the oil-rich former Soviet 
republics suvch as Kazakhstan, but was rare in Central and Eastern 
Europe. The main investors in Central and Eastern Europe 
concentrated in building shopping malls, tobacco factories, sometimes 
in order to monopolize the markets. (PepsiCo, Philip Morris) Trading 
companies sometimes also contracted with local companies or 
established production factories in the same countries, to secure 
supply for its shops ont he spot. Market-seeking investments, 
although serving the monopolization of parts of the domestic markets 
of the region and repatriating the profits, also stimulated the backward 
retail trade sectors of these countries and contributed to a substantial 
increase of services, as part of a belated service revolution. Market-
seeking investments took on several other forms as well. Great 
Online-Reader: Joint Second Cycle Degree in International Relations: Europe in the Visegrad Perspective             
159 
 
Material under copyright protection. 
 
international companies bought leading Central and Eastern European 
newspapers and magazines and several hotels also went under the 
ownership of international companies. Telecommunication was also a 
target point for market-seeking aspiration. Deutsche Telekom found 
itself in a monopolized situation being present in almost every Central 
and Eastern European countries. The Baltic states had the same kind 
of cooperation with leading Finnish and Swedish companies.  
2. The second type of investmet can be called as labour-seeking or 
least-cost-approach investment, which exploited the great 
differences in wages in particular in labour-intensive production 
branches. At the beginning of transformation Central and 
Eastern Europe stood at only 7 percent of the European Union’s 
wage level. (Berend, 2009, p. 121) After more than a decade, 
wages in exchange rate parities increased to 15 percent of the 
Union’s level. Low wage levels in the Central and Eastern 
European countries were combined with a relatively well-trained 
and educated workforce. Foreign investors in medium-high 
sectors such as the car industry, prefer this combination and 
maintain that it is more important than a low wage level by 
itself. They tend to invest in such countries where the wages are 
higher but the qualification is better. The strong base of basic 
research and talented specialists in important sectors were also 
combined in Central and Eastern Europe with an outstanding 
geopolitical situation.295 Proximity of the advanced countries of 
Europe fostered labour-intensive sectors of the textile, clothong, 
leather, furniture and other industries.  
3. The third type of foreign direct invetment is complementary 
specialization investment. According to Berend complementery 
                                                          
295
 Part of what makes Poland such a good place to invest today is the depth of the bond it has forged with 
Europe’s leading economy. The relationship benefits both countries. A large part of the German export machine is 
now based in Poland. Poland gets German investment and markets for its goods, and Germany profits from the 
opportunity to use Poland as a low-cost, high-quality production platform to compete with East Asia. Indeed, 
some German industries are able to produce goods in Poland for less than what they would cost to make in China. 
And Poland offers Germany a friendly business climate, plenty of skilled labor, and, above all, proximity. 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/poland/2013-12-06/six-markets-watch-poland  
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specializaton opnes the door for technological-structural 
advance.  
In practice these three components rarely exist in a pure condition. They are 
rather combined with each other.  
The EU helped the transforming countries in favour to keep the balance of 
the state budget, they intervented in favour of promarket, prodemocratic, 
and por-European actors. The perspective of European Union membership 
led domestic politicians to be more open to the demands of other  
FDI played the most important role in Central and East European 
adjustment to the European Union and to globalisation. At the same time, it 
was the most powerful vechile for the European Union countries to build a 
huge production network in Central and Eastern Europe and give an 
appropriate response to the challenge of globalisation. When the Berlin Wall 
collapsed, multinational companies from Asia, the United States of America, 
and most of all from Europe turned to the new hunting ground in Central 
and Eastern Europe. (Berend, 2009, p.117) The incorporation of the huge 
market with its natural and human resources offered several advantages for 
them. They could increase economies of scale and to exploit a low-wage and 
relatively well-educated labor force, and rearrange their production 
networks with a new kind of division of labour. The countries of the 
postsocialist region remained dependent on foreign investment. These 
weaknesses did not slow down the region’s transformation and adjustment 
to the market requirements, but instead created limitations on further 
changes of transformation to catch up with the advanced West. (Berend, 
2009) 
The crisis in Hungary and in Visegrad group 
 
In the run-up to the global crisis, the countries in Central Eastern and 
Southeastern Europe attracted large capital inflows and some of them built 
up large external imbalances. Previous studies on external imbalance in the 
CEE show the positive and significant impact of foreign capital on the 
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investment rate in the CEE and on growth. However, the crisis years caused 
not only a deterioration of capital inflows but also a deterioration of 
domestic and foreign demand, which led to a deep economic depression in 
much of the region. 
The crisis has modified the incentives for EU countries that are not part of 
the EMU—such as many of the CEE countries—to access the eurozone. 
Foreign currency indebtedness296 channelled through the interlinkages of 
West European parent banks and their local subsidiaries has an implication 
for internal and external imbalances within the EU banking system.297 The 
‘dual-banking systems’ in the CEE are more prone to transmit adverse 
shocks across borders and serve as a propagation channel for potential 
regional shocks that might be transmitted throughout the CEE. Increased 
domestic savings (dramatic fall in consumption) were spent for debt 
repayment rather than investment and consumption. This was the case in 
some countries that experienced negative or zero growth in 2008 and 2009 
(Latvia, Hungary, Romania). (Gál, 2014) 
The outbreak of the crisis in the autumn of 2008 changed the whole 
economic landscape. First, it exposed the vulnerability of the Hungarian 
economy, revealing that the government had pursued a mistaken economic 
policy and now lacked any effective means of crisis management due to its 
inability to apply fiscal or monetary policy. 
Fiscal policy was hampered since, in contrast to the majority of EU 
countries, the Hungarian government had no means of pursuing an anti-
cyclical policy to alleviate the crisis due to the large volume of debt. It was 
unable to do so since a lack of private investment had to be 
counterbalanced by an increasing volume of public investment. (A massive 
                                                          
296 In a few CEE countries, catching up in the first half of the 2000s was generally accompanied by macroeconomic 
stability, but most countries in the region became increasingly vulnerable due to the unsustainable trajectories of 
huge credit, housing and consumption booms, high current-account deficits and quickly rising external debt (a 
large proportion of it denominated in foreign currencies). 
297
 G. Gorzelak, C. Goh (eds.), ‘Financial Crisis in Central and Eastern Europe: From Similarity to Diversity’, 
Scholar, Warsaw, 2010. 
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budgetary expansion had already occurred in Hungary during the relatively 
tranquil period between 2002 and 2006.) 
Monetary policy was also hampered since it was unable to reduce interest 
rates to stimulate investment and was also unable to weaken the forint to 
boost competitiveness, since these actions would have seriously damaged 
the situation of economic stakeholders with foreign currency debts. 
Households with foreign currency debts began to feel the real weight of their 
indebtedness after the outbreak of the crisis as a consequence of continuous 
depreciation. They began to reduce their consumption due to the sudden 
increase of their debt (expressed in forints) to achieve a budgetary balance. 
This decrease in consumption triggered a major contraction of investment. 
Depreciation also meant that the situation could not be improved by 
stimulating demand, since the majority of export activity was carried out by 
foreign majority-owned firms for whom the Euro exchange rate was a trivial 
concern.  
Economic recession reached 6.8% in Hungary in 2008, whilst, in the Czech 
Republic it was only 4.5% (identical to the EU average), and in Slovakia 
4.9%. Meanwhile, far from declining, GDP in Poland increased by 1.6%.   
While the Visegrad states countries were also badly affected by the sudden 
withdrawal of international liquidity, their dependence on the credit was 
overall lower than that of the Baltic countries. Export-dependent as they 
are, however, these economies suffered from the breakdown of their major 
markets. The Visegrad states however came out form the crisis in various 
ways.  
 
GNDI per capita in the Visegrad member states in Euroes (2003- 
2012) 
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Source: 
http://hvg.hu/kkv/20141212_5_abra_arrol_hogy_mennyire_csuszik_le_Mag 
The graph clearly shows that in 2003 Hungary still be found in the second 
position however by 2013 it declines from the others. The authors note that 
in 2003 the Hungarian household income was 51 percent of the Austrian 
level and in 2012 it was 52 percent, so the relative position in this regard 
has not changed. Slovakia and Poland improved, the Slovakian level reached 
the Czech Republic’s income level, while Poland also preceded Hungary. The 
fastest growing Slovaks preceded Hungary already in 2007, while Poland 
tdid the same two years later. In 2003, the Hungarian income level was 
1,500 euro higher than the Slovakian while it became 1900 euro lower than 
the Slovakian case. 
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The consumption of households in the Visegrad group countries 
comparing with the EU27 and EU 15 countries. (2004- 2013) 
EU15 = 100 
 
Source: 
http://hvg.hu/kkv/20141212_5_abra_arrol_hogy_mennyire_csuszik_le_Mag 
 
Between 2003 and 2013 Czech Republic stood at 63 percent of the 
consumption of the „old” European Union member states (the EU15), while 
Hungary stayed at 58 percent. Slovakia was lagging behind at 48 percent 
and Poland occupied the last position with its 47 percent. Ten years later the 
entire situation changed, as the Polish, the Czech and the Slovakian results 
are almost the same; the 66, 67 and 68 percent of the EU 15 average while 
the Hungarian position reach only 58 percent. As the Polish economy 
produces 21 percent increase and a relatively quick convergense, the 
Hungarian economy stopped at 0 level. 
The Visegrad group after the crisis 
Despite the Baltic states the Visegrad group states were dependent mostly 
on the expert activity while the Baltic states concentrated on credot- and 
mortgage-based groeth of domestic markets. The reason of the recession in 
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Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic298 was the breakdown of their 
export markets. However as the Visegrad member states were dependent 
on the German economy the relatively fast recovery of its economy 
smoothed the economic fluctuations.  
Another vulnerablity of the Visegrad countries and their weak capacity to 
keep their public finances under control, has, however, attracted attention. 
It was a great trouble in the Visegrad group states governments that they 
had to reconcile the public opinion and the aggregate interests. The 
disappointed population inclined to vote for the populist representatives a 
sin happened in Poland in 2005 after the first ambivalent year in the 
European Union. In Hungary the results of Jobbik (For Better Hungary), the 
extremist right-wing party, caused schock among the political establisment. 
Targeting the „welfare parasites” (Bohle-Gerskovits, 2013, p. 241), and 
rushing to protect „true Hungarians” against „Gypsy” crime resonates 
particularly well in much of Hungary’s countryside, where employment 
opportunities are scare, salaries low, and powerty persistent. The double 
crisis Hungary had to face299 was the result of past irresponsible 
governments that focused on their popularity index necessary for the re-
election instead of continuing responsible fiscal and monetary policy.  
Whereas long prehistory of economic and political instability has made 
Hungray especially crisis-prone, the other Visegrad states could escape from 
stagnation and continued their rapid growth. As Poland successfully 
defeated the populist parties’ (Samoobrona, Liga Polskich Rodzin and PiS300) 
in 2007, a year before the crisis, since 2007 Donald Tusk’s party (PO)301 
managed to repeat the victory three times letting for Donald Tusk to remain 
prime minister of a stablie Poland for seven year.  
In Slovakia there was also an attempt for the radical HZDS party to get a 
wide support, by 2010 this party was swept from the political arena.  
                                                          
298
 However it was also the member of the Visegrad group between 2008 and 2013 Poland never experienced 
negative economic growth!  
299
 Twin fiscal and current account deficit. 
300
 Samoobrona= Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland, Liga Polskich Rodzin= League of Polish Families, PiS= Law 
and Justice) 
301
 PO = Civic Platform 
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They were also vulnerable to the frequently changing international factors, 
too. Among them the European integration considered to be crucial. As 
Bohle and Gerskovits mention, stability was attributed to a combination of 
accession negotiations and conditionally, transnational linkages between 
socio-economic and political actors, and the deep penetration of the region’s 
economies by the foreign direct investment. The first years of European 
Union membership were quite flourishing, while the crisis in 2008 and its 
consequences revealed the weaknesses of the rapid transformation. Easy 
access to foreign finance fueled rapid growth and foreign currency-
dominated lending granted households a larger share in the new system’s 
wealth, but all of this came at a heavy cost.  
Facing the consequence of the economic decline and the statistical data 
showing the level of convergence, there is no reason to be optimistic. May 
be it is not diplomatic to close this book with a pessimistic argument by 
Catherine Samary, who already in 2009 warned the postsocialist, EU 
member states about the potential negative consequence they had to face, 
but she also blamed the Western market economies for their greedyattitude 
towards the region.  
„The countries of Central and Eastern Europe which have been admitted to 
the EU are at the same time in a dependent (peripheral) situation and at the 
heart of neoliberal European construction. Confronted with the crisis, they 
expected from the EU various forms of protection and solidarity. But the 
European Union has just directed them to the IMF, like the other peripheral 
countries. It is likely to receive as a boomerang a new banking tsunami, 
whose epicentre will this time be within the Union, with as a premium 
increasingly explosive social discontent.” (Samary, 2009) 
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Hungarian nonprofit sector twenty years after: the situation of the 
third sector and impact of the economic crisis302 
 
Abstract 
In my paper, I try to review the situation of the Hungarian civil sector after the 
regime change. I present its structure, the systemic characteristics and the time-
series changes. The study undertakes the modelling of the Hungarian nonprofit 
sector by surveying previous attempts at modelling the non-profit sector. I'd like to 
emphasize especially the effects of the economic crisis (influenced Hungary in 
2008) and the impact of structural and territorial effects of the sector. 
 
keywords: development of Hungarian nonprofit sector, community and territorial 
structure of non-profit organisation, economic and territorial/regional connection. 
  
                                                          
302
 This chapter appeared in Politeja 28, 2014 Journal of the Faculty of International and 
Political Studies of the Jagiellonian University in Kraków 
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My study may seem quite eclectic because it concentrates on two questions 
which can be regarded controversial. One of them is about the effect of the 
economic potential on the development of the Hungarian nonprofit sector, while the 
other deals with local and regional identity influencing the growth of the 
organizations, its presence or lack in the world of civil organizations.  
First of all, I will concentrate on some inconsistencies in the development of 
Hungarian non-governmental organizations. Before I come to this point, I want to 
touch on a number of effects and tendencies which have significant implications for 
our subject and serve as a framework to better understand the Hungarian process. 
In every developed, democratic country of the world, non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) are indispensable components of the democratic political 
systems, playing an important mediatorial role between the society and the 
political institutions. Their number, role, and influence have been increasing since 
World War II. The attention directed at NGOs may primarily be attributed to the 
more than two-decade-long crisis of the state as well as the crisis phenomena of 
representative democracy based on political parties.303   
In Europe, this crisis manifested itself in various forms. In the developed North, 
the traditional welfare social policy was questioned; in a considerable part of the 
developing South, people became disillusioned with state-controlled development; 
in Central and Eastern Europe, state socialism collapsed.  
 
Civil Society tendencies in historic context 
 
In Central and Eastern Europe, the development of the nonprofit304 sector is 
essentially linked with the 1989 revolutions. During the communist times, except 
                                                          
303 L. Kákai, “Are there any distortions in the economic management of the Hungarian non-
profit sector? Economic aspects of duality” In I. Tarrósy – S. Milford (ed.) Challenges for the 
European Union in the next decade. A wiew from the Danube Region. Publikon Books, Pécs, 
2013, pp. 107. 
304 From the content point of view, all the organisations where the prohibition of profit 
distribution, organisational independence from the governmental sector, institutionalisation 
(independent legal personality), self-governance (self management, own leadership), and, 
to some extent, voluntariness and self-activity prevail, can be considered nonprofit 
organisations  (É. Kuti, Hívjuk talán nonprofitnak? [Shall we perhaps call it nonprofit?] 
Nonprofit Kutatócsoport, Budapest, 1998.; L. M. Salamon, Szektor születik. [A sector is 
Online-Reader: Joint Second Cycle Degree in International Relations: Europe in the Visegrad Perspective             
172 
 
Material under copyright protection. 
 
for a short period, the civil society was disrupted. After the 1956 revolution, it was 
only Hungary, Poland and the former Yugoslavia where a limited pluralism was 
allowed at the universities and in the arts and culture. A newly emerged civil 
society was prepared by the Solidarity movement in Poland; by a range of small 
clubs and societies in Hungary; and by peace and green movement groups in 
Czechoslovakia. 
The escalation of the economic, political and social crisis from the mid 80s 
generated a “revival” of organisational life in Hungary. At the beginning of the 80s, 
new types of social self-organising emerged from peace movements to eco 
movements, which were later followed by a “new wave” of student movements, 
self-directing college movement and the club movement within and outside 
universities, as well as politically-oriented associations and forums. The beginning 
of opening up was marked by the re-appearance of foundation as a legal entity in 
1987, then it went on with the ratification of the Associations Act in 1989, and it 
was concluded with the amendment of Civil Code (enacted in 1990) which 
abolished the former restriction that a foundation could only be set up with the 
approval of the relevant government authority. Following the 1989 Act which 
guaranteed the conditions of freely setting up organisations, taking advantage of 
the historical opportunity and the erosion of the political system, the number of 
organisations was growing continuously. While in 1982 there were 6.570 registered 
organisations, in 1989 there were 8.514. The internal structure of the sector also 
changed: between 1987 and 1989 the number of art, city preservation, and 
cultural organisations increased sevenfold, and the number of other, typically self-
starting associations (environmental protection, humane, pensioner, 
economic/professional) also increased tenfold. 
We also need to highlight the counter process during which double 
transformation of the former state party power took place. By breaking up the 
former assets of the state party and building on the infrastructure of some of its 
satellite organisations, new associations and foundations were formed, this time 
within the legal framework of democratic laws. Their officials were “scattered” but 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
born.] Nonprofit Kutatócsoport Budapest, 1995.; A. M. Bartal, Nonprofit elméletek, 
modellek, trendek. [Nonprofit teories, models and trends.] Századvég Kiadó, Budapest, 
2005.)  
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they were able to carry on with their personal networking outside the party. Some 
of them really worked to establish an independent civil society, while others 
retained their political connections. 
After 40 years of state socialism which resulted in the forced abolition of civil 
society and the erosion of social capital, the patterns and conventions of society’s 
self-organizing and representation were not present in every area of society. 
Therefore, there were no opportunities for the various social groups to satisfy the 
different social needs. We have to say that the fast economic and constitutional 
changes could not be followed by the development of the bourgeois society’s civil 
culture. Most of the political élite and the active civilians of the post-communistic 
countries were socialised in the old communistic system. Their expectations 
concerning paternalism, stability and the welfare state are unbroken, they expect 
the maintenance of all those under the conditions of market-economy, too.305    
After the transition, the number of the civil organisations multiplied rapidly, the 
sector kept expanding dynamically and continuously until 1997. This process was 
mainly due to the intensive spread of the foundations that had been very small in 
number in the previous era. In 1997, the “phase of extensive growth” had finished, 
and between 1998 and 2000 the number of the operating organisations hardly 
changed.306  However, the studies done by the Central Statistical Office in 2000 
marked a clear slowdown in the sector’s development dynamics. It means that 
since 1997, the number of organisations hasn’t actually changed. Moreover, 2000 
was the first year when the size of the sector didn’t increase but actually 
decreased. Following the decline, or “flatting out,” of the development tendency, 
again there has been a growth trend since 2003. 
Then came a slight increase, which was principally due to the membership 
nonprofit organisations; foundations were seldom founded in this period of time. 
 
Figure 1 
                                                          
305 L. Kákai, Kik is vagyunk mi? Civil szervezetek Magyarországon. [Who are we? Civil 
organisations in Hungary.] Publikon Kiadó, Pécs, 2009. 
306
 L. Kákai – I. Sebestény, “The weight of the non-profit sector and the impact of the economic crises in Hungary”, 
Civil Szemle, Vol. IX. no. 3. (2012) pp. 115-135.  
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By the end of the decade the number of the organisations seemed to have reached 
a constant level, the nonprofit sector “became saturated” at a level of 65 thousand 
organizations. 
During the years, the activity structure in the nonprofit sector also changed 
gradually. Those engaged in health care, education and research, economic 
development and social care are characterised by a dynamic and rapid growth 
throughout the whole period. 
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A slowing growth is visible in the fields of culture, environment, sports and 
recreation, international relations, and nonprofit federations. However, the number 
of economic and professional advocacy organisations and voluntary fire brigades 
decreased.307  It is essential to mention that the composition of the sphere of 
foundations and associations differ fundamentally as far as the activities are 
concerned. The fields which were definitely underdeveloped in Hungary compared 
to the developed, democratic countries, represented much higher shares in the 
foundations sector than among voluntary associations. The most striking difference 
was the relatively low share of Hungarian voluntary organisations in welfare 
services, which are the most important fields of voluntary activities in developed 
countries. It could be explained by the state monopoly of education, social and 
health care under state socialism. While voluntary organisations such as service 
providers were tolerated in culture and even promoted in sports, recreation and 
emergency prevention, they were not allowed to establish schools or hospitals. 
Recently, the structure has become more balanced. The largest number of civil 
organisations is engaged in sports and recreations, traditionally in the form of 
                                                          
307 R. Nagy – I. Sebestény, “Methodological Practice and Practical Methodology: Fifteen 
Years in Nonprofit Statistics”, Hungarian Statistical Review, vol. 86, Special Number 12 
(2008) p. 127. 
 
0% 
5% 
10% 
15% 
20% 
25% 
Re
cr
ea
tio
n 
an
d 
ho
bb
y 
Ed
uc
at
ion
 
Sp
or
ts 
Cu
ltu
re
 
So
cia
l s
er
vic
es
 
Pr
ofe
ss
ion
al,
 e
co
no
m
ic 
ad
vo
ca
cy
 
Co
m
m
un
ity
 d
ev
elo
pm
en
t 
He
alt
h c
ar
e 
Pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
of
 pu
bli
c s
af
ety
 
Re
lig
ion
 
En
vir
on
me
nt
 p
ro
te
cti
on
 
Ec
on
om
ic 
de
ve
lop
me
nt 
Re
se
ar
ch
 
Em
er
ge
nc
y a
nd
 re
lie
f 
Pr
ote
cti
on
 of
 rig
hts
 
In
te
rn
at
ion
al 
re
lat
ion
s 
M
ult
ipu
rp
os
e 
gr
an
tm
ak
ing
, n
on
pr
ofi
t u
nio
ns
 
Po
liti
cs
 
1993 2000 2011 
The percentage distribution of nonprofit organisations by fields of 
activity, 1993-2011 
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, 2013 
Online-Reader: Joint Second Cycle Degree in International Relations: Europe in the Visegrad Perspective             
176 
 
Material under copyright protection. 
 
voluntary associations. Many nonprofit associations can be classified within the 
fields of the arts and culture, too. The field of education and health is characterised 
by the dominance of foundations. The smallest groups of the Hungarian nonprofit 
sector are politics, multipurpose grant-making and nonprofit unions.308   
Hungarian nonprofit organisations have nearly 4 million members, which, 
regardless that one person can be a member of several organisations, is a 
remarkable achievement in a country of 10 million. In contrast, looking at the 
volunteers of nonprofit organizations too, statistical data show that less than half a 
million people carried out such activity, which makes only 5% of the population 
over 14.  
In the entire period here examined, the two most important indexes that reflect 
the development of the sector are the number of nonprofit organisations and the 
real value of revenues. The total income of the sector exceeded HUF 1 202 billion309 
– it grew to ten times as much at current price, as compared to the HUF 118 billion 
in 1993, and to nearly two and a half times as much as the HUF 496 billion in 
2000.  Despite this fact, the proportion of the organisations with less than HUF 500 
thousand annual income was still 43 percent. The annual income of the nonprofit 
sector in 2010 more than HUF 1200 billion, which appears to be a huge sum, but it 
was actually less than 5% of the GDP.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
308 R. Nagy – I. Sebestény, Methodological…. p. 127. 
309
 App. €4.4 billion. 
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Figure 3 
 
The two main indicators of the sector’s development, the number of the 
organisations and the real value of the incomes kept increasing, although showing 
some fluctuation, from 1993 throughout the whole period; the previous one grew 
by 88 percent and the latter by 91 one percent. 
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Figure 4 
 
The two growth paths, however, had different curves. The real value of the 
revenues slightly decreased in the first years, then started to grow very slowly, 
from 1997 it began to rise more dynamically, in 2000 it caught up with the 
previous indicator, and then, until 2008, it exceeded the growth rate in the number 
of the organisations. In the last two years, the two figures were practically 
stagnating at the same level.310  
This positive tendency, however, gains another light if we have a look at the 
real income in terms of one organization. During the nearly twenty years this 
figure hardly changed. This means that the growth indicated in the number of 
organisations and the real income did not appear at the unique organisational 
level, the previous figure actually “eliminated” the latter one: the financial 
situation of an average organisation was the same in 1993 and in 2010.311  
                                                          
310 R. Nagy Renáta– I. Sebestény, Nonprofit szervezetek Magyarországon, 2010. [Nonprofit 
organizations in Hungary, 2010.] Központi Statisztikai Hivatal, Budapest, 2012. 
311 L. Kákai – I. Sebestény, „The weight of the non-profit……..p. 119. 
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Employment, however, grew a lot more consistently and rapidly.312 The nonprofit 
sector employed almost twice as many people in 2000 and more than three and a 
half times as many in 2010 as in 1993.   
Employment, however, is typical within only a narrow range of nonprofit 
organisations. In 2010, merely 16 percent of them had a paid employee, and, 
within that, only 11 percent had a full time employee.  
By the end of the decade the number of those working for nonprofit organizations 
reached 143 thousand. The number of the people employed in full time regular jobs 
rose over 119 thousand. The performance of the 47 thousand people employed in 
part time jobs equalled to that of almost 20 thousand full-time workers.313 
The low rate of civilian participation and low subjective competence can partly be 
explaied by a tendency, experienced in other Eastern European countries too, 
which indicates that the altered social and economic environment brings new 
challenges and demands to its citizens. Besides the sector growth, we also need to 
consider the role the sector plays in employment. Affected by the transformation 
crisis and globalisation, the state is continuously withdrawing from the fields of 
education, healthcare and social policy. Many expected that the empty “space” 
would be increasingly filled in by a growing non-governmental sector, together with 
other players (business, entrepreneurs), and thus would dominate the employment 
and public services. In Western European countries, the size of non-governmental 
sector is generally large. The rate of labour force it employs is 7.8% on average 
compared to economically active population. In three countries (Belgium, Ireland, 
and the Netherlands) this rate exceeds 10%. 
The tendency of Hungary does not differ much from Central and East European 
tendencies, since the non-profit sector can employ less than two percent of full 
time employees and only 5 percent of the organisations are contracted to carry out 
public tasks. 
The revenue of the nonprofit sector was about HUF 1238 billion314 in 2011. This 
sum came from four major sources. In 1993, nearly 55 percent of the total 
revenues derived from investment, unrelated business and private donations. By 
                                                          
312 In the comparison, we use the indicator of the number of staff calculated in terms of 
regular, full-time employees. This is the Hungarian version of full-time equivalent (FTE) 
used in the international literature. 
313 L. Kákai – I. Sebestény, „The weight of the non-profit……..p. 120. 
314
 App. €5 billion. 
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2011 the form ratio had changed, around 67 percent of the total income came from 
revenue from the basic activity and state support. 
The state contributes 42% to the nonprofit sector’s income, which is relatively low 
compared to nearly 60% of Western European contribution; however, it is regarded 
high among former socialist countries. I should remark that perhaps the way of 
financing itself reveals the inherent distortions of the sector.  
Figure 5 
 
The income structure, however, considerably changed. In 1993, the bigger part 
(55%) of the total income was gained from economic activities and private support. 
By the late 1990s, this rate considerably changed. From that time on, a growing 
proportion of the sources were made up of incomes gained from basic activities and 
governmental grants. The previous had grown permanently until 2000, and then 
came a serious recession, which was followed by stagnation. The rate of 
governmental support had remained practically unchanged through long years, but 
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began to increase after 2000 and was always above 40 percent after 2003; this 
type of contribution reached HUF 514 billion in 2010.315  
From the mid-90s, partly taking advantage of legal possibilities, the government 
and the local councils were busy starting public foundations whose actual purpose 
was to distribute state subsidies among various fields and target groups (e.g. 
public education, sport, Roma minority, needy university students, etc.), as well as 
to carry out prominent activities (mainly in research and teaching).  
Within a few years’ time, these big public foundations and public benefit 
companies operating mostly nationally or regionally “absorbed” a significant 
portion of the rather scarce central (state) subventions dedicated for the 
nonprofit sector.  
As shown in the following graph, the income of public benefit companies and 
public foundations set up by the state and local governments have been 
dynamically growing at the expense of other organisations. It all happened 
despite the fact that the proportion of these two types of organisation within 
the whole NGO sector is basically insignificant.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
315 App. €1.9 billion. (L. Kákai – I. Sebestény, „The weight of the non-profit……..p. 119.) 
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Figure 6 
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Figure 6 
 
If we look at the distribution of revenues in 2011 only, we can see that 
public benefit companies and public foundations received more than 54% of 
the financial support.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rate of revenues and sectoral weight of public benefit companies 
(nonprofit business corporations), 1994-2011 
* From 2007 the public benefit companies instead of the nonprofit business corporations 
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office 1993-2013 
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Figure 7  
 
This process reinforces the tendencies that caused the evolution of a “second” 
nonprofit sphere in Hungary (public foundations and public benefit companies) – 
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Figure 8 
 
It means that nearly two-thirds of the income land at certain organisations 
in the capital, while only less than a third of them are located there. 
Although its extent decreased somewhat compared to that of 1993, when 
28.2 percent of the non-profit organisations operated in the capital (where 
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(public foundations, public benefit companies) which are strongly connected 
(through contracts and subsidies) with the state and local governments or 
their institutions. 
 
Some local and regional aspects of the sector  
It is a very difficult undertaking to group countries or state establishments based 
on the extent of their decentralisation or the models they follow to divide power in 
space. Territorial division by ways of public administration largely depends on the 
territorial size of states, the size of population, but most importantly, on the 
political-ideological objectives and conditions of organising and controlling the 
society, and the way of exercising power. Under different conditions, the national 
characteristics of a given country play a crucial role in defining the principles (e.g. 
based on the constitution or unwritten law), which govern the relationship between 
the categories and levels of public administration. Therefore, before observing the 
regional setup of NGOs, some remarks have to made about the relationship 
between regional and local models of Hungarian public administration and the civil 
society. 
The decentralisation of local governments in Hungary has not relied on strong 
traditions. Strong centralisation and also the majority of earlier periods of state 
development characterised the period of state socialism between 1950 and 1990.  
In Hungary, the most important decisions are made by national bodies – the 
parliament and the government – but the so-called devolutionary processes which 
were seen in other European Unitarian countries316 have not taken place here since 
the change of regime, delegating major rights articulated in the constitution to sub-
national levels within the Unitarian system. At the same time, the mid-level 
institutions of regional self-government were gradually built up and gained power 
(general county assemblies, regional development councils), but they have not 
reached the level of “regionalism.” Thus, the area of Hungary is divided into three 
NUTS 1-level parts. NUTS 2 consists of seven regions, NUTS 3 level (the lowest 
one) corresponds to the counties and Budapest. 
                                                          
316 In reference to that, the territory of state is governed in a uniform and central way, the 
legislative power of the central government is not divided among the member-state 
governments. Further classifications are possible within the unitarian state, such as the 
classic unitarian state, devolutionary and regionalised unitarian states. Examples include 
the constitutional development of Greece, Portugal and Belgium in the past decade. 
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Figure 9 
 
The reason for this is that both the decentralisation of self-government and 
regionalism has had no traditions. As regions today have neither organisational, 
nor other relevant functions, the “setting” of regional problems continues to be the 
county, defined by hundreds of years of tradition. In the framework of national 
regional policy, the county is a regional unit exhibiting decades- or centuries-long 
traditions, regional identity, and administrative powers. Professional and political 
debates on the county system since 1989 – concerning mostly the public 
administration role of middle level, and the distribution of tasks and resources 
between the county and local governments – have resulted in the weakened 
position of county and the appearance of other regional categories as a decision 
framework.317 
 
                                                          
317 An example of this is the rapid extension of regional public administration, as well as the 
“stealth” expansion of sub-regional and regional development institutions.   
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As a summary, Hungary’s regions are extremely divided, both horizontally and 
vertically. The large number of municipalities, while horizontal division is due to the 
separation of four regional levels, i.e., settlement, sub-region, county and region 
causes vertical division.318  
Centralization had a significant impact on the buildup and strengthening of 
communities as well.  
The size of Hungary’s nonprofit sector increased in a relatively short time. The 
initial period presented an extremely extensive and dynamic picture, although the 
establishment of organisations cannot be considered even (regarding the different 
types of settlement and regional aspects). Hungary has nearly 3200 settlements; 
the average size of population per settlement is 3100, which means that the 
Hungarian settlement structure is particularly divided.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
318 G. Soós – L. Kákai, „Remarkable Success and Costly Failures. An Evaluation of 
Subnational Democracy in Hungary” In J. Loughlin, F. Hendricks, A. Lindstrom (ed.) The 
handbook of Subnational Democracy in the European Union Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2010, pp. 528-551. 
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Table 1 
 
This table is also shown in the division of organisations by settlement. 23 percent 
of the settlements – all of them are small villages – have no or only one active 
NGO. Over half of the settlements (55%) have more than 1 but less than 10 NGOs, 
and only 22 percent have 10 or more such organizations.  
The connection of organisations to the settlements can be analysed in their scope 
of activity as well. The activity of more than half of all the organizations319 is 
connected to a settlement or a smaller area of it. A quarter of them have a regional 
scope320 and less than one-sixth operate across the country borders. The data 
suggest that Hungarian NGOs largely developed locally, although this fact in itself 
does not exclude the possibility of establishing broader relationships; but, as I will 
present it in detail in the section of relationship networks, they can rarely be 
connected with the political and representative processes on a county or regional 
level. 
In 1993, most organisations worked in Budapest. Its high population and the 
availability of potential resources can perhaps explain the role of Budapest by 
2011, it slid back to third in terms of number of organizations. Data shows that 
Budapest-based organisations were superior in numbers within the sector only until 
2000. 
 
                                                          
319 The lowest rate is in the capital and in the county seats; the highest rate is in villages. 
320 70 percent of regional organisations are active in cities and county seats. 
Settlements by size of population in Hungary 
Size of 
population*  
Village City 
City of county 
rank 
District of 
capital 
Capital Total 
                – 10 000 2853 149 - - - 3002 
10 001 – 50 000 3 116 3 4 - 171 
50 001 – 200 000 - 1 18 19 - 39 
200 001 – - - - -  1 1 
Total 2856 266 22 23 1 3168**  
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Figure 10 
 
Since 2000, urban nonprofit organisations have advanced to be the dominant 
organisations which define the division of settlements within the sector. The rate of 
village-based organisations decreased between 1993 and 2011,321 and has since 
remained largely unchanged, similarly to county-based organisations. Therefore, it 
can be concluded that in the past 14 years, nonprofit has become an urban 
phenomenon in Hungary.322 The dominance of rural organisations can also be 
attributed to the increasing effects of suburbanisation in the past decade, which, at 
least in the number of organizations, diminished the “fault line” between capital 
and countryside in the 1990s.323 
The rate of nonprofit organizations per thousand residents indicates the regional 
division of organisational density, or in other words, non-governmental activity. In 
1996, there were 4,5 organisations per thousand residents on average, in 2006 
there were 5,8, while in 2011 there were 6,6 organisations, showing that 
                                                          
321 Between 2006-2011, another major decrease occurred in this municipal category. 
322 A. M. Bartal, Nonprofit elméletek, modellek…….p. 248.  
323 L. Kákai, Kik is vagyunk mi?..............p. 62. 
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organisational density rose in every county in the past ten years.324 While growth 
could be observed in every county, there was above-average growth during the 10-
year period in Tolna, Békés, Vas, Csongrád, and Zala counties. The lowest growth 
was seen in Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok, Komárom-Esztergom, Baranya, Somogy and 
Bács-Kiskun counties. 
A regional analysis of the number of NGOs per thousand residents shows that the 
central region is followed by South Transdanubia as first, and the North Great Plain 
as last. 
Figure 11 
 
 
During the past ten years, regional inequalities, although slightly, have increased 
(and fluctuated in time). The difference between the highest (Central Hungary) and 
lowest (North Great Plain) regional indicators of nonprofit organisations per 10 
thousand residents was 21 in 1996, which sank to 19 in 2000 but increased again 
to 22 in 2006.  
                                                          
324 However, the data have to be treated carefully as growth was accompanied by a 2.5 
percent reduction in the size of population. 
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office 1995-2013 
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Overall, the changing number of NGOs displays regional and local differences 
but they do not adapt to centrally “defined” regional boundaries. Whereas 
along with Budapest and Pest county, Veszprém, Zala, Vas, Somogy, Heves 
counties have the highest (5 on average) number of nonprofit organisations per 
thousand residents, the eastern regions of the country regularly have a lower 
number (4 on average).  
The large number of Budapest-based NGOs may be due to that the capital 
“drains” nonprofit organisations away from the neighbouring counties (Fejér, Pest). 
A comparison of the years 1997–1999 reveals that while there used to be a strip 
across Nógrád, Heves, Szolnok, Csongrád counties comprising relatively many 
organisations in 1997, it fell apart by 1999. The period since the millennium shows 
a much more “mixed” picture when comparing counties and regions;325 however, 
the growth in the number of organisations did not lead towards the convergence of 
regions, but rather conserved the advantages and disadvantages already observed.  
The data related to the regional location of nonprofit organisations and the size of 
population generally suggest that nonprofit organisations are much more 
concentrated in the capital and the Transdanubian counties than in the Great Plain 
and the north. This can probably be explained by the earlier historical, cultural 
traditions and the current level of economic development of the given region, the 
needs of the unsatisfied population and the co-operation of local governments and 
other institutions with nonprofit organisations. 
 
Regional economic potential and the non-profit sector 
 
Eeconomists have been seeking an answer to the following question for a very long 
time: why can a country be successful, or rather what the chances of a country are 
for catching up with the rest of the world? Edmund S. Phelps, a Nobel Prize winner, 
tried to answer the question of how much cultural variables affect the growth of 
productivity, economic activity and employment.326 He refers to the survey 
published in 2006 (World Values Survey) in which he divides cultural factors into 
                                                          
325 With some structural rearrangement (i. e. mutatis mutandis). 
326 E. S. Phelps, Economic Culture and economic performance: What light is shed on the 
continent’s problems? CESinfo/CCS Joint Conference, San Servolo (Venice), July 21-22, 
2006 
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two groups: individual and public cultural values. Individual values are civil and 
political freedom, the support of the participation of the individual in public 
decisions (elections) and its frequency, tolerance of verbally non-conformist 
behaviour, the freedom of self-determination and the expression of trust toward 
other people. Public factors consist of religion, emphasis on national feelings, the 
strength of authority and obedience as well as family traditions. The results of the 
survey show the existence of homogeneous country-groups such as protestant 
Europe, where both the individual and public cultural values represent great 
opportunities for choice, Confucianist Far East, Anglo-Saxon and Latin world. A 
surprising result of the survey is that there are some “odd-ones-out” in some 
cultural groups regarding geographical locations. For example, Hungary does not 
show qualities which characterise the western ex-communist Visegrad Group or the 
Baltic Group but it is closer to the Eastern and the Balkan327 ex-communist nations. 
Maybe I was inspired by this in my analysis of the influence of the economic 
environment on the number and the situation of civil organizations regarding the 
interaction between economic parameters and nonprofit organisations. 
Apart from considerable amount research on the sector, there were very few 
surveys made about the relation between the nonprofit organisations amd certain 
economic indicators, and, in the light of these relations, about the impacts of the 
economic crisis on the sector. How did the economic position presented above and 
the lack of resources typical of most of the organisations result from the narrow 
resources and the withdrawal of finances attending the crisis, and to what extent 
were the organizations able to counterbalance these factors? Did the crisis shake 
unstable economic basis of the sector?  
Economic and regional potentials of the sector before the crisis 
Janos Rechnitzer started an interesting experiment by which he wanted to discover 
the way in which certain economic indicators influence the geographical localisation 
and the activity of nonprofit organisations. In this survey, the indicators were 
applied as follows.328 
 
                                                          
327 For example: Romania, Bulgaria, Montenegro, Albania, Moldova, Serbia, Latvia and 
Ukraine etc.  
328 The author strove to choose uniform dates concerning the variables and figures used in 
the analysis, and as the data were available only after long delay, the analysed data are 
from 1996. 
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Table 2. Variables used in the analysis 
Name of variable Content of variable 
Economic income 
potentials 
Regional income per capita (HUF 
thousand/capita) 
Foreign capital 
attraction 
Foreign investment per capita (HUF 
thousand/capita)  
Employment level Active earners per 100 capita (%) 
Entrepreneurial activity Number of enterprises with or without legal 
personality per 100 capita (organization/100 
capita) 
Income potentials of 
population 
Personal income tax per capita (HUF/capita) 
Higher grade 
qualification 
Rate of persons with completed higher-grade 
(college, university) qualification per 100 capita 
(%) 
Nonprofit activity Number of nonprofit organizations per 1000 
capita (organization/1000) 
Inclination to donate Tax payers offering 1% of PIT in terms of total 
number of tax payers (%) 
Potential to donate Amount of offered PIT in terms of one tax 
payer (HUF/tax payers) 
 
In the data here analysed, the closeness of the relations between the certain 
dimensions was studied especially in terms of the evolution of the three variables 
that are most typical of the nonprofit sector (nonprofit activity, inclination to 
donate and the potential to donate). 
Relying on the above variables, János Rechnitzer formed various groups from the 
regional units of the country, and his main conclusion was that the country is 
stratified and has a strongly echeloned structure in terms of the regional economic 
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potentials, the activity of the nonprofit organisations and the support obtained by 
them. Consequently, the country can be divided into the following groups of 
regions.329  
 The first, one-member group consists of Budapest. The capital showed 
outstanding values concerning each compacted variable, and so it is 
incomparable to the other groups. 
 The second group included the two counties in Western Transdanubia, 
Győr-Moson-Sopron and Vas. In these counties, the willingness to 
donate is a lot higher than it is in the other groups, however, nonprofit 
activity and the potential to donate does not reach this level, although 
they are still higher than in the rest of the groups. 
 The third group is Central Transdanubia330 where nonprofit activity is 
high, higher than it is in the previous group, but the economic position 
is worse, and this goes hand in hand with the lower values of potential 
and willingness to donate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
329 J. Rechnitzer, “Nonprofit szervezetek területi szerkezete” [Regional structure of nonprofit 
organisations.] In S. Kurtán–P. Sándor–L.Vass (ed.), Magyarország évtizedkönyve. 
Demokráciakutatások Magyar Központja Alapítvány, Budapest, 1998, pp. 539–553. 
330 The author calls it a “transitional” region.  
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Figure 12   
Regional structure of the relation between nonprofit features and economic 
potential, 1996 
 
 The fourth group331 is primarily separated from the fifth group which 
consists of the counties in Eastern and East-Northern Hungary, not by 
the indicators of nonprofit activity or the willingness to donate. We 
could rather say that in the middle part of the country the activity of 
the nonprofit organisations, and so the donation activeness of the 
population is weak, but the economic potentials are stronger than 
those in the Eastern region. 
 In the fifth group, the unfavourable economic potentials are one of the 
reasons for the low level of nonprofit activity and donation, and for the 
regional group organisation. 
I were also keen to know whether the stratified and echeloned structure described 
above changed during the ten years, and if did so, what the extension of this 
change was.332 
                                                          
331 Which includes the counties situated in the middle of the country, along the river 
Danube and Csongrád County. 
332 Concerning the variables used in the analysis, for the sake of comparability, we also 
chose a common date; the data are from 2006, and so the developments of a 10 years’ 
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According to the data, the stratified structure did change to some extent during the 
ten years. The former groups no. 1, 2 and 3 came closer to each other. According 
to the data of 2006, the country showed a picture of triple division in terms of the 
number of civil organisations and the economic indicators. The Eastern part of the 
country possessed uniformly low civil activity and was attended by weak economic 
potentials.  
Among the Eastern counties, Csongrád was the only exception where nonprofit 
activity was relatively high, and the economic conditions were better than the 
average. This combination was only present in the capital and the Western 
counties. There were several reasons of that: first, in the last ten years, the growth 
in the income within the civil sector exceeded 10 percent in the Southern part of 
the Great Plains of Hungary and within that Csongrád; second, the number of the 
nonprofit organisations by 1000 persons, too, rose above the national average. As 
far as domestic migration is concerned, the only county with a positive balance in 
the region (Bács-Kiskun, Békés and Csongrád counties) was Csongrád: the 
domestic migration difference in terms of one thousand inhabitants indicated 
positive (0-2.9) data, and the impacts of the crises did not affect this trend, either. 
The transition between the two groups of extreme features was provided by the 
counties lying in the middle part of the country. In this region, the level of 
nonprofit activity was low and was accompanied by a moderate level of economic 
potentials equalling about the national average. 
Therefore, if we consider both indicators, the national average was made up of 
very good and very bad regions of about the same number which were completed 
by an average regional category of approximately the same size. 
The situation of group no. 4 practically did not change, except for the very 
important difference that Csongrád County “joined” the more developed regions of 
the country.  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
period can be followed. We complemented the analysis by comparing these data to the 
figures of 2000, as well. First, we studied the relations between the certain social and 
economic indicators and the organisational number by doing correlation analysis, and then 
– in order to select the possible indirect impacts – by doing path model analysis based on 
regression analysis.  
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Finally, group no. 5, although its nominal values improved, was unable to catch up 
with the other groups, and no equation between the regions took place.333   
 
Figure 13 
  Regional structure of the relation between nonprofit features and economic 
potential, 2006 
 
The same regional differences are shown by the location of businesses.334 Before 
going into details, it should be mentioned that in 1989, the year prior to the change 
of regime, nearly 360 thousand businesses were registered in Hungary, of which 89 
percent were individual enterprises. In 2000 the number of businesses exceeded 1 
million, of which the rate of individual enterprises decreased to 62 percent. The 
latest study reveals that in 2008, the number of businesses was over one and a 
half million, 64 percent of which were individual enterprises. 
                                                          
333
 L. Kákai, “Civil szervezetek regionális összefüggései” [Regional correlations of civil organizations.] Civil Szemle, 
Vol. VI. no. 1–2 (2009), pp. 132–146. 
 
334 Such businesses were involved in the study that filed tax declaration in the given year to 
the corresponding tax authority. 
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Companies registered in Budapest are about twice as much overrepresented among 
the Hungarian businesses compared to the population size of the capital. As to 
indicators of business intensity, the figure for businesses per thousand residents in 
1995 was three times bigger than the national average; Budapest was leading the 
enterprising boom. In the following years – slowly and not in every region – the 
convergence process prevailed.  
Whereas the number of businesses grew by 58 percent in the capital, it was 15 
percent in Pest County, about 5 percent in West and Central Transdanubia and in 
Northern Hungary, and 65 percent in the North Great Plain. Convergence failed to 
materialise in South Transdanubia and Southern Hungary, regions considered 
backward, with about 45 percent growth, which only increased their lagging behind 
the average. 
In 2006 in Hungary, there were 25.800 businesses with foreign interest, most of 
which (68% of all) were located in Central Hungary, the least (2.5%) in Northern 
Hungary. In 2006, the number of businesses with foreign interest decreased by one 
percent on national level compared to the previous year, and with significant 
regional differences. The only region that grew was Central Hungary (by 2.6%), the 
rest fell back. Especially Northern Hungary (by 7.3%) and the North Great Plain (by 
35.8%) were standing out. The presented data suggest that in terms of number of 
businesses, the level of foreign investment is the lowest in Northern Hungary; in 
terms of all other indicators (sales income, own capital, foreign investment within 
own capital), it is South Transdanubia.  
Comparing civil penetration to the economic figures of Hungary in 2000, the 
indicators connected to personal tax payers (number of tax payers, amount of tax 
base, amount of tax paid) proved to be factors of considerable importance. The 
amount of GDP per capita and foreign direct investment possessed influence of 
medium strength. The indicators reflecting the general situation of the enterprises 
(number of enterprises with or without legal personality) were only of weak effect.    
After all, I can state that in 2000 the civil sector mostly depended – 
beside the governmental supports and enterpreneurial earnings – on the 
citizens’ “conditions”, or in other words, the positions of the organisations 
were most influenced by the intensity of the citizens’ contribution to their 
activities or financing. It is also important to remark that the impact of the 
economic sector began to be considerable, however, it did not arrive from 
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the direction of domestic enterprises, but from foreign and multinational 
companies. There may be two factors hiding in the background. On the one 
hand, at this time CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) activities that 
started in our country later, had already spread to other countries.335 CSR is 
based on the concept of sustainable development, on the vision that today’s 
economy and life must be organized in a way that allows future generations 
to have conditions and experiences similar to ours.336 This approach includes 
the environmental, social and economic (altogether: social) aspects of 
development. Instead of focusing on the quantitative advance, it focuses on 
qualitative improvement. 
Thus, CSR is not only a fashion wave in relation to which some publications, 
standards or interesting researches have been released. It is more than that, it 
includes basic principles and methods that companies and other stakeholders are 
urged to utilise. Today, foreign companies all over the world pay attention to CSR, 
i.e. to spending a part of the produced capital on objectives of social benefit. One 
of the most frequent forms of this is the support of the civil sector. The 
multinational companies, of course, introduced this practice in their Hungarian 
subsidiaries, as well; this is the reason why in 2000 the situation of the civil 
organisations was more influenced by foreign companies than by Hungarian ones. 
On the other hand, we must not disregard the fact that these big companies 
possessed much stronger economic positions than the Hungarian firms, so it was 
easier for them to spend financial resources on support. 
Moreover, the regional distribution of the civil organisations supports these 
statements. The number of the organisations per 10 thousand capita is higher in 
the regions (mainly in the Western part of the country, e.g. Middle-Transdanubia, 
Middle-Hungary and the capital) where the population’s income exceeds the 
average, and where many foreign companies are located.  
                                                          
335 By this term we mean that a company operates in a way that – through internal 
regulations and practical solutions – it reaches or transcends the ethical, legal, trade and 
public requirements the society lays for the business sector.  
336 Council for the European Comission (CEC), National Sustainable Development Strategies 
in the European Union, a first Analysis by the European Comission, 2004; É. Kuti, Az önzés 
iskolája? Vállalati mecenatúra – CSR környezetben. [School of selfishness? Corporate 
patronage – in a CSR environment.] Nonprofit Kutatócsoport, Budapest, 2010.  
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In the middle of the first decade of the new millennium, important changes took 
place in the Hungarian society which affected the conditions of the civil 
organisations as well. A great modification in the correlation between the economic 
conditions and the position of the civil organisations could be observed in 2006. 
The population-related variables kept strongly influencing the situation of the 
organisations, while the impact exerted by foreign and domestic companies 
reached about the same level. Thus, by 2006 all, of the non-governmental 
stakeholders had lined up behind the nonprofit organisations, the sector could 
count on considerable support from both the citizens and the domestic and 
international companies.337  
It is worth to examine the position these above-mentioned resources take up in 
the income structure of civil organizations, on a national and regional scale.  
If I compare the proportion of support made by citizens and different 
companies as part of the whole income, we can see that while the 
proportion of income coming from civil resources is the same, the proportion 
of company resources has changed considerably.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
337 L. Kákai, Kik is vagyunk mi?........ 
Online-Reader: Joint Second Cycle Degree in International Relations: Europe in the Visegrad Perspective             
202 
 
Material under copyright protection. 
 
Figure 14 
 
At the same time, the picture is a good indication of the fact that that while 
the citizens' income increased with by a few measures between 2006-2007, 
(although it has already decreased with 0.6 percent in 2008 by the 
economic crisis), on the other hand the business incomings decreased 
significantly with nearly 7 percent between 2006-2008. 
The decrease can explain the fact that the first symptoms of the economic crisis 
were already seen in the data of 2007. Economists agree that the first effects 
appeared in 2007. Probably this means that the first effects were felt by the 
Hungarian enterprise sector, although this period was not regarded as a crisis, and 
it started to rationalise its expenses. This rationalisation probably started with the 
cutting down of those expenses which were not essential parts of the operation of a 
company, e.g. the support of civil organisations. This scenario seems likely because 
the pattern of changes does not look homogenous, i.e. it does not mean that 
companies in a general sense spent less on the support of civil organisations, but it 
means that companies of particular regions or those of a particular sector spent 
less on this purpose. 
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If I want to examine the sources of business income according to 
settlement structure, the next picture looks good. Although it makes an 
influence practically in every settlement type, but the major decline is in the 
most frequent capital from the economic point of view, and it is striking in 
other some cities, where the business income rate dropped to one third 
compared to the 2006 year data. 
Figure 15 
 
If I examine the regional level, we will find the same trends. The proportion of 
income from civil sources between 2000 and 2006 remained the same in almost all 
regions. The only exception to this is the region of Northern Hungary, where the 
quota from this source dropped from 3.1 percent to 2.4 percent. 
The proportion of enterprise income from different sources, however, increased 
significantly in almost all regions except for the region of Central Transdanubia and 
the region of the Northern Great (Hungarian) Plain. The quota of income coming 
from enterprises remained unchanged in these areas. 
The quota of income the source of which were different companies was 
considerably higher in 2000 in the Central Region and in the region of Central 
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Transdanubia than the national average. By 2006, this changed a bit, the region of 
Central Transdanubia showed only average results, while in the region of the 
Southern Great (Hungarian) Plain they were above the average. 
 
 
Figure 16 
 
The quota of income from companies, especially in the region of West Pannonia 
and in the region of the Southern Great Plain decreased in 2007, and this can be 
interpreted as a symptom of the economic crisis. It has been partly confirmed by 
analyses conducted since the beginning of the economic crisis according to which 
the greatest economic decline was observed in the regions that were prospering 
economically. 
Economic and regional potential of the sector after the crisis 
The impact of the economic crisis on Hungary on 2008 and then in 2010 had 
considerably changed the triple structure described above, and by this time, as far 
as the relation between economic potential and civil activity is concerned, there 
The proportion of the civil and company incomes in the whole income of 
organisations by regions (2000, 2007, 2010, 2011) 
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were six different groups existing. The geographical situation of the new groups 
broke the former West-Middle-East division.  
It was still only the capital that could be characterised by high-level nonprofit 
activity and favourable economic conditions. Civil presence was moderate and the 
economic position was favourable in Fejér, Komárom-Esztergom and Győr-Moson-
Sopron counties. Exactly the opposite thing (moderate economic conditions and 
high nonprofit activity) could be observed in Veszprém county.    
The largest group consisted of those counties where both civil activity and the 
economic potentials remained at a low level. These included Pest, Vas, Zala, 
Baranya, Tolna, Heves, Hajdú, Bács-Kiskun and Csongrád counties.  
Somogy, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Nógrád, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok and Békés 
counties faced weak economic conditions and a moderate level of civic power. In 
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county both the economic situation and the nonprofit 
activity was very poor.   
In most of the counties, no substantial change took place in the economic 
position (in terms of the national conditions) between 2006 and 2010, the counties 
remained in the same category. The only county making a negative shift was Fejér. 
Positive changes happened in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg and 
Somogy. 
More significant changes occurred in the field of nonprofit activity. In 2008, civic 
presence improved in seven counties. These338 were all the counties in which the 
level of activity was low two years earlier. Six counties339 faced an opposite 
process: the former high level of activity decreased. This recession was 
accompanied by the worsening of the economic conditions in Csongrád, Somogy, 
Vas and Zala counties.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
338 Bács-Kiskun, Baranya, Békés, Fejér, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok, Pest and Tolna. 
339 Csongrád, Győr-Moson-Sopron, Komárom-Esztergom, Somogy, Vas and Zala. 
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Table 3.  
Change in nonprofit activity and economic potential between 2008 
and 2010 
 
County 
2008 2010 
Nonprofit 
activity 
Economic 
potential  
Nonprofit 
activity  
Economic 
potential  
Bács-Kiskun Moderate moderate moderate moderate 
Baranya Moderate moderate moderate moderate 
Békés Moderate weak moderate weak 
Borsod-Abaúj-
Zemplén 
Moderate weak 
moderate 
moderate 
Budapest High favourable high favourable 
Csongrád Moderate moderate moderate moderate 
Fejér Moderate favourable moderate moderate 
Győr-Moson-
Sopron 
Moderate 
favourable 
moderate 
favourable 
Hajdú-Bihar Moderate moderate moderate moderate 
Heves Moderate moderate moderate moderate 
Jász-Nagykun-
Szolnok 
Moderate 
weak 
moderate 
weak 
Komárom-
Esztergom 
Moderate 
favourable 
moderate 
weak 
Nógrád Moderate weak moderate weak 
Pest  Moderate moderate moderate moderate 
Somogy Moderate weak moderate moderate 
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Szabolcs-Szatmár-
Bereg 
low weak 
moderate moderate 
Tolna moderate moderate moderate moderate 
Vas moderate moderate moderate moderate 
Veszprém high moderate moderate moderate 
Zala moderate moderate moderate moderate 
 
Thus, in most of the counties with low civil activity in 2006, a considerable 
nonprofit expansion took place mainly amongst unchanged economic conditions.     
In the same period, in many counties possessing a strong civil segment, the 
level of civic activity declined, the reason for which was – probably due to the 
impacts of the economic crisis – the decay in the economic environment of the civil 
organisations. However, there were two counties where nonprofit activity 
decreased while the economic potential remained at the same level.340  
To explain the cases of the counties showing a declining civic activity as a result 
of the decaying economic environment, I cannot draw one possible universal 
reason, on the basis of the data I cannot precisely tell which factor of the economy 
elicited this impact. As far as the framework of interpretation is concerned, I 
primarily thought of the revival of the “classical” civil world where the most 
important figures, the financers of the civil society are the citizens themselves. The 
citizens react to the world by embracing them through getting self-organised in 
order to achieve smaller or bigger community objectives. It is common knowledge 
in sociology that during crises the inner cohesion of the groups becomes stronger. 
This may be the reason why nonprofit activity strengthened in the less-developed 
regions between 2006 and 2008 while the economic potentials remained at the 
same level in most places. The revival of the “classical” civil view, however, is not 
only needed in the less-developed regions, but in the stronger Western counties as 
well, where the economic conditions declined considerably already in the first year 
of the crisis. As I see it, the withering of the formerly blooming nonprofit world 
started in these counties, as well.  
                                                          
340 Győr-Moson-Sopron and Komárom-Esztergom counties. 
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This is supported by the data on the economy of the civil organisations: the 
share of the company supports in the budget of the organisations dropped to 
nearly one third between 2006 and 2008, and actually stagnated at the same low 
level in 2009. Meanwhile, the resources gained from the public remained at an 
unchanged level.  
 
Figure 17 
Relation between the change in the GDP and the nonprofit activity (2000-
2010) 
 
In the early 2000s, in the period of economic boom, the GDP per capita increased. 
Between 2000 and 2008, in each of the three examined years (2000, 2006 and 
2008), the value of the gross domestic product showed a growing tendency. By 
2010, basically as a result of the world economic crisis, the value of this indicator 
fell to a much lower level.  
At the same time, the figure reflecting nonprofit activity rose until 2008. In the 
years of economic expansion, the civil sector flourished as well, manifesting 
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considerable growth in the period. From 2008 to 2010, this indicator did not follow 
the tendency in the GDP. Between these two years, the number of the nonprofit 
organisations per 10 thousand citizens practically stagnated.    
This is partly supported by the economic analyses made after the outburst of the 
economic crisis, according to which the winners of the boom suffered from the 
biggest economic recession. During the last 10-15 years, the export-oriented 
processing industry firms established in the North-Western part of Transdanubia 
and their contractors in 2009 were forced to retain their production, dismiss parts 
of their staff, or even terminate their operation. At the same time, the 
underdeveloped outer peripheries by the Northeastern and Southern borders and 
the disadvantaged regions of the Great Plains and Southern Transdanubia, lacking 
big cities, as well, seemed to have escaped.341 Basically, the data support the 
results of the economic geographical research which shows that the development of 
the domestic regions was periodic and, in terms of its pace, was continuously 
moving between wide extreme values. The essence of the process is that the 
regions exceeding the average in development (Middle-Hungary, Middle-
Transdanubia and Western Transdanubia) had been developing faster than the 
average, while the regions below the average level of development (Southern 
Transdanubia and Southern Great Plains) had shown improvement. However, the 
pace of this considerably lagged behind the average.342  The development of 
Northern Hungary and the Northern Great Plains had more or less met the national 
trends.343 This trend changed, to the detriment of the developed regions, by the 
economic crisis.344 All this suggests that the crisis finally acts in the direction of the 
decrease in the regional inequalities of development, which is in itself desirable, but 
this unfortunately takes place by the degradation of the more developed regions, 
and not the catching up of the less developed areas. The only relation where the 
                                                          
341 Since they had had no considerable industrial production capacities. 
342 KSH (Central Statistical Office), Magyarország 2011. [Hungary 2011.] Központi 
Statisztikai Hivatal, Budapest, 2012, pp. 86. (nyilvántartási szám: J/7503) 
343 Z. Pitti, (2008) “Gazdasági folyamatok nagyban és kicsiben” [Economic processes in big 
and small.] In F. Gazsó–L. Laki–Z. Pitti, Társadalmi zárványok. MTA Politikatudományok 
Intézete, Budapest, 2008, pp. 33–79.  
344 By 2010, despite the economic crisis, the gap between Middle-Hungary (as the most 
developed region) and Northern-Hungary, the least-developed region, deepened further as 
compared to 2007: the difference between the two regions in 2010 was 2.8 times as much, 
(Central Statistical Office, Magyarország, 2011………..p. 86.). 
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further growth and sharpening of the differences is expected is the capital-
countryside relation.345 
What may be the reason of this phenomenon is that the social sector, the 
financing of which is very much dependent of the financial situation of the state 
and the economic organisations, reacts to the changes happening in the economy 
so inflexibly?  
The reason probably lies in the operational method of the civil organisations. 
Most of these organizations are small, with minimal costs of operation, so the 
reduction of the resources makes their operation more difficult, but does not make 
it impossible. And the bigger organisations with higher budgets probably find the 
possibilities to access resources amongst the more difficult economic conditions, as 
well.  
In addition, when evaluating this indicator, I must also consider the fact that, in 
case of “bankruptcy”, the nonprofit organisations are not legally liquidated, unlike 
the economic corporations. Their legal existence is not affected by the fact that 
they have no money to reach their goals, so they keep existing statistically, 
although they do not operate. And the representatives of the concerned 
organisations (due to the lack of legal regulations and even more, the lack of 
sanctions) do not usually follow the legal paths of liquidation, they simply stop their 
everyday operation.    
Owing to all this, during the years of the crisis no clear patterns, similar to those 
found in the 1990s or the middle of 2000s, between nonprofit activity and 
economic development showed.346  
Due to the “faulty operation” of the nonprofit activity indicator, I cannot say that 
in the “poorer” counties the activity declined, and I cannot say that it grew or 
stagnated in the “richer” counties. Between 2008 and 2010, it remained unchanged 
in Komárom-Esztergom County, which suffered great losses in its GDP, while in 
                                                          
345 H. Lőcsei, A gazdasági válság földrajza. [Geography of the economic crisis.] MKIK 
Gazdaság- és Vállalkozáselemző Intézet, Budapest, 2009. Július 
 
346 L. Kákai, “Civil szervezetek regionális….”; L. Kákai, Kik is vagyunk mi?......; L. Kákai, “A 
civil szektor a gazdasági válság” [The civil sector after the crisis.] Civil Szemle, Vol. VIII. 
no. 1–2. pp. 5–19.  
Online-Reader: Joint Second Cycle Degree in International Relations: Europe in the Visegrad Perspective             
211 
 
Material under copyright protection. 
 
Budapest, which had a growing tendency in GDP, the volume of civil organizations 
slightly decreased.   
All this does not mean that there is absolutely no sense in comparing these two 
indicators, and from now on it is not possible to conduct valid research of this 
system of relations. It only means that in order to understand the connections 
between the economic and the civil sector, I need more indicators and multi-
variable analysis models, and that from searching for big, general tendencies I 
must move towards more complex, meso- or micro-level analyses. 
 
Summary 
 
To sum up, the legal and economic regulations have created a wide institutional 
framework and favourable (though not ideal) conditions for the development of civil 
initiatives and non-profit service provision since 1989.347 Due to all these reasons 
and circumstances, if I had to describe the Hungarian nonprofit sector in a single 
sentence, I would say that its number and membership may be significant, though 
it is particularly weak in terms of resources and its role to accumulate social capital 
and to get involved in national and local political decision support and articulation 
of interests.  
To sum up, I could say that the lack, the weakness and the decline of bourgeois 
and civilian traditions is the inheritance in Europe that makes positions of etatism 
easier after 20 years. 
The pictures I get of the structure and development of the nonprofit sector 
considerably differ depending on which indicator; the organisational number or the 
economic power I use to examine them. To sum up, when I look at the 
developments and changes in the examined period of almost two decades, I can 
undoubtedly state that the weight of the nonprofit sector considerably increased 
both in absolute terms and within the framework of the national economy. At the 
same time, due to the heterogeneous composition of the sector, within the 
organisational heaps of very much differing nature, this process gained diverse 
                                                          
347 É. Kuti,  Civil Európa – Civil Magyarország [Civil Europa – Civil Hungary] Európa Ház, 
Budapest, 2008, p. 15.   
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emphasises, and the shift experienced and measured by certain dimensions were 
not only of differing dynamics, but in some cases of opposing directions, as well. 
Although I have no figures to prove our conclusion, the tendencies described above 
and other – not only empirical – information we have about the sector’s activity, 
clearly demonstrate the fact that the weight of the nonprofit sector grew during the 
years examined. 
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Post-communist media model. The press in the Czech Republic and 
Poland. 
 
The collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe had a huge 
impact on the transformation taking place in the mass media. Social, 
political, economic and technological development influenced the dynamics 
of the ongoing transformations and development of democratic media 
systems.  
The aim of this article is to illustrate the development of the press in 
Poland and the Czech Republic under the influence of political 
transformations. According to Hallin and Mancini for some time, Poland and 
the Czech Republic exhibited many common features with the countries of 
the model of democratic corporatism, however, the period of communism 
definitely distanced them from this pattern.  
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Functions of the media 
 
Increasingly, the media not only inform, analyze or interpret, but are 
also opinion-forming348. John Pleszczyński even writes that the media who 
are a guarantors of democracy. "The media are not good in themselves - 
says the author - but because of democracy, on a whole, which are subject 
only to a part.  
They have no intrinsic value >> << they are not independent. Their 
value is relativized to the function they play in a democracy. >> Democracy 
is not just regimes, but include the state of a society or well-functioning 
social bonds <<. Without media links not only cannot function well, but 
cannot function at all. Therefore they only have a contributory positive 
value"349.  
Media play an intermediary role between citizens and the 
authorities350, social and political reality. The close relationship between 
democracy and its authorities and the media is called mediocracy or media 
democracy, and the media are called the fourth power. According to Dobek-
Ostrowska "myth of mass media as the fourth power comes down to real or 
potential impact on knowledge and attitudes of consumers and thus 
participation in the formation of public opinion”351.  
The media as the fourth estate activate the community, evaluate and 
control the work of government institutions, inform, consolidate the rule of 
law and to affect changes in political and economic life.  
 
The authors of the introduction to the publication entitled Mediatyzacja 
kampanii wyborczych also emphasized that the media as the fourth wall 
                                                          
348 W. Stankiewicz, Media a demokracja w społeczeństwie informacyjnym, [w:] Teoria i 
praktyka funkcjonowania mediów, red. J. Marszałek-Kawa, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam 
Marszałek 2010, s. 48. 
349 J. Pleszczyński, Przestrzeń akcjologiczna mediów popularnych i jakościowych, [w:] 
Oblicza komunikacji. Język i kultura tabloidów, Wrocław, 29-30 czerwca 2009, s. 
http://oblicza.konferencja.org/ufiles/File/ksiazka_przedkonferencyjna.pdf 
350 W. Stankiewicz, op. cit., s. 48. 
351 B. Dobek-Ostrowska, Media masowe i aktorzy polityczni w świetle studiów nad 
komunikowaniem politycznym,  Wrocław: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego 2004. 
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"constitute an instance of the control for all types of power: legislative, 
executive and judicial. ”352. 
Hence they emphasize that the media should be independent 
economically, must keep its distance and retain its autonomy. These 
responsibilities derive from the fact that the media is power that intervenes 
and shapes the course of events. There are even theories that put the media 
against other types of power, and call them first power, there are also 
others, such as Jerzy Jastrzebski, who write that the media is "neither the 
first, nor the second”353 power. 
 
In his controversial book, Thomas Meyer354 emphasizes that media 
transforms traditionally understood democracy into media democracy. It is 
media that dictates public opinion its views and emphasizes that media 
shapes traditionally understood concepts of democracy into media 
democracy. It is the media that dictates the opinion of the public its views 
and create its worldview. Moreover, political elites work closely on a large 
scale with the media in hope that it’s the media who will enable their  
 
Therefore, political elites cooperate with the media on a large scale in 
hopes that it is the media who will enable them to gain popularity and 
secure high position in the world of politics. In this way, writes Meyer, the 
media colonize politics, making politicians their companions.  
Media and politics form a corporation whose subject of activity is 
politics understood as an aesthetic phenomenon, the functioning of which is 
confirmed and maintained as presence in the media. It is the media that 
make politics so unique and worthy of attention.  
                                                          
352 J. Jastrzębski, Ani pierwsza, ani czwarta, [w:] Media w Polsce. Pierwsza władza IV RP?, 
red. M. Sokołowski, Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Akademickie I Profesjonalne 2007. 
353 J. Jastrzębski, Ani pierwsza, ani czwarta, [w:] Media w Polsce. Pierwsza władza IV RP?, 
red. M. Sokołowski, Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Akademickie I Profesjonalne 2007. 
354 T. Meyer with Lewis P. Hinchman, Media Democracy: How the Media Colonize Politics, 
Cambridge: Polity 2002. 
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The interests of the media and politicians are beginning therefore to 
be inter-related. Today's politics and democratic processes have moved 
from the real world, from parliament to the world of media. The author 
simultaneously acknowledges the potential of the media, which should 
educate civil society to uphold the traditions and values of democracy and 
enable citizens to deepen their knowledge and understanding of political 
realities. 
 
Media democracy otherwise known as mediocracy is a dynamic 
structure, which involves strengthening the role of public service 
broadcasters, developing alternative media, socially engaging, civic 
journalism and encouraging consumers to take action. The media in a media 
democracy create a system that gives all members of society an opportunity 
to actively participate in democracy.  
Media are used to promote democracy and are themselves democratic, 
all whilst upholding democracy. Hence, the media act as critic and 
watchdog. An important role of the media is "paying attention to public 
opinion on current problems and social pathologies, as well as provoking 
public debate on matters of  provoking legitimate public interest”355. 
 
Ewa Nowińska356 defines the media even as the judge and scare-crow 
emphasizing their role to guard and uphold social order. Stanislaw 
Michalczyk in his book Demokracja medialna adds that democracy is 
characterized by the media coverage of social life357. Marian Golka 
commenting on the entertaining-nature of politics quotes Ryszard 
Kapuscinski: "Journalism today is more in the business of entertaining than 
providing information. It informs about events without reaching to the 
sources, examining the real causes. Even the news on current events is 
taken out of the broader context. (...) Rather than inform, journalists 
                                                          
355 D. Głowacka, A. Ploszka, Media w okresie wyborczym. Przewodnik dla dziennikarzy, 
Warszawa: Helsińska Fundacja Praw Człowieka 2014, s. 8. 
356 E. Nowińska, Media jako czwarta władza? Co na to prawo?, [w:] Media, władza, prawo, 
red. M. Magoska, Kraków: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego 2005, s. 13-14. 
357 S. Michalczyk, Demokratyzacja medialna. Teoretyczna analiza problemu, Toruń: 
Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, 2010, s. 7-12. 
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mislead”358. Zbigniew Bauer writes however: "The role of serious, analytical, 
public journalism, the serious discourse about serious matters is gradually 
decreasing; it is marginalized. The mainstream media begins to dominate 
the vision of the public sphere as a stage where spectacle take place. Social 
life - from politics to economics, sport and culture – treated as a spectacle 
created by the media, for the media and then  reported by the media. This 
phenomenon, sometimes referred to as politainment, should in fact be 
called depolitaintment, a "depoliticization spectacle" whose effect is to 
discourage recipients from public activity, provoking them to build distrust 
and distance,  and confirming the negative experiences and 
disappointments”359".  
The process of entertaining is, inter alia, the shortening, simplifying 
and making the transmission of information more attractive. Both the 
process of entertaining and the mediatisation are associated with privileging 
the image and visual media. It is about rhetoric, which favors an image, 
emotion and metaphor in place of rational argument 
 
Czech post-communist media model based upon the example of the 
press 
 
The Czech Republic360 was established in January 1993, when 
Czechoslovakia was divided into two independent states. After seventy-five 
years, the Czech Republic became an independent state, which from the 
beginning had to define its statehood. Because Czechoslovakia was founded 
on the 28th October 1918 after the end of World War I, detaching from the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire.  
                                                          
358 M. Golka, Bariery w komunikowaniu i społeczeństwo (dez)informacyjne, Warszawa: PWN 
2008, s. 115. 
359 Z. Bauer, Twój głos w Twoim domu: cztery typy tabloidyzacji, [w:] Oblicza komunikacji. 
Język i kultura tabloidów, Wrocław, 29-30 czerwca 2009, s. 12. 
http://oblicza.konferencja.org/ufiles/File/ksiazka_przedkonferencyjna.pdf (dostęp: 
15.02.2015). 
360 Artykuł poświęcony historii mediów czeskich w: Kinga Anna Gajda 
Czechy, [w:] Systemy medialne państw Unii Europejskiej, red. A. Matykiewicz – 
Włodarska, M. Ślufińska, Toruń: Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek 2014. 
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Two years earlier, the Czechoslovak National Council was founded in 
Paris which in 1918 was deemed by the Entente states as the representation 
of Czechs and Slovaks. Czechoslovakia  was comprised of the Czech 
Republic, Moravia, Silesia Opava, Slovakia, Transcarpathian Ukraine, the 
western part of Cieszyn Silesia, part of the Spiš and Orava. During the 
interwar years, Czechoslovakia was one of the most economically and 
technologically developed European countries. Mainly because, within this 
area (specifically in the area of today's Czech Republic) there were sixty 
percent of the industrial potential of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 
Czechoslovakia was a stable country and the only one in Europe which 
remained a pluralistic democracy with a sophisticated media infrastructure - 
developed and the film industry, and a radio, which began broadcasting in 
May 1923 year.  
The only potential harm within Czechoslovakia was the friction of both 
ethnic Germans, Hungarians, Ruthenians, Slovaks and Czechs. After World 
War II, Czechoslovakia was in the Soviet sphere of influence. An important 
event of this time was an attempt to return to parliamentary democracy, 
within the framework of the so-called Prague Spring (1968), which ended 
with the intervention of Warsaw Pact troops.  
The Prague Spring was caused by a deep chasm between the 
communist ideology and social changes that took place in Czechoslovakia - a 
lush development of cultural, Czech cinema, youth culture. The increasing 
opposition to the government were writers who published their texts in 
"Literární noviny", a Czech cultural and political weekly which came out in 
1927.  
In the sixties, the weekly had a great impact on the liberalization of 
the Czechoslovak society as “Literární Lists ", on pages of which Havel’s 
writings were published on the establishment of an independent Christian 
Democrat Party, as well as the ‘Two thousand words’ petition, then editor of 
Literary Letters and Nowiny, Ludvika Vaculik. The press was one of the most 
important platforms of intellectual discussion during the Prague Spring. 
Because of its political nature, several weeklies was stopped, and so, for 
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example ‘Literární Noviny’ was shut down three times in 1967, 1968 and in 
1969. 
"Literární noviny" modeled on a bi-monthly cultural and socio-political 
journal "Listy" published in 1971 initially during exile in Rome by a Czech 
publicist Jiří Pelican who between the years 1963 and 1968 was the director 
of state television.  
During the Prague Spring Pelikán represented the pro-reform position, 
which is why TV directly informed the public about political events. Co-editor 
of "Listy" Václav Burian was later the editor of the cultural magazine "Arch 
A5", "Notes", the Olomouc newspaper "Hanácké noviny" and the letter 
"Scriptum", which prepared, among others, a special issue devoted to Polish 
literature. He was also the editor of the weekly "Literární noviny", which, 
after the so-called Velvet Revolution in 1989, which began a transformation 
of the political system in Czechoslovakia, issuing resumed.  
The first two numbers of the "Literární noviny" were published as a 
supplement to the liberal-conservative "lidových Novin", the oldest Czech 
journal published today, founded in 1893 in Brno by the politician Adolf 
Stránský. To the "Lidovek," as was the journal referred to, wrote the 
supporters of the Czechs and Slovak independence, and after the 
establishment of Czechoslovakia representatives of cultural and artistic elite. 
"Lidovek" was not issued during the Second World War, and in 1952 it was 
shut down by the communist government. Its consequent issuance, in the 
form of underground monthlies resumed in 1987, and since 1989, meaning 
from the moment on its pages appeared "Literární noviny", began to appear 
regularly until a year later it once again began to issue on a daily basis. 
 The few months during which society enjoyed absolute freedom 
during the period of the Prague Spring was a very significant moment in the 
history of Czech media - radio, newspapers and television became a 
professional tool for shaping and informing the public, a lot of new leading 
broadcasters came to be. After the end of the Prague Spring, the media 
went underground, still going strong, leading independent news service, 
calling for peace and preventing subsequent bloodshed. There was also the 
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emigre press, including "Svědectví", a Czech political and cultural quarterly 
magazine founded in 1956 in New York by a journalist, publicist and editor-
in-chief Pavel Tigrida.  
Tigrid was also the editor of the BBC Czech service, collaborated with 
Radio Free Europe, published in magazines in Czech and English, among 
others, in "Kulturní zápisník" and "42 Review", and co-founded a emigration 
magazine "Skutečnosti". From 1960 "Svědectví" was published in Paris, and 
after the Velvet Revolution in Prague. It was published until 1992.  
This quarterly magazine discussed the current events taking place in 
Czechoslovakia, and devoted a lot of space to literature. Many well-known, 
underground writers and journalist wrote him. Emigration Czech race 
amounts in many titles. Mention should also be given to "Listy" published in 
1979 in Rome and "Studie" from 1958, a Munich-based "Obrys" (from 
1981), "Paternoster" coming out in Vienna since 1983, "Proměny" founded 
in 1964 in New York, or a London-based "Rozmluvy" founded by a 
conservative political scientist Alexander Tomský.  
In the seventies and eighties oppression in Czechoslovakia was much 
stronger than in other countries behind the Iron Curtain, which was a 
consequence of the Prague Spring. Socialists tried to suppress the 
Czechoslovak intelligence and pacify the media reformers. Media, which 
without exceptions were the state-owned, until the fall of communism had 
to use a typical socialist jargon and serve the Communist propaganda.  
As a result, journalism was suppressed and became uncreative, 
reconstructive activity comprised of constant lies. After the fall of 
communism, state media were transferred into the hands of privateers. 
Privatization was confined mostly to the change of ownership and title, the 
content, the recipient, the market and often even brand remained 
unchanged. And so the daily " Mladá Fronta " which originated in 1945, in 
1990 was turned into " Mladá Fronta Dnes", today's left-wing daily "Právo" 
published in 1995 in Prague is a continuation of the newspaper "Rude Právo" 
belonging to the Communist Party activeo since 1920, and the Prague daily 
initially a four-page "Večerní Prague" was founded in 1955 as an information 
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sheet, containing national and international news, but also essays, reports 
and interviews was renamed in 1995 to "Večerník Praha", and this one in 
2005 to the tabloid „Šíp”„. Amatérské Radio" . "Amatérské Radio" instead of 
a monthly radio systems and electronic published since 1952, which in 1996 
became the new title of "Praktická electronics - amatérské Radio".  
Most of these privatized newspapers was eventually sold to foreign 
investors. In addition to the "Právo" published under the editorship Zdenka 
Porybný, the other Czech newspapers belong to foreign publishers. Two of 
the three major daily newspapers "Mlada fronta Dnes" and "Lidové noviny" 
one of the biggest publishing houses in the German market, Düsseldorf 
publishing house founded in 2000, Rheinisch-Bergische Verlagsgesellschaft 
GmbH und Druckerei-, the third most important newspaper " Hospodářské 
noviny” belongs to another German publisher Handelsblatt and the US daily 
Wall Street Jorunal, tabloid 'Blesk' and the daily 'Sport' issued by the Swiss 
Ringier, Paving "Super" belongs to the Austrian Epic Holding. Even the 
regional dailies belong to foreign owners - German group Vltava Labe Press 
(PNP) bought most regional newspapers, such as "Deníky Bohemia", 
released their journalists and replaced their magazines with the addition of 
one or two-pages of local news.  
This results in a weakening of those newspapers which do not have 
any way influence on public opinion and do not participate in the daily life of 
the Czechs. Similar, two national newspapers "Zemská noviny" and "Slovo", 
whose several pages are continually repeated day after day, consequently 
caused a drop in readership of these newspapers. 
 The Communist attack on the Czechoslovak media professionalism 
contributed to the low level of Czech journalism of the nineties, which lacked 
the courage to be independent and critical. Thus, most of the media 
between 1996 and 1997 supported the right-wing government of Vaclav 
Klaus and anti-communist groups. Young journalists also lacked the 
experience and tradition of journalism that they could continue, as well as 
masters of journalism, which they could and would like to emulate. Thus the 
Czech media of the nineties was shy, timid, uncreative, unproductive, 
superficial, impervious and conventional. Foreign publishers were only 
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interested in profit and not building public opinion, and journalists could not 
affect this opinion and to shape it. All learn this only in the XXI century. 
 Today, one of the three major dailies in the Czech Republic next to 
Lidovych novin and Mladej fronty Dnes are „Hospodářské noviny” which are 
primarily devoted to economic issues, sport and cultural activities. Twice a 
week, along with "Hospodarskimi novinami" supplements come out, devoted 
to traveling, fashion and gastronomy. This newspaper running 1990 as 
"Lidové noviny" and "Mladá Fronta DNES" presents liberal-conservative 
views. "Mladá Fronta DNES" belongs to the same owner as the 'Lidové 
nowiny’  namely the German publishing group Rheinisch-Bergische 
Verlagsgesellschaft GmbH und Druckerei-. This peridical brought to life in 
1945, in the period of socialist power was the leadning press organ of the 
Czechoslovak Union of Youth (Československý svaz mládeže, CSM) formed 
in 1949. Following its dissolution in 1968,  and the transformation into the 
Socialist Youth Union (Socialiastický svaz mládeže), within the organization . 
In those days the newspaper was titled "Mlada Fronta". After the Velvet 
Revolution previous editors of "Mladé Fronty" decided to create a new 
journal and in September 1990 showed up the first issue of the newspaper " 
Mladá Fronta DNES." Officially, this newspaper does not endorse any 
political orientation. The most influential weeklies are "Týden", right-wing 
"Respekt" and the economic magazine "Ekonom". For most renowned Czech 
weekly issued since 1990 is "Respekt", specializing in investigative 
journalism and reportage on politics and culture. Other renowned Czech 
weekly is the conservative-liberal 'Reflex' coming out since 1990. It is 
considered a periodical dealing with particularly controversial subjects and 
does not avoid provocation. The "Prague Daily Monitor” is the internet-based 
journal published in English. 
 
A large readership in the Czech Republic enjoy the tabloids, especially 
the two most important: the newspaper "Blesk" published in 1992, modeled 
on the Swiss daily  "Blick" published by the same company Ringier, and 
"Super". In addition, there are many thematic magazines in Czech Republic. 
Among others, a bimonthly philosophical magazine published in Prague 
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since 1953 by the Czech Academy of Sciences Filosofický časopis", which 
publishes historical and philosophical articles in Czech, with abstracts in 
English and German; similar to a philosophical and theological scientific 
journal "Reflex”, founded in 1985 by the philosopher Ladislav Hejdánka. 
Until 1989 it was published underground and only since 1990 published 
legally. The "Slezský Sborník", a historical journal devoted to the history of 
Silesia was founded in 1878 under the title " Věstník Matice opavské", 
publishing research materials, documents,discussion reports and reviews of 
recent literature, both domestic and foreign, as well as a summary of 
numerous studies in Czech, Slovak, Polish, German and English. Currently, 
the magazine is published twice a year, issued by the Silesian Museum in 
Opava. Other magazines are publications dedicated to the history of 
medieval Czech " Mediaevalia Historica Bohemica "published in 1991, 
representing a continuation of "Film Historica Bohemicy", which publishes 
scientific papers and discussions, inspiration, ideas, essays, reviews, 
conference reports; a Prague bizantynological magazine published since 
1929 entitled "Byzantinoslavica"; a bimonthly "Psalterium" which 
popularizes sacred music; the monthly railway magazine, "Draham" and 
Catholic magazines, among others: Katolický týdeník ", “Světlo” or 
"Teologické texty". It is also worth mentioning few Polish periodicals,  
published since 1949 by the Polish minority in Zaolzie, a literary monthly 
"Zwrot", which publishes reports and the „Głosie Ludu”, published since 
1945, initially as a weekly and from 1951 to the present day three times a 
week. Finally, the "Prager Presse", a newspaper published by the German 
minority during the years 1921 and 1939. 
Media in the Czech Republic are subject to the Press Act (Media právo 
No. 46/2000 Coll.) from February, 2000. They also have to respect the laws 
of civil liberties (Act. No. 23/1991 of January 1991) and the Code of Ethics 
published by journalists in June of 1998. Freedom of speech also provides 
freedom of the press and lack of censorship. The government therefore has 
no right of viewership or censure with regards to content. According to 
Czech media law however, all newspapers must be previously registered 
with the Ministry of Culture. Editors publishing their newspapers without 
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permission of the Ministry, who remain unregistered are fined. However, this 
law does not impose any specific obligations regarding the disclosure of the 
identity of the owner. The owner however, assumes responsibility for the 
accuracy and truthfulness of the information published. The Press Act gives 
journalists the right to protect sources of information, unless they are 
involved in criminal activity. In addition, there are no regulations regarding 
government grants regarding daily newspapers. 
Jan Čulik361 describing the Czech media defines them as post-
communist media model  and explains that these media are characterized 
by bias, uncritical attitude to the authorities (for example, in autumn of 
2001 during the war in Afghanistan, most Czech media uncritically 
supported the US action), partiality, politicizing , lack of professionalism, 
and the traditional approach. Čulik also cites the words of journalist Bohumil 
Pečinka that "Reflex" in 1999 wrote that the Czech media are characterized 
with small-town mentality, despite the fact that the media in the Czech 
Republic are concentrated around the capital.  
This is where most newspapers are issued with their principal place of 
broadcasting. As Čulik pointed out, the only positive note in the media is the 
attitude of Czech anti-discrimination. In and so in 1992, "Politika" was shut 
down for anti-Semitic attitude and its editor was sentenced to seven months 
in jail. Still, the future of media in the Czech Republic is dependent on 
developments in the political arena. 
 Politicians and political parties still control the media flow of 
information. Foreign owners of television stations, radio stations and the 
press do not interfere in politics, they are not interested in neither quality of 
its media, nor partiality journalists. Geared only a quick profit or loss, hence 
eager to present entertaining material. Čulik lists ten "deadly sins" of the 
Czech media: strong dependence of the media There is a strong dependence 
                                                          
361 Jan Čulík, Czech Media now – a postcommunist model?,  
http://www.arts.gla.ac.uk/Slavonic/Czech_Media_now.htm (dostęp: 02.09.2013). 
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on the Czech Press Agency362   (Česká tisková kancelář -  ČTK) which meant 
that in various newspapers appear identical passages appear; dry, dull, 
mechanical style of communication of information - passive, unimaginative 
and criticism; too much information in one service - very fast pace and 
hence incomprehensible information; angry, one-dimensional way of 
conducting interviews and information; not exemplary, uninteresting and 
graphic content; lack of comparisons and references to foreign countries; 
the lack of debate; lack of journalistic instinct and adherence to stereotypes. 
To this list Jiri Hanaki, a journalist and commentator publishing the "Právo" 
adds, easy to succumb to ideology, laziness, pseudo-intellectualism and 
pragmatism.  
Czech media also now favored by other statistics - Czechs read 
considerably less with only approximately 45 percent of the Czech 
population reading a magazine at least once a week. Moreover, they hardly 
watch television. Czechs are below the European average of viewership. 
 
Polish post-communist media model based upon the example of the 
press 
 
The development of the press in the Second Republic also 
hampered the events of 1926. After the coup d’état undertaken by the camp 
of Pilsudski supporters, changed legal and political functioning of the press. 
Penalties for insulting the authorities and spreading false information were 
introduced.  
The Constitution of 1935 omitted the issue of freedom of the press, 
and in 1938 the administrative authorities granted the right to confiscate 
titles. Activity was tightened by censorship, through which surprisingly was 
                                                          
362 Założona w 1992 roku jako instytucja publiczna (ustanowiona Aktem CTK nr 517/1992 
Coll.), następczyni  Jako Czechosłowackiej Agencji Prasowej (ČTK lub "cacko"). Od 1996 
ČTK nie jest dotowana z funduszy państwowych. Posiada 14 oddziałów w Czechach i 
korespondentów zagranicznych w 3 krajach, . z wieloma innymi agencjami krajowymi i 
zagranicznymi. 
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not the white spots on the front pages of newspapers. Despite this, the 
press was constantly developing and expanding, and the scope of readers 
continually expanding. Of particular interest was the press outlets, which 
had a large circulation and number of titles, including „Ilustrowany Kurier 
Codzienny”, „Kurier Czerwony”, „Express Poranny. Increasingly popular 
became specialized magazines, targeted to the more educated groups of 
Polish society, such as: "Ivy" and "Literary News"( „Bluszcz” czy 
„Wiadomości Literackie”.) Just before the outbreak of World War II there 
were ten national daily newspapers. World War II marked the end of the 
press system model developed in the first years of independent Poland. 
After World War II a system completely subordinated to political structures 
was developed, being one of the key instruments of the Communist Party 
power. 
Since January 1947 the flow of information was monitered by the 
Press Commission of the Central Committee and the General Office of 
Control of Performances and Publications, and the founded Cooperative 
Publishing House "Press" (later the Workers Cooperative Publishing House 
"Press-Book-Activity") organized the structure of the press market.  
The biggest newspaper was founded on December 16, 1948, "The 
People's Tribune". Although adopted in 1952 Constitution of the Polish 
People's Republic guaranteed the citizens’ freedom of speech, in fact, strict 
control policy with regards to publication was enforced. A Second circuit 
press began to appear, which further developed especially in the seventies 
and eighties, including "(Biuletyn”, „Informator”, „Komunikat Komitetu 
Obrony Robotników”, „Biuletyn Informacyjny”, „Robotnik” ).  
Illegal publishing activities did not only participate in the building 
and supporting the identity of the ideological opposition groups, but were 
also an intellectual base of political opposition and the foundation of building 
an independent media market in Poland after 1989. In addition, Catholic 
press which was issued legally by the Church and the environment close to 
the Church included („Tygodnik Powszechny”, „Tygodnik Warszawski”, „Gość 
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Niedzielny”, „Niedziela”), whose existence was unique in communist bloc 
countries. 
At the beginning of building a democratic state and market in 
Poland after 1989, privatized and corporatization took place, which for most 
newspapers and magazines existing in the era of PRL meant an end to their 
activities. Technological backwardness, low levels of managerial skills of 
journalists and the lack of funds made it impossible to operate in market 
conditions. In the 20 years following the system transformation, on a 
legitimate success story we can speak only in the case of several 
companies, including Cooperative "Politics", publisher of the weekly 
"Polityka".  
Other titles were sold mainly to foreign entities or liquidated. The 
roundtable discussions initially led to an agreement of the existence of the 
first independent state newspaper - "Gazeta Wyborcza". As a result of 
political changes in 1989, high volume of independent press ("Gazeta 
Wyborcza" and reissued "Tygodnik Solidarność”) appeared. Second circuit 
press also appeared („Arka”, „Krytyka” et al.), and officially émigré press 
was widely distributed (eg. Paris "Kultura").  
The new editorial teams began to issue, among others, 
"Rzeczpospolita", "Zycie Warszawy" and "Evening Express", "Tribune" 
(referring to the defunct "Tribune of the People"), some newspapers have 
changed titles, and a part of the weekly socio-cultural magazines ceased to 
exist („Życie Literackie”, „Zdanie”, „Kultura”). In addition, many writings 
related to new parties and political groupings, such as “Słowo Narodowe” or 
“Sprawa Polska”. The Catholic press is still developing, such as “Niedziela” 
or Jesuit monthly „Przegląd Powszechny ". Within the privitized press market 
new publishers began to emerge and tabloids emerged as well. In 1995, a 
total of approximately 4,500 titles emerged.  
Currently, on the Polish press market nationwide there are two dailies 
belonging to a segment of the press, of which only the "Rzeczpospolita" has 
its roots in the previous system. "Gazeta Wyborcza", which belongs to the 
company Agora was set up in May 1989, shortly before the first democratic 
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Parliamentary elections. An important place on the Polish market is secured 
by specialized magazines and journals, mainly devoted to business  
(„Dziennik Gazeta Prawna”, „Gazeta Podatkowa”) or sports („Przegląd 
Sportowy”, „Sport”).  In Poland approximately 5,400 periodicals are issued – 
they are characterized by a high developmental figures and dynamics.  
On the market more and more magazines appear with a clearly 
defined profile, as well as exclusive journals as well as journals addressed to 
ordinary consumers. A lot of magazines are funded with foreign capital, 
therefore quite often the so-called carbon paper is placed on the market, 
which is the equivalent of a journal published in another country or a foreign 
journal issued in Polish language. An example of this is "Playboy". In the 
nineties, there was a rash of magazines or periodicals, characterized by high 
standards - both universal and targeted to a specific group of small 
consumers, including “Twój Styl”, “Sukces”, “Polityka”, “Wprost”.  
On the market there are always new journals that fall in this category. 
For instance, journals on the theory of marketing and advertising, which is 
associated with the emergence of new industries and specializations. The 
most dynamically developing category are monthly magazines. Most 
profitable in fact are magazines which are least ambition, namely “Tele 
Tydzień”, “Pani domu”, “Przyjaciółka” – 18,5 %,  “Chwila dla ciebie” – 
approx. 13 %. „Claudia” – 15, 9 %.  Considerable interest is also generated 
by free press such as “Metro”. 
The ownership structure of Polish press market is dominated by 
foreign media companies. Although the biggest Polish company Agora ranks 
on top in the list of publishers in the daily press (in terms of circulation), it 
also loses competition in the magazine (circulation, advertising revenues), 
giving way to German and Swiss groups (Bauer Media Group, Edipresse, 
Verlagsgruppe Passau, Hubert Burda Media, Ringier Axel Springier, Gruner 
+ Jahr). The fundamental act regulating the functioning of the media in 
Poland is the Constitution adopted in 1997, with Art. 14 ensuring freedom of 
the press and other media.  
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The Constitution also contains a provision on the prohibition of 
censorship. Constitutional provisions are to confirm and strengthen 
legislation adopted in Poland following the 1989 changes, which include: the 
Act on the Liquidation of RSW " Prasa-Książka-Ruch"; the Act on repeal of 
the Act on the Control of publications and performances; the abolition of 
these bodies; the changes in the Act on Press Law and finally approved after 
a heated debate about the parliamentary Law on Radio and Television of 29 
December 1992. Regulations with regards to media system in Poland relate 
primarily to radio and television sector. The press market is not subject to 
licensing. The main document regulating the functioning of the media in 
Poland is the Act on Radio and Television adopted in 1992, under which the 
former state television broadcaster of public companies was transformed.  
Furthermore, it created conditions for the emergence of private 
operators on the market, whose activity was to oversee the new national 
regulator National Broadcasting Council and Television The pivotal act to the 
functioning of journalists in Poland is the Act of Press Law of 26 January 
1984. Admittedly, after the changes in 1989, this document was often 
amended by introducing further provisions adapting the law to changing 
social, political, economic and even technological, but nevertheless both 
journalism and political circles consider it unsuited to the needs of modern 
media market and journalism.  
Therefore, more important from the point of view of journalists are 
rulings of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court and the applicable 
law, which does not guarantee the full autonomy of journalists in Poland. 
Media freedom is also ratified by Polish international law - including The 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms Act of 26 January 1984 (Dziennik Ustaw of February 7, 1984.), 
which states that "the press, according to the Polish Constitution, takes 
advantage of the right to freedom of expression and embodies the right of 
citizens to their reliable information, transparency in public life and control 
and social criticism "(Sec. 1, Art. 1) and that "the task of a journalist is to 
serve society and the state. The journalist has a duty to act in accordance 
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with professional ethics and rules of social coexistence, within the limits set 
by law "(Sec. 2, Art. 10) 
The dominant position in the Polish press market is taken by 
nationwide dailies, if you take into account their overall one-time print run. 
A considerable advantage is appropriated by local and regional newspapers, 
which since the transformation of the political system and every  year 
thereafter, however decrease. Their place is taken by an agglomeration of 
more popular newspaper free of charge, and in smaller towns, self-
government newspapers published once a week or once every two weeks. 
Currently, Polish media system in general concept of systems based 
on the criterion forms of media ownership is one of the dual systems. From 
the point of view of development of the press, publications in Polish, both 
occasional and periodic, they appeared relatively early, especially in 
comparison with the Czech Republic. Intricate story influenced the character 
and shape of the emerging market of mass press. Due to the general 
cultural and civilizational conditions at the time of independence in 1918, 
natural circulation area of the press were larger urban centers and which 
had clear political nature.  
For the modern shape of the media system in Poland, a particularly 
determining period was during communism. Over time, journalists have 
become increasingly critical of the policy, and therefore we can say that 
Polish media system more closely resembles the model of polarized 
pluralism (typical for the countries of southern Europe). 
 
Summary 
 
According to media systems division presented in 1956 by - Siebert, 
Peterson and Siebert, Peterson and Schramm363, who assume the existence 
of four models: libertian, social responsibility, soviet communist and 
                                                          
363 Siebert F.S., Peterson T., Schramm W (1956), Four theories of the Press: The 
Authoritarian, Libertarian, Social Responsibility and Soviet Communist. Concept of What the 
Press Should Be and Do, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956. 
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authoritarian, Polish and Czech system definitely belonged to the third 
model. Similarly  classified in the case of a division used by Hachten’s364 was 
the concept of the press, which included the division of Western 
Development, Communications, communist and authoritarian and 
Altschull’s365 system (market-Western, advancing -Third World, Marxist –
communist).  
In 2002 the division made by Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini was 
introduced in a monograph media systems. Three models of media and 
politics in comparative terms, which distinguishes three models of media 
systems: a model of polarized pluralism characteristic of the Mediterranean 
countries; model of democratic corporatism occurring in north-central 
European countries and the liberal model in North Atlantic countries. The 
model of polarized pluralism is characterized by low levels of literacy and 
high politicization.  
This model of journalism is a commentary and is characterized by a 
low degree of professionalization. In this model, there is a strong state 
intervention. The democratic corporatism model is characterized by a high 
rate of readership, having its origin in the early development of the mass 
press, where the commercial press is rather neutral and socio-political 
newspapers enjoys a high degree of journalistic autonomy. Journalism is 
highly professionalized. In this model, the state intervenes in the media 
market, but also strongly protects freedom of the media. The last model, 
the liberal model has a readership at an average level, despite the fact that 
the press began to massively expand there relatively early. Journalism 
within this model is also highly professionalized and it is mainly informative.  
Hallin and Mancini underlined that the pattern of the relationship 
between the media and politics is the result of specific cultural, political and 
historical development in a particular country. In 2008 Hallin and Mancini 
                                                          
364 Hachten, W. A., & Hachten, H. (1981). The world news prism: Changing media, clashing 
ideologies. Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press. 
 
365 Altschull J.H. (1984), Agents of Power: The Role of the News Media in Human Affairs, 
New York: Longmann. 
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with several other researchers complemented the three already established 
models, by adding a fourth ideal model: The Eastern European/Post –
Communist Media Model to include the Eastern European countries back in 
2004.  
Media in Poland and Czech Republish have changed along with the 
democratization of the state,  and their pathways of democratization 
following the considerations outlined by Hollifield i Jillson366 as well as 
Whitehead367, can be described as transitions from communist oligarchy in 
Eastern Europe. 
Communism left a permanent mark on the viewing and trusting of the 
media among readers, but also upon its shape. Perhaps this is because, as 
notes the author of an article entitled, Comparing media system in New 
democracies: East meets South meets West: „Communist regimes are 
unique in that their legitimacy and are based on an elaborated ideology that 
pays a central part in guiding political decision making and in shaping the 
relationship between politics and society. (…) The two features that 
characterize communist regimes – nationalization of economy and 
ideological legitimation – also shaped the role of the media and how they 
operated. (…) The media were obligated to serve as mouthpieces of the 
government and the ruling party, and political coverage was aimed at 
conveying a political message rather than covering facts and events”368.  
Both, Polish and Czech media have to go through a very long road 
from the communist model and become a democratic press. Thus Polish 
press system cannot be directly attributed to any models proposed by Hallin 
and Mancini because it possess characteristics also assigned to states with 
the so-called democratic corporatism. Perhaps this is so because, as noted 
by Voltmer: “Poland is a special case in communist history in Easters Europe 
in that it developed a strong civil society with Solidarność as its most 
                                                          
366 Hollifield J.F., Jillson C. (eds) (2000) Pathways to Democracy. The Political Exonomy of 
Democratic Transitions, New York,/London, Routledge. 
367 Whitehead L. (2002), Democratization. Theory and Experience, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
368 Katrun Voltmer, Comparing media system in New democracies: East meets South meets 
West, “Central European Journal of Communication 2008 nr 1, p. 29. 
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prominent representative. Closely connected with these groups a vivid and 
diverse clandestine press also existed”369.   
About changes of the Polish media system also write Ryszard Filas and 
Paweł Płaneta in an article Media in Poland and Public Discourse: „A few 
years after the collapse of Communism, the press readership model in 
Poland changed completely. In the People’s Republic of Poland the 
readership was mainly focused on the daily press, especially regional dailies, 
while in the mid-1990s it was focused on periodical reading: especially 
newly- launched weeklies and monthlies, which were more and more 
colorful, in accordance with the modernization of the printing industry, and 
which were introduces to the press market by major western publishers. (…) 
Until the autumn of 2003 the tabloid (…) was placed at the forefront of the 
rank of sales results”370. They concluded: “In the public debate a significant 
role is played by low-circulation socio-political titles, varied in terms of 
political orientation (…) The local and sub-local press played an important 
role in local democracy”371, and quoted the opinion of Tadeusz Kowalski372: 
“in Poland the media market is stable and moreover, it is just a system of 
mature and competitive markets that have become a part of the European 
media system.  
The press market in Poland, despite possessing some specific features, 
does not differ essentially from the one of the developed European 
countries”373. All the while, Dobek-Ostrowska, Barczyszyn, Michel, 
Baranowski write in an article Polish journalists-from politics to market:  „In 
Poland, during the two decades following the collapse of communism, the 
level of journalistic professionalism was perceived by many scholars to be 
lower than in democratic corporatist and liberal models. (…) In the 2000s, 
the analysis of journalistic professionalism in Poland suggests that at the 
                                                          
369 Ibidem, p. 30. 
370 Filas R., Płaneta P., Media in Poland and Public Discourse, p. 143 
371 Ibidem, p. 147 
372 Kowalski, T. (2006), ‘W kierunku rynku. Zmiany w prasie codziennej na tle tendencji 
europejskich’, in Podstawowe czynniki przemian polskiego rynku prasowego w latach 1996–
2006, materiały konferencyjne pod red. Jana Kani, Poznan´. Kowalski, T. (2007), ‘Wizja bez 
granic’, Ranking 
373 Filas R., Płaneta P., Media in Poland and Public Discourse, p. 156. 
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legal level as well as the level of accepted regulations, it had a lot of 
features typical to the democratic corporatist model or liberal model, but 
this could be a misleading assumption”374.  
Meanwhile, the Czech system can be described as a polarized 
pluralism mode.  Toepfl writes: „Since the fall of Communism in the former 
Eastern bloc, media landscapes in the region have taken starkly diverging 
paths of development. In some countries, for instance the Czech Republic, 
media systems have emerged that closely resemble Western models. (…) In 
the Czech Republic, by the end of the 1990s, as many as 89 percent of 
citizens belied that freedom of the press was important for a well-
functioning democracy. (…) By the mid-2000s, 59 percent of Czech citizens 
said that they trusted their mass media. The media thus achieved the 
highest level of trust amongst all political institutions, with political parties 
ranking last”375. Finally he concludes: “Media change in the Czech Republic 
[is] the best-case scenario in terms of convergence with the Western 
model”376. He also quotes Mungiu Pippidi377 who argues: “the Czech Republic 
is an exceptional case in the sense that none of the other East European 
countries had ‘a serious democratic tradition’. To the extent that the roots of 
Czech journalistic culture were traced back here to the early 20th century, 
this feature may thus be rather unique to the Czech case”378.  
In preliminary analyzes, based on the concept of the aforementioned 
authors, there were frequent opinions that most of today's media systems in 
                                                          
374 B. Dobek-Ostrowska, P. Barczyszyn, A. Michel, P. Baranowski, Polish journalists-from 
politics to market, in: Journalists in Three Media Systems: Polish, Russian and Swedish 
journalists about values and ideals, daily practice and the future / Ed. by Maria Anikina, 
Boguslawa DobekOstrowska, Gunnar Nygren (eds.). – Moscow: Journalism Faculty, 2013, 
p. 35. 
375 Florian Toepfl, Why do pluralistic media systems emerge? Comparing media change in 
the Czech Republic and in Russia after the collapse of Communism, Global Media and 
Communication, 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/53148/1/Toepfl_Pluralistic_media_systems_2013.pdf, p. 3, 14,  
376 Ibidem, p. 18. 
377 Mungiu-Pippidi A (2008) How media and politics shape each other in the new Europe. In: 
Jakubowicz K and Sükösd M (eds) Finding the Right Place on the Map: Central and Eastern 
European Media Change in a Global Perspective. Bristol: Intellect, pp.87– 100. 
378 378 Florian Toepfl, Why do pluralistic media systems emerge? Comparing media change 
in the Czech Republic and in Russia after the collapse of Communism, Global Media and 
Communication, 
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/53148/1/Toepfl_Pluralistic_media_systems_2013.pdf, p. 19 
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Europe, including Central and Eastern Europe, is evolving towards the third 
model - liberal, characteristic of Anglo-Saxon countries. Volter emphasized 
in his article: „Spichal379 points at the „Italianization” of media in East-
Central Europe involving a combination of extensive commercialization of 
the press and a high degree of state interference into public service 
broadcasting”. It seems to underline – as Katrin Volter suggests – the new 
democracies in East-Central Europe could be grouped together with the 
Mediterrean countries and “cultural differences are becoming less relevant 
giving way to a global media industry that is dominated by few international 
conglomerates that distribute their produces around the world”. 
 About Italianization or Mediterraneanization of Polish media writes as 
well Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska. In her book she writes: “At the beginning 
of the 1990s S. Splichal380 coined the phrase >>Italianization of the 
media<< to describe the process of media change in the post-communist 
world. Many other scholars in this period also compared Central European 
media systems to that of Italy, including A. Wyka381 and T. Goban-Klas382. 
Quoting Paolo Mancini, Goban-Klas describes the Italian media system as 
being dominated by the following four features: (1) state control over the 
media, realized in the direct control over television and indirect control over 
the press; (2) political party influence on the selection of topics and the 
structure of the media organizations; (3) a high degree of integration of the 
media and political elites; and (4) ethical divisions among journalists and 
media personnel383 (Mancini, 1991: 139). Goban-Klas argues that “these 
                                                          
379 Spicahl S. (2001), Imitative revolutions. Change in the media and journalism in East—
Central Europe, „Javorst/The Public” 8 (4), pp. 31-57. 
380 Spichal S. (1994), Media beyond Socialism. Theory and Practice in the East-Central 
Europe, Boulder, Westview. 
381 Wyka, Angelika W. (2008): In search of the East Central European media model - the 
Italianization model? A comparative perspective on the East Central European and South 
European media systems. In: Dobek-Ostrowska, B./Glowacki, M. (ed.): Comparing media 
systems in Central Europe: between commercialization and politicization. Wrocław: 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego: 55-69. 
382 T. Goban-Klas, Media i komunikowania masowe. Teorie i analizy i praktyka propagandy, 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 1997. 
383 Mancini P. (1991), The Public Sphere and the Use of News in a „Coalition” system of 
Goverment, in: P. Dahlgren, C. Sparks (eds) Communication and Citixenship, London: 
Routledge. 
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four characteristics of the Italian system are surprisingly close to the 
present situation in East-Central Europe”384. A few years later, many 
scholars expanded their comparative analyses by introducing a new 
concept: “Mediterraneanization.”  
One such scholar is K. Jakubowicz385, who argues that former 
communist countries share some features with the countries grouped in the 
Mediterranean media system: They have undergone recent democratization, 
they lag in economic development, and they are characterized by a weak 
rational-legal authority combined with a strong direct influence of state. He 
adds that their modernization is incomplete or (in some cases) little 
advanced”386. Jakubowicz writes: “The public media are torn between 
opposite values-declared vs. actually realized: independences, impartiality 
and public service vs. ideological engagement; non-commercial vs. 
dependence on advertising and commercialization; respect for audience and 
public service vs. objectification of audience as an aim of ideological actions 
and >>audience commodity<<”387.  
The Westernization of the media in Czech Republic and Poland, thus 
took place according to the model possible scenario of how the sitation 
might develop in Eastern European media developed by Hans Heinz Fabris, 
who in 1995 wrote about the Westfication of Eastern European media. He 
consequently foreshadowed that Eastern Europe could become a 
supplemental engine for the Western European media industry and end up 
                                                          
384 T. Goban-Klas, Media i komunikowania masowe. Teorie i analizy i praktyka propagandy, 
Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego, Wrocław 1997. 
385 Jakubowicz, K. (2008) “Public service broadcasting in post-communist countries: Finding 
the right place on the map,” in: K. Jakubowicz, Miklós Sükösd, Finding the Right Place on 
the Map Central and Eastern European Media Change in a Global Perspective, Chicago: 
IntellectBooks,TheUniversityofChicagoPress, 
http://courses.jmsc.hku.hk/jmsc6002fall2012/files/2012/10/Karol-Jakubowicz-Miklos-
Sukosd-%E2%80%93-Finding-the-right-place-on-the-map.pdf 
386 
http://ebooks.cambridge.org/chapter.jsf?bid=CBO9781139005098&cid=CBO978113900509
8A010 
387 Jakubowicz, K. (2007), Media publiczne Pocza˛tek kon´ca czy nowy początek, 
Warszawa: WAIP; za: Filas R., Płaneta P., Media in Poland and Public Discourse. 
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with the status of quasi-colonial dependency388, in accordance with the 
Europeanization process undertaken by the European Union.  
Nonetheless, in an attempt to best reflect the nature of Polish and 
Czech media, it seems that the best and most appropriate model is the 
latest model introduced by Hallin and Mancini, the so-called Eastern 
European / Post -Communist Media Model. 
  
                                                          
388 Fabris H.H. (1995), Westifiction? In: Glasnost and After: Media and Change in Central and Eastern Europe (The Hampton Press 
Communication Series. Political Communication), ed by Karol Jakubowicz, Pavao Novosel, David L. Paletz, The Hampton Press 
Communication Series. Political Communication, cytat za:  Karol Jakubowicz Post-Communist Media Development in Perspective, 
Internationale Politikanalyse Europäische Politik | Politikinformation Osteuropa, März 2005, http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/id/02841.pdf 
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1.    Introduction 
 
 
“Heritage matters, but it matters not necessarily because it is nice, pretty or an expression 
of so-called ‘universal’ values, it matters because how it is used has consequences for 
the individual, community, national, and global understanding of self and ‘other.”1 The 
questions raised in this quote by the heritage scholar Laurajane Smith, of how heritage 
matters and for whom, is also of significance for the examination of the processes around 
UNESCO heritage sites. The UNESCO Convention concerning the Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage2, adopted in 1972, defines cultural heritage as monuments, 
groups of buildings and sites of “outstanding universal value from the point of view of 
history, art or science.”3  The Convention  addresses  mainly  states  and  governments  
whose  duty  it  is  to  ensure  “the 
identification, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations 
of the cultural and natural heritage (…) situated on its territory.”4 UNESCO heritage is 
accordingly a matter of politics. Heritage scholars from the fields of cultural anthropology or 
geography, like Laurajane Smith, Gregory Ashworth or Brian Graham however stress other 
aspects of cultural heritage such as its role for the inheritors, the community, and their 
identity building processes through it. 
This paper thus takes a cultural anthropological perspective on UNESCO heritage in the 
way anthropologist Regina Bendix proposes it by looking at the agents who generate these 
processes and on the interrelation of a specific UNESCO heritage site or group of buildings to 
the everyday life of the people living in that place.5  For the purpose of this paper, these 
processes of the local use of politicized heritage are examined at the inscription of the 
historic center of the Polish city of Krakow which has been part of the UNESCO World 
Heritage list since its inauguration in 1978. Krakow is inscribed with more than 1160 
objects6  of built heritage such as churches and monasteries, synagogues and Jewish 
cemeteries or museums, as 
well as numerous movable assets as, for example, paintings or artifacts in museums, from 
the 
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1 Laurajane Smith, “Discussion,” in Heritage Regimes and the State, ed. Regina F. Bendix, Aditya Eggert and Arnika 
Peselmann, 289–395, Göttingen Studies on Cultural Property 6 (Göttingen: Göttingen University Press, 2012), 393. 
2 In the following, I will refer to this Convention by naming it also “World Heritage Convention”. 
3 UNESCO, “Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage,” (UNESCO, 
16.11.1972), http://whc.unesco.org/archive/convention-en.pdf (accessed 22 January 2013), 2. 
4 ibid. 
5 Cf. Regina Bendix, “Heritage between economy and politics: An assessment from the perspective of cultural 
anthropology,” in Intangible heritage, ed. Laurajane Smith and Natsuko Akagawa, 253–69 (London: Routledge, 
2009), 255. 
6 In an e-mail message to the author on February 15, 2013, the Office of Monument Protection of the Municipality 
of Krakow clarifies the amount of inscribed tangible objects in Krakow: “In Krakow, there are more than 1160 
monuments entered in the register of immovable monuments (which ensures that those objects are strictly and 
totally protected) and ca. 6500 objects inscribed on the communal evidence of monuments (including those in 
the register) – partly protected.”
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Romanesque period until present-day.7 Krakow’s medieval architecture, for which it is 
highlighted on the UNESCO website, is based on four areas: the old town, Wawel hill which 
is inhabited since Palaeolithic times and which encompasses the royal palace; the Stradom 
quarter and the urban district of Kazimierz.8 
A part of the latter was from the 15th  century until the Second World War, the 
historic 
 
Jewish quarter of Krakow. Because of the terrors of the Holocaust it became a neglected, 
empty and disinherited place during communism. The edifices and buildings remained; its 
religious and cultural functions vanished with its inhabitants. Since the end of the 1980s, the 
district has experienced a revival of Jewish culture with mainly non-Jewish Polish people 
initiating cultural centers, museums, Jewish style cafés and  the internationally 
renowned Jewish Culture Festival which have given opportunities to interact with Jewish 
culture that once flourished in the district.9  The anthropologists Annamaria Orla-
Bukowska and Jack Kugelmass define the process in Kazimierz as follows: “Kazimierz has 
become a kind of field of dreams, with diverse interests and competing ideas about 
restoration co-existing, and not always harmoniously so, among a growing number of carpet-
baggers, entrepreneurs, artists, guides, charlatans, townspeople, tourists and pilgrims. 
There may never be a unified plan for the area.”10 Those different purposes and meanings 
that the different agents on the civic level as  well  as  on  the  municipal,  national  and  
international  level  ascribe  to  the  heritage  in Kazimierz are the focus of this paper. How is 
the UNESCO heritage in Krakow thus used and handled on a local level? 
Since my research interest is about the people’s handling of heritage, I chose a 
qualitative, empirical approach including interviews with the official representatives of the 
UNESCO heritage in Krakow and qualitative fieldwork in Kazimierz in order to get 
insights on the above mentioned questions. Accordingly, I conducted two qualitative expert 
interviews with persons responsible for the Office of Monument Protection of the 
Municipality of Krakow, which is in charge of the protection of Krakow’s UNESCO heritage. 
Moreover, an expert interview with Professor Jacek Purchla, who is among others holder of 
the UNESCO Chair of Cultural Heritage & Urban Studies at the Krakow University of 
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Economics and founder and director  of  the  International  Cultural  Center  in  Krakow,  
gives  the  background  for  the 
understanding of heritage management in Poland. The point of view of the local 
community 
 
 
7 Cf. Małgorzata Anna Laliczka, “The city of Cracow: cultural heritage at the time of the system transformation,” 
http://www.cyf-kr.edu.pl/~ncbratas/pdf/full_lalicka.pdf (accessed 25 October 2012), 142. 
8 Cf. UNESCO, “Cracow’s Historic Center,“ http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/29 (accessed 20 January 2013). 
9 Cf. Monika A. Murzyn, Kazimierz: The Central European experience of urban regeneration (Krakow: International 
Cultural Centre, 2006), 440. 
10 Jack Kugelmass and Annamaria Orla-Bukowska, “’If You Build it They Will Come’: Recreating an Historic Jewish 
District in Post-Communist Krakow,” City & Society 10.1 (1998): 324.
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and  their  involvement  in  the  heritage  processes  is  represented  through  local  agents  
and citizens in Kazimierz. I thus conducted qualitative interviews with people involved in 
cultural institutions that deal with Jewish culture and heritage. The analysis of image 
documents that represent Krakow’s inscriptions on the UNESCO list support the interviews 
and add a basis to 
it. 
 
The theory is mainly composed of the assumptions by Laurajane Smith on the authorized 
heritage discourse (AHD). She conceptualizes heritage as authorized by mostly Western 
experts who “make” heritage by imposing a dominant idea on it and decide on its meanings. 
Smith argues that the community is not given many opportunities to participate in the 
heritage discourse and she proposes therefore to look more at the opportunities that the 
concept of intangible heritage offers for the community.11 This paper therefore starts with 
a theoretical background defining the aspects of heritage and the differences between 
tangible and intangible aspects in the context of UNESCO in order to then elaborate on the 
Authorized Heritage Discourse and on the role of the community in the process of heritage 
making. The second part displays the findings of the fieldwork about the understanding and 
handling of the UNESCO heritage in Krakow, with a special focus on Kazimierz, by the 
different agents. Lastly, an outlook shall give insights on the potential of Krakow’s UNESCO 
heritage for combining all agents’ aspirations. 
 
2.    Theoretical background: Uses and functions of heritage 
 
 
Heritage is defined in the Oxford dictionaries as “valued objects and qualities such as historic 
buildings and cultural traditions that have been passed down from previous 
generations.”12 Accordingly,   heritage   is   perceived   as   tangible   and   intangible   cultural   
phenomena; furthermore, it is connected to a sense of continuity over time; human beings 
are mentioned explicitly as transmitters. Those aspects are going to be explored in greater 
depth in the following chapter. Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett’s anthropological 
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understanding of heritage therefore builds the basis. She emphasizes the creative aspect of 
heritage by defining it as “a 
mode of cultural production in the present that has recourse to the past.”13 In order to 
follow 
 
the research interest of how Krakow’s UNESCO heritage is used by whom and for which 
 
 
 
 
11 Cf. Laurajane Smith, Uses of heritage (London: Routledge, 2006). 
12 Oxford Dictionaries, “Heritage,” http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/heritage?q=Heritage (accessed 20 
January 2013). 
13 Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, “Theorizing Heritage,” Ethnomusicology 39.3 (1995): 369.
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purpose, the uses and functions of those heritage productions in the present are in focus of 
this chapter. 
 
2.1 Some characteristics of the concept of cultural heritage 
 
“There is no heritage without an inheritor; if it is to survive, it must be accepted and 
desirable for someone.”14 Some features and characteristics that make the involvement 
with heritage desirable and interesting for people shall be highlighted in this section. Starting 
from the assumption that heritage is a present-centered concept,15  the phenomenon of 
putting cultural artifacts and events into new contexts can be explained by the theory of 
invented tradition from the British social historian Eric Hobsbawm: “’Invented tradition’ is 
taken to mean a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and 
of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior 
by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.”16 This quote reveals 
three aspects that help to illustrate the characteristics of heritage. 
Accordingly, the first aspect is that heritage, understood as something taken from the past 
for the present, is a practice of a symbolic nature. Heritage thus needs to be made visual or 
communicable, which is done for example through the UNESCO label. The label helps to 
communicate  certain  values  of  the  heritage  and  bestows  the  site  with  prestige.  
Another symbol  that  is  adopted  to  transmit  some  information  is  the Judaic  menorah,  
the seven- branched candelabrum. It is used in Kazimierz as the official logo of the Jewish 
Heritage Route, which is organized by the Krakow municipality. This commonly known image 
puts the contemporary practices of a heritage route in the context of Jewish culture. Symbols 
are thus adopted or newly invented in order to shape the perception of the respective 
heritage. 
This is linked to the second aspect of heritage, mentioned in Hobsbawm’s definition, that 
those symbolic practices inculcate among others certain values and meanings. The 
transmission of those can be used by agents and have different functions. One purpose of 
ascribing certain values to heritage can be in order to legitimize a certain opinion or the 
existence and practice of the heritage itself. Anthropologist Krzysztof Kowalski thus states 
that “meaning is the essence of reality because something that has no meaning is not 
real.”17 
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Heritage thus becomes real through the meanings that the people ascribe to it. Another 
reason 
 
 
 
14 Murzyn, Kazimierz, 54. 
15 Cf. Gregory J. Ashworth, Brian J. Graham and John E. Tunbridge, Pluralising pasts: Heritage, identity and place in 
multicultural societies (London: Pluto Press, 2007), 3. 
16 Eric J. Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions,” in The invention of tradition, ed. Eric J. Hobsbawm and 
Terence Ranger, 1–14 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1. 
17 Krzysztof Kowalski, Europa: mity, modele, symbole (Kraków: International Cultural Centre, 2002), 216.
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concerns the people themselves because by ascribing meanings to the heritage, they proof 
identification with and concern for the cultural phenomena. Smith thus asserts: “Identity is 
not simply something 'produced' or represented by heritage places or heritage moments, 
but is something actively and  continually recreated and negotiated as people, 
communities and institutions reinterpret, remember and reassess the meaning of the past in 
terms of the social, cultural and political needs of the present.”18  To sum up in the words of 
the urban planning scholars Brian Graham and Peter Howard: “The meaning of the past in 
the present (…) lies in the very contested core of who we are and of who others want us to 
be.”19 
The third feature of present-centered heritage, that Hobsbawm mentions when 
defining 
 
invented tradition, is that heritage implies continuity with the past. Hobsbawm connects this 
innovative aspect of tradition to the constant change in modern society that demands new 
attempts to structure the social life and to represent continuity.20 This function of heritage as 
transmitting  a  sense  of  continuity is  not  only  important  for  the  construction  of  
cultural identities, for which continuity is also an important prerequisite,21  but it is also an 
argument used in the context of UNESCO heritage. It is thus first of all used in order to 
legitimize the existence of the Convention itself as it is stated in the Preamble of the 
Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. The 
Preamble thus takes the “changing social and economic conditions”22  as a reason for the 
need of the Convention to protect the heritage and to consequently establish continuity 
with the past. According to Graham  and  Howard,  another  function  of  heritage  is  that  it  
creates  continuity  through reference to the past by allowing us to “locate our lives in linear 
narratives that connect past, present and future.”23 
All the aforementioned heritage features – symbolic nature, practice of meaning 
making and continuity – are also connected with processes of inclusion and exclusion. 
Anthropologist Valdimar Hafstein thus proclaims that the system of heritage is structured on 
mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion: “it gives value to certain things rather than others 
with reference to 
an assortment of criteria that can only ever be indeterminate.”24 Thus, heritage is a 
selection, 
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because it is chosen from among other cultural phenomena. Moreover, heritage is important 
in 
 
 
 
18 Smith, Uses of heritage, 83. 
19 Brian J. Graham and Peter Howard, “Heritage and identity,” in The Ashgate research companion to heritage and 
identity, ed. Brian J. Graham and Peter Howard, 1–15 (Burlington: Ashgate, 2008), 13. 
20 Cf. Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions”: 2. 
21 Cf. Barbara Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, “Intangible Heritage as Metacultural Production,” Museum International 56, 1-2 
(2004): 54 (accessed 8 October 2012). 
22 UNESCO, “Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage”, 2. 
23 Graham and Howard, “Heritage and identity”: 6. 
24 Valdimar T. Hafstein, “Intangible Heritage as a list: from masterpieces to representations,” in Intangible heritage, 
ed. Laurajane Smith and Natsuko Akagawa, 93–111 (London: Routledge, 2009), 93.
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the formation of group affiliations.25  As determined earlier, heritage serves as 
representation of identity. According to the cultural geographers Gregory Ashworth and John 
Tunbridge, those representations are constructed in counter-distinction to other forms of 
representation.26 
Heritage is eventually in the core of identity formation and makes it an object of 
negotiation. 
 
The next section will exemplify those features of heritage by discussing how UNESCO 
understands and handles the tangible and intangible aspects of heritage – since those are 
also of importance for the understanding of the research field. 
 
 
2.2 The understanding of heritage in the context of UNESCO heritage lists 
 
“[UNESCO] is today the indisputable global-level instrument which mobilises resources, 
reproduces dominant arguments and rationales, establishes program agendas and policies, 
and dispenses   status   surrounding   the   conservation   and   preservation   of   the   thing   
called 
‘heritage’.”27  One of those instruments is the previously mentioned UNESCO Convention 
 
concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. Its main goals are, as 
the  Preamble  indicates,  to  assure  that  the  natural  and  cultural  heritage  of  
“outstanding universal value” is sufficiently protected with international support in terms of 
“economic, scientific and technological resources”.28 To become part of the World heritage 
list, sites must be of outstanding universal value and must fit one of the ten selection 
criteria.29 Krakow thus met criteria four for being “an outstanding example of a type of 
building, architectural or 
technological ensemble or landscape which illustrates (a) significant stage(s) in human 
history.”30 The terms that are used in the criteria such as “masterpieces”, “exceptional 
testimony to a cultural tradition” or “human values” are not further specified, but 
rather vague. Thus, Regina Bendix stresses that the criteria are open enough to be 
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interpreted by the applicants in the way that they fit to their specific heritage site. 
Additionally, special expert 
consultants can assist the application 
procedure.31 
 
 
 
 
25 Cf. Kristin Kuutma, “Between Arbitration and Engineering: Concept and Contingencies in the Shaping of Heritage 
Regimes,” in Heritage Regimes and the State, ed. Regina F. Bendix, Aditya Eggert and Arnika Peselmann, 21–33, 
Göttingen Studies on Cultural Property 6 (Göttingen: Göttingen University Press, 2012), 27. 
26 Cf. Gregory J. Ashworth and Brian J. Graham, “Senses of Place. Senses of Time and Heritage,” in Senses of 
place: Senses of time, ed. Gregory J. Ashworth and Brian J. Graham, 3–12 (Burlington: Ashgate, 2005), 9. 
27 Marc Askew, “The magic list of global status: UNESCO, world heritage and the agendas of states,” in Heritage and 
globalisation, ed. Sophia Labadi and Colin Long, 19–44 (New York: Routledge, 2010), 19. 
28 UNESCO, “Convention concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage”, 2. 
29 Cf. UNESCO, World Heritage Convention, “The Criteria for Selection,” http://whc.unesco.org/en/criteria/ (accessed 
21 January 2013). 
30 ibid. 
31 Cf. Regina Bendix, “Heritage between economy and politics: An assessment from the perspective of cultural 
anthropology,” in Intangible heritage, ed. Laurajane Smith and Natsuko Akagawa, 253–69 (London: Routledge, 
2009), 258.
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Concerning the use and function of heritage, this short presentation already indicates 
that the World Heritage Convention uses heritage by making it an object of politics. Through 
procedural indications the Convention defines the power structures of heritage. States and 
governments are thus responsible for the nomination and protection of the sites on their 
territory. In the application process, the sites are interpreted in order to fit criteria that are 
formulated “from above” by UNESCO; meanings are thus newly created. The title itself, after 
having successfully passed the procedure, is according to the social scientist Marc Askew a 
“condensed label for the valorized past”32 that can itself be used for fundraising or 
attracting tourists. Consequently, to use David Lowenthal’s term, UNESCO heritage is 
upgraded heritage: “We improve our heritage, as just shown, by endowing the past with 
today's exemplary perspectives.”33 
However, the World Heritage Convention does not include the community itself in the 
process of defining the value of the heritage. The question thus is who is supposed to use the 
World Heritage? Since the implementation of the Convention for the Safeguarding of 
Intangible Cultural Heritage34 in 2003, a conceptual shift has occurred to include the 
community more in the decision making process.35 Intangible cultural heritage (ICH) is about 
the safeguarding of living heritage that is constantly evolving as a result of human 
concern.  
The Convention defines intangible heritage hence as “the practices, representations, 
expressions, knowledge, skills – as well as the instruments, objects, artefacts and cultural 
spaces associated therewith – that communities, groups and, in some cases, individuals 
recognize as part of their cultural heritage.”36 The role of the involved people is thus explicitly 
highlighted as creators, maintainers and transmitters of the cultural heritage – only they can 
recognize the intangible cultural heritage.37  In consequence, the Convention does not only 
focus on the actual heritage itself but sees it as linked with the people. The World Heritage 
Center thus emphasizes in a report stating challenges for the World Heritage mission, that 
the safeguarding measures for intangible heritage reside in the revitalization of human 
circumstances, whereas tangible World Heritage measures are more concerned with the 
specific state of conservation of a site. Moreover, the Intangible Heritage Convention does 
not 
refer anymore to outstanding universal value but uses the term representativity in order 
to 
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32 Marc Askew, “The magic list of global status”: 19–20. 
33 David Lowenthal, Possessed by the past: The heritage crusade and the spoils of history (New York: Free Press, 
1996), 153. 
34 In the following, I will refer to this Convention by naming it also “Intangible Heritage Convention”. 
35 Cf. Kristin Kuutma, “Between Arbitration and Engineering”: 24. 
36 UNESCO, “Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage; 2003,” (03.11.2003), 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001325/132540e.pdf (accessed 24 January 2013). 
37 Cf. UNESCO, Intangible Cultural Heritage, “What is Intangible Cultural Heritage?,” 
http://www.unesco.org/culture/ich/index.php?lg=en&pg=00002 (accessed 22 January 2013).
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prevent hierarchization which is necessary since ICH is considered relevant for a sense of 
identity and continuity of the groups and communities.38 
 
 
2.3 Authorized heritage discourse and the role of community 
 
The previous section illustrated some characteristics of UNESCO heritage such as the 
assumptions that the occupation with heritage is a response to present-day challenges, that 
its values are constructed and that different agents on a political as well as local level 
are involved in this process. Accordingly, heritage is also a cultural practice, as Smith defines 
it, which is “involved in the construction and regulation of a range of values and 
understandings.”39 The cultural practices and its resulting values and understandings that 
were elaborated  in  the  two  previous  sections  are  now  analyzed  under  the  viewpoint  of  
the authorized heritage discourse hypothesis by Laurajane Smith with special regard to the 
role of community. 
The authorized heritage discourse can hardly be defined in one sentence since it 
encompasses many different aspects. In the beginning, the term discourse needs 
clarification. Smith  does  not  understand  it  as  language,  but  rather  as  “a  form  of  
social  practice”.40 
Accordingly, AHD is connected mainly with the idea that it “privileges monumentality and 
grand scale, innate artefact/site significance tied to time depth, scientific/aesthetic expert 
judgment, social consensus and nation building.”41 This statement already reveals aspects 
of AHD that Smith formulates and that are elaborated in the following. 
AHD  privileges  firstly  aesthetic  and  scientific  values  as  well  as  the  physicality  of 
heritage.42 This fact resembles the UNESCO World Heritage Convention, since it also 
highlights expert knowledge concerning the preservation of physical heritage. According to 
Smith, experts thus impose their dominant view about objects by making it manageable 
and by reducing conflicts over the meanings through the power instruments of lists and 
registers.43 
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With its lists, UNESCO is thus also part of the authorizing institutions. Moreover, the act of 
listing means also selecting which phenomena are upgraded to be heritage, and which 
phenomena  not.44   By listing  something  as  heritage,  experts  give  value  to  certain  things 
whereas  other  aspects  are  marginalized  with  reference  to  a  certain  set  of  criteria,  
as 
 
 
 
 
38 Cf. ibid. 
39 Smith, Uses of heritage, 11. 
40 ibid., 4. 
41 ibid., 11. 
42 Cf. ibid., 87. 
43 Cf. ibid., 31. 
44 Cf. Lowenthal, Possessed by the past, 153.
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anthropologist Valdimar Hafstein stresses.45 In this case, the purpose of selection for a label 
is to produce a sense of uniqueness to the site. The label, as the result of expert 
investigation, produces consequently one understanding of the meanings. 
The second hypothesis of the AHD is that technical processes of heritage management, 
preservation and conservation create values and meanings by relating to the past.46  
This aspect is linked to Eric Hobsbawm’s assumption that traditions, or in this case heritages, 
are invented in response to novel situations by taking reference to old situations. 
Consequently a continuity with the past is constructed that can be maintained by 
repetition.47  In the case of AHD the repetition is constituted by the spread of the authorized 
values of the heritage in the public  through  official  presentations  that  retell  the  historic  
significance  of  a  site.  The repetition of those narratives makes people believe in their 
continuity. 
Thirdly, Smith characterizes AHD as regulating social and cultural meanings, so that there 
is no dissonance in its understanding.48 By assuming that there are dissonant meanings, 
Smith refers to the feature of heritage as being mainly about negotiation. On the one 
hand the experts thus create a coherent discourse in order to regulate dissonant opinions. 
On the other hand, various groups redefine the received values.49 Moreover, heritage is not 
just negotiable in the present, as the cultural scientist Peter Bugge points out. Its values and 
meanings are rather under constant change over the time.50 This process of the negotiation 
on the meaning of heritage is discussed in the following when looking at the role of the 
community in the heritage making process. 
Consequently, the term community needs further elaboration in the context of heritage. 
Anthropologist Kristin Kuutma states that “[c]ommunities may be linked by a merger of 
social and cultural experiences; criteria extend from objective (ethnicity, language, etc.) to 
subjective ones (self-identification, solidarity, etc.); communities are segmented into those 
of culture, location, interests, etc.”51 One of the binding factors of communities can thus 
be constituted by heritage since it is perceived to provide a particular sense of community 
and of communal belonging. 52 Moreover, these factors are important because heritage 
needs to be 
inherited by someone as the name already proclaims. In the case of World Heritage, the 
entire 
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45 Cf. Valdimar T. Hafstein, “Intangible Heritage as a list”: 93. 
46 Cf. Smith, Uses of heritage, 87. 
47 Cf. Eric J. Hobsbawm, “Introduction: Inventing Traditions”: 2. 
48 Cf. Smith, Uses of heritage, 88. 
49 Cf. ibid., 4. 
50 Cf. Peter Bugge, “A European Cultural Heritage? Reflections on a Concept and a Programme,” in Rethinking 
Heritage: Cultures and Politics in Europe, ed. Robert S. Peckham, 61–73 (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), 61. 
51 Kristin Kuutma, “Between Arbitration and Engineering”: 27. 
52 Cf. Kristin Kuutma, “Cultural Heritage: An Introduction to Entanglements of Knowledge, Politics and Property,” 
Journal of Ethnology and Folkloristics 3, no. 2 (2009): 8.
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world community would thus be perceived as the inheritors. A communal feeling of 
responsibility for the site – on all levels, local, national and global alike – is thus a basis for 
successful safeguarding. This special fact however of universal heritage and value is very 
much contested as Smith shows. Especially intangible heritage relates to a small audience, 
since it mainly addresses the tradition bearers themselves and since the primary meaning 
is for the construction of their sense of continuity and group identity.53 
However, the AHD does not include the community sufficiently. According to Smith, the 
 
expert knowledge shall be passively consumed by the audience. An interaction in the 
negotiation of the meaning is not encouraged, neither are they explicitly named in the World 
Heritage Convention. Rather “visitors are led to, are instructed about, but are then not 
invited to engage with [the tangible heritage] more actively.”54  Tangible heritage is thus 
reduced to simple consumption55 and its characteristic of being in constant change and 
negotiation does not have any chance to develop. As shown previously, intangible heritage 
is conceptualized 
differently by including the role of the community. However, all heritage is also intangible 
because of the values and meanings. Smith argues that because agents practice and 
engage with heritage, the values and meanings are actually the real subject of heritage 
preservation and not the tangible site itself.56 
 
3.    Uses of the UNESCO heritage in Krakow 
 
 
“The harmonious compromise between the principles of heritage care and the requirements 
of life and rules governing the economy is the requirement of the moment.”57 Accordingly, 
this section examines how far the conceptualization and management efforts of the 
Municipality of Krakow concerning Krakow’s UNESCO heritage is in accordance with the 
handling of the heritage by civic agents in Kazimierz. For the analysis of those local uses of 
heritage, the official UNESCO documentations of Krakow that are available on the UNESCO 
website58 as well as publications by the Municipality of Krakow build the data basis of the 
first section. Additionally, expert interviews with persons responsible for Krakow’s heritage 
add to the analysis of the documentation. My first approach was an interview with two 
inspectors in the 
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Office of Monument Protection, the art historian Katarzyna Biecuszek  and  the historian 
 
53 Cf. Smith, Uses of heritage, 109. 
54 ibid., 31. 
55 Cf. ibid., 33. 
56 Cf. ibid., 56. 
57 Małgorzata Anna Laliczka, “The city of Cracow”: 143. 
58 See UNESCO, “Cracow’s Historic Center. Documents,” http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/29/documents/ (accessed 27 
January 2013).
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Michał Szkoła, who are among others in charge of  questions  related  to  UNESCO 
requirements in Krakow. This interview served to get more information on the functioning of 
the heritage management and on the priorities. A second interview with the head of the 
Office of Monument Protection, Halina Rojkowska-Tasak, was then more about the 
interpretation of Krakow’s UNESCO heritage. An expert interview with the as scholar and 
consultant very engaged  heritage  expert  Jacek  Purchla,  helps  to  frame  the  management  
of  Krakow’s UNESCO heritage in the wider heritage context of Poland. The second part 
focuses then on the perceptions of the citizens which are the result of qualitative fieldwork 
in Kazimierz about the use of the local Jewish heritage. 
 
 
3.1 Official uses and perceptions of Krakow’s UNESCO heritage 
 
“Krakow’s rich history, diverse cultural heritage and unique atmosphere blend to make 
the city a truly exceptional place.”59 This official presentation of Krakow by the director 
general of UNESCO at that time, Kōichirō Matsuura, in the context of Krakow’s 30th 
anniversary of being on the UNESCO World Heritage list, reveals already some aspects of the 
terms that are going to be explored in this section: Who is thus speaking about and 
producing the heritage discourses in Krakow? Which values are ascribed to the heritage and 
what are they used for? 
 
 
3.1.1   Agents of the handling of Krakow’s UNESCO heritage 
 
The main agent who is responsible for the protection and management of Krakow’s heritage 
inscription is the Municipality of Krakow. The documents relating to UNESCO requirements 
such as management plans or the formulation of the outstanding universal value (OUV) are 
prepared by the Office of Monument Protection of the Municipality, often in cooperation 
with other heritage agencies such as the National Heritage Board of Poland who “gathers 
and disseminates information on heritage, sets standards for its protection and 
conservation, and 
aims to raise the social awareness on cultural heritage of Poland.”60  Additionally, the Office 
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in Krakow prepared the official nomination documentations for the inscription on the 
World 
 
Heritage  List  which  was  coordinated  on  the  international  level  by  Professor  Krzysztof 
 
Pawłowski, member of the Polish UNESCO Committee. The majority of the monuments and 
 
 
 
 
59 Kōichirō Matsuura, “Official Presentation,” in 30 Years of the UNESCO List: Materials from the conference organised 
within the 30th anniversary of the inclusion of Krakow's Historical Centre and the Salt Mine in Wieliczka in the 
UNESCO World Heritage List in 1978, ed. Stanisław Dziedzic and Halina Rojkowska-Tasak, 9–10 (Krakow 
2009), 9. 
60 National Heritage Board of Poland, “About Heritage Board,” http://www.nid.pl/idm,45.html (accessed 28 January 
2013).
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buildings are state-owned, other parts are owned by individuals, legal entities or they 
are clerical property.61 
The official discourses around Krakow’s heritage are often produced in the context of 
special occasions such as conferences or anniversaries, since politicians, persons responsible 
for the management of the heritage and scholars come together and exchange their 
opinions. Thus for the occasion of the 30th anniversary of Krakow’s inscription on the list, the 
President of the Republic of Poland, the Director General of UNESCO, Krakow’s Mayor and 
the Chairman of the City Council as well as the Ambassador and Permanent Representative 
of Poland to UNESCO put Krakow in various different contexts and produce thus meanings, 
that will be elaborated later on.62 (International) conferences about the management of 
UNESCO heritage sites have been organized among others  by the International Cultural 
Center of  Krakow, which “focuses on a multidimensional approach to cultural heritage.”63 
In their periodic reporting in 2006, the Municipality reports to what kind of staff they 
have access in which fields. Accordingly, it is stated that the Municipality has very good 
contact to “adequate professional staff” in “conservation, interpretation, education”, good 
access to “management and visitor management” and average to promotion.64  The 
wording assumes that it is more about the management of the site than about the citizens. 
Experts shall be specially trained mainly in academic institutions such as in universities. 
Another important role is performed by the Społeczny Komitet Odnowy Zabytków Krakow 
(SKOZK), the Civic Committee for the Restoration of Cracow Heritage. The members who 
are appointed by the President of the Polish Republic are mostly Professors or Doctors in the 
fields of architecture or (art) history. They commit themselves voluntarily to the protection 
of Krakow’s heritage which they mainly do by choosing where to invest public funds from 
the state budget for heritage protection.65 Even though the Committee is called Civic 
Committee, it includes mainly respective experts in the field of tangible heritage conservation 
who act as connection point between the state government and the locality. 
The tangible results of the expert knowledge – thus legal documents, 
recommendations, 
 
scholarly publications etc. – function as well as agents. The instructors in the Office of 
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61 Cf. Katarzyna Biecuszek, e-mail message to author, 15 February 2013. 
62 Cf. Stanisław Dziedzic and Halina Rojkowska-Tasak, eds., 30 Years of the UNESCO List: Materials from the 
conference organised within the 30th anniversary of the inclusion of Krakow's Historical Centre and the Salt Mine 
in Wieliczka in the UNESCO World Heritage List in 1978 (Krakow, 2009), 7–26. 
63 International Cultural Center of Krakow, “Mission,” http://www.mck.krakow.pl/page/mission (accessed 28 January 
2013). 
64 Cf. WHC/EUR, “Section II: Summary of the Periodic Report on the State of Conservation, 2006,”, 
http://whc.unesco.org/archive/periodicreporting/EUR/cycle01/section2/29-summary.pdf (accessed 29 January 
2013). 
65 Cf. SKOZK, “Historia,“ http://www.skozk.pl/historia.html (accessed 29 January 2013).
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Monument Protection of the Krakow City Hall thus emphasize in the interview that 
nowadays much more documents and studies are needed and produced than 30 years 
ago.66 The power of those normative documents is also omnipresent during the interview 
since the instructors often refer to legal texts or to other expert opinions instead of 
sharing their personal view about the handling of Krakow’s heritage. The director of the 
Office of Monument Protection stresses particularly the role of laws, which guides the way in 
which historical monuments are protected.67  These facts support Smith’s argument that 
normative texts or expert knowledge function as authorizing discourse that undermine 
dissonant opinions. 
When it comes to the involvement of average citizens, the periodic report only states 
that they can take part in the management of the heritage by being elected into the City 
Council.68 
People without an institutional, academic or political affiliation are consequently not 
considered in the decision-making process. The main agents in Krakow are thus – in 
accordance with the AHD – experts and political decision makers. 
 
 
3.1.2   Meanings and values of Krakow’s heritage in the official representations 
 
What kind of meanings and values those agents ascribe to Krakow’s UNESCO heritage is 
being questioned in the following. Earlier, it was determined that meanings make people 
experience something as real. Those meanings can be transported through narratives, which 
offer according to the sociologist Gerard Delanty “new interpretations of the present; they 
are ways of experiencing and interpreting time and situate the present in relation to the 
past and future.”69 The interpretations of the narratives that the aforementioned agents 
distribute about Krakow’s heritage, can thus give some insights on which aspects they want 
to build continuity and for what they can be used afterwards. 
In order to focus on the values that are produced about the heritage in Krakow, it is worth 
analyzing the significance and statements of the outstanding universal value. Since the 
requirements of UNESCO concerning the documentation of the (also already inscribed) 
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inscriptions have changed consistently over the time,70  Krakow’s statement of its 
universal 
value was adopted only in 2009, so around 30 years after the initial inscription. For 
the 
 
66 Cf. Katarzyna Biecuszek and Michał Szkoła, interview by Sina Wohlgemuth, 30 October 2012, Krakow. 
67 Cf. Halina Rojkowska-Tasak, interview by Sina Wohlgemuth, 12 November 2012, Krakow. 
68 Cf. WHC/EUR, “Section II: Summary of the Periodic Report on the State of Conservation, 2006”. 
69 Gerard Delanty, “The European heritage from a critical cosmopolitan perspective,” (LEQS Paper 19, February 
2010), 10. 
70 See the more detailed debates about the processes of formulating the outstanding universal values in retrospective 
nowadays in: Bogusław Szmygin, ed., Outstanding universal value and monitoring of world heritage properties: 
Summary of the project : "Improvement of the existing protection and management system for sites inscribed on 
the UNESCO Wor[l]d Heritage List - preparation of statements of outstanding universal value and monitoring 
indicators based on Polish and Norwegian experience" (Warsaw: Polish National Committee of ICOMOS; 
National Heritage Board, 2011).
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purpose of this paper, technical regulations, definitions and requirements from the side 
of 
 
UNESCO are thus factored out here. 
 
Accordingly,  the  statement  of  Krakow’s  outstanding  universal  value  starts  with  a 
characteristic of the historic layout: 
“The historic layout of Cracow, with Wawel and Kazimierz, is one of the most 
outstanding examples of European urban planning, characterised by the 
harmonious development and accumulation of elements representing all 
architectural styles from the early Romanesque phase up to Modernism.”71 
 
This statement thus puts Krakow first in comparison to European architectural achievements 
and highlights its superiority over other urban layouts. By associating itself with the 
European sphere, other world regions are not considered worth comparison. This focus 
on Europe is also in accordance with Smith’s observations of the Eurocentric character 
of the AHD.72 
Furthermore, Krakow’s heritage is supposed to represent continuity in time – from 
Romanesque to Modernism – which is supposed to consequently prove its architectural 
integrity. 
The importance of the city is argued mainly in terms of tangible buildings of different 
characters: 
“The importance of the city is evident in the urban layout, numerous churches 
and monasteries, monumental secular public buildings, the remains of medieval 
city walls, as well as urban palaces and town houses designed and built by high-
class architects and craftsmen.”73 
 
Regarding the content, only Christian buildings are listed, even though, the Jewish part of 
Kazimierz is also included under the inscription of Krakow’s historic center. Kazimierz is 
also not part of Krakow’s protection area of the “highest cultural value”74 which also 
indicates a prioritization of Christian heritage in Krakow. Additionally, the named artifacts of 
importance are described as “monumental”, “palaces”, “town houses” from “high-class” 
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architects and craftsmen. Elite-culture and its reference to the past – “medieval city wall” 
–seem thus to endow heritage with importance. Normal housings for citizens or the 
reference to uses and functions of those buildings that give insights on the ways of life of the 
people who have lived with the heritage, are not given. 
The ascribed value repeats some of the just mentioned aspects: 
 
71 World Heritage Centre, “WHC-08/32.COM/8B.Add: Item 8B of the Provisional Agenda: Nominations to the World 
Heritage List Nominations to the World Heritage List,”, http://whc.unesco.org/archive/2008/whc08-32com- 
8BAdde.pdf (accessed 29 January 2013). 
72 Cf. Smith, Uses of heritage, 98f. 
73 World Heritage Centre, “WHC-08/32.COM/8B.Add”. 
74 Halina Rojkowska-Tasak, “Activities of Krakow's Municipal Government in the field of World Heritage,” in 30 
Years of the UNESCO List: Materials from the conference organised within the 30th anniversary of the inclusion of 
Krakow's Historical Centre and the Salt Mine in Wieliczka in the UNESCO World Heritage List in 1978, ed. Stanisław 
Dziedzic and Halina Rojkowska-Tasak, 81–88 (Krakow 2009), 82.
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“The value of the ensemble is determined by the extraordinary accumulation of 
monuments from various periods, preserved in their original form, with authentic 
fittings, which combine to create a uniform urban ensemble in which the tangible 
and intangible heritage is preserved and nurtured to the present day.”75 
 
Accordingly, the main value is the aspect of authenticity. Authenticity is understood here 
in the originality of stones, in the Materialgerechtigkeit, which date back to past centuries. 
However, Jacek Purchla sees this concept challenged nowadays, thinking of 
reconstructions of ruins in the 21st  century who also claim to be authentic. Nevertheless, 
he perceives those reconstructions rather as “Disneyland reconstructions than as something 
with authenticity.”76 
Jan Janczykowski, the Małopolska Voivodship Conservator of Monuments, sees tourists as a 
threat to the authenticity of the place.77  This perception indicates more an understanding 
of authenticity as a special atmosphere. Dissonance in the conceptualization of 
authenticity is thus visible. Another value that this statement highlights is the aspect of a 
uniform urban ensemble. Since the influences of different époques were emphasized before, 
this argument of uniformity thus refers to the characteristic of heritage as being a product of 
a new creation for the present. The present purpose and value lie consequently in 
communicating uniformity despite diversity.  Moreover, the statement refers to intangible 
heritage without  however specifying  what  those  intangible  aspects  could  be,  whereas  
the  tangible  aspects  are sufficiently defined. Halina Rojkowska-Tasak also underlines that 
the Municipality does not yet have any inventories of intangible heritage in the region.78 
The last segment of the newly adopted statement of OUV interprets Krakow’s significance 
 
in Europe: 
 
“The dominant point of the urban ensemble, Wawel Hill, is the symbol of the 
crown, a necropolis documenting the dynastic and political links of medieval and 
modern Europe. Cracow, one of the largest administrative and commercial 
centres in Central Europe, was a centre of arts and crafts, a place where Eastern 
and Western culture and art met. The importance of Cracow as a cultural centre 
of European significance is reinforced by the existence of one of the oldest 
universities of international renown, the Jagiellonian University. The picture of 
the city’s cultural richness is supplemented by Jewish monuments of Cracow’s 
Kazimierz.”79 
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Trans-border contacts are associated in this statement with royalty, commerce, arts and the 
university – which are again elite contacts and European narratives. Jewish monuments 
are 
 
 
75 World Heritage Centre, “WHC-08/32.COM/8B.Add”. 
76 Jacek Purchla, interview by Sina Wohlgemuth, 4 December 2012, Krakow. 
77 Cf. Jan Janczykowski, “Protecting Monuments in Krakow: Factors and Problems,” in 30 Years of the UNESCO List: 
Materials from the conference organised within the 30th anniversary of the inclusion of Krakow's Historical 
Centre and the Salt Mine in Wieliczka in the UNESCO World Heritage List in 1978, ed. Stanisław Dziedzic and 
Halina Rojkowska-Tasak, 75–79 (Krakow 2009), 76. 
78 Cf. Rojkowska-Tasak, interview by Sina Wohlgemuth. 
79 World Heritage Centre, “WHC-08/32.COM/8B.Add”.
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not interpreted in the same range as the other attributes; Jewish heritage is seen more as a 
supplement, thus as something which does not belong to the overall narrative. Moreover, all 
those named significances refer to past aspects, present-day interpretations or new 
contributions to Krakow’s culture are not considered. However, in the official 
representations in the context of the 30th  anniversary Matsuura indicates the importance 
of thinking on the future role of Krakow by highlighting that the city shall remain an “active 
platform for international dialogue”  and  that  “a valuable legacy will  be  appreciated  and  
enriched  by generations to come.”80 
To conclude, the outstanding universal value of Krakow is mainly interpreted regarding 
tangible culture and its position towards other European achievements and areas. 
Continuity in time and content is thereby tried to be transmitted. It is however interesting 
that negative parts of Krakow’s history, which interrupt in a certain way the splendorous 
continuity of the place, are excluded from the interpretation of Krakow’s outstanding 
universal value. The changes in urban layout as for example the occupation by the Nazi-
Germans or the expulsion of the Jewish inhabitants of Kazimierz and the transformation of 
Krakow’s district Podgórze into the Jewish ghetto during the Second World War has thus not 
been mentioned. Delanty however highlights in regards to the conception of European 
heritage, which is also valid for the conception of World Heritage, that “what is required is a 
theory of cultural heritage that is 
sensitive to dialogic concepts of rationality, self-problematization and 
critique.”81 
 
 
 
3.1.3   Purposes and uses of Krakow’s UNESCO heritage 
 
After having examined the values of Krakow’s heritage, this section examines for which 
purposes those values are used. The empirical data are therefore based on expert interviews 
with the City Hall and with Professor Purchla.82 
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“I think that the meaning of it [the UNESCO title] is mainly used or mainly overused as a 
kind of advertisement.”83  Jacek Purchla thus emphasizes the instrumentalization of the title 
itself. The main reason for the application in the 1970s was the poor economic condition in 
Poland that did not guarantee sufficient aid for heritage maintenance. Thanks to the title, an 
extra fund – the National Fund for the Restoration of Cracow Heritage – was established in 
1978 – together with SKOZK, which administers the  money. Consequently, the urban 
structure has improved significantly since the inscription on the UNESCO list, which all 
80 Kōichirō Matsuura, “Official Presentation”: 9. 
81 Delanty, The European heritage from a critical cosmopolitan perspective, 4. 
82 As long as I indicate in the text, which statements are said by whom, I will not make any references in footnotes. 
83 Purchla, interview by Sina Wohlgemuth.
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interviewees highlight. Additionally, the title also means “a huge prestige for Krakow and for 
Poland, that one Polish city was the first inscribed on the UNESCO list,” as the instructors in 
the Office of Monument protection emphasize. But it is also of significance for the people, 
because “it means that you are working with something really important.” With those 
statements, the instructors underline the symbolic power of the title for intangible purposes 
such as constructing a sense of allegiance to a place. The title thus attracts investments as 
well as people to the city. The head of the Office of Monument Protection consequently 
highlights that heritage is more and more perceived and used as a “motor of development”. 
The explicit use of the buildings is regulated by laws which are according to Halina 
Rojkowska-Tasak very helpful in the management of the city. It is thus envisaged to keep the 
original function of the buildings. This focus on the function is quite new as the 
heritage expert Jacek Purchla explains: “people realized – pretty late – a couple of years ago 
that it [the conservation of the monuments] is not enough, that what is much more 
important is its function.”  He  stresses  that  heritage  as  to  be  seen  in  its  entirety,  
meaning  tangible  and intangible aspects alike. Halina Rojkowska-Tasak demonstrates, with 
regard to the past of the old town and not to Kazimierz, that the ground floor and first floor 
used to have a practical function for gastronomy, commerce or craftsmanship. The other 
floors are supposed to be housings. The use of the laws thus aims at preventing that those 
historic functions of the buildings being repressed by new developments such as high rent 
prices and increasing business and tourist facilities. The director of the Office of 
Monument Protection perceives 
the lack of citizens who inhabit the city as “the disease of every center of ancient 
cities.”84 
 
Interesting in this quote is that the primary concern lies not on the people but more on the 
buildings themselves. 
Thirdly, Krakow’s heritage is used for educational purposes. However, both specialists 
Halina Rojkowksa-Tasak and Jacek Purchla confess that there are not enough educational 
programs. The director of the Municipality office thus names exhibition projects taking place 
in the context of the Solidarity Day of World Heritage Cities for which Krakow displays its 
restoration projects. In 2012, parts of the exhibition took place in the Temple and Kupa 
Synagogues in Kazimierz and were mainly about their decorations and compositions. 
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According to the director, the purpose of those exhibitions is “to show the citizens the 
historical role of the heritage and of the restoration and conservation.” Additionally, she 
refers to the role of the citizens and says that “the citizens of Krakow are proud of their 
historic city. 
They know that Krakow was the former capital of Poland, a royal city, so that there was of 
 
84 The interview was conducted in French. All direct quotations from the interview with Halina Rojkowska-Tasak are 
translations from French into English by the author.
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course power. There is Wawel, the royal castle, the cloth halls, the tower of the town hall.” 
Even though, the city hall aims at education through heritage, the concept still refers to 
some characteristics of the AHD, namely that the citizens are perceived as consumers of 
given values. 
Accordingly, the National Heritage Board of Poland (NID), the consultants for the creation 
of  Polish  heritage  policies,  highlights  explicitly that  people  need  heritage:  “Dziedzictwo 
kulturowe jest  tym,  co  każdy  z  nas  indywidualnie  lub  większą  grupą  chce  zachować  i 
przekazać następnemu pokoleniu.”85 In order thus to include the people in the 
conceptualization, the NID facilitates the opportunity for young people to get involved in 
volunteer services. Even though, those volunteer services are mainly in the fields of heritage 
conservation, thus in the tangible aspects of heritage86  it already indicates another 
approach to heritage management that focuses more on the inclusion of citizens. The 
references to functions of heritage reveal furthermore the perception that tangible heritage 
can be used for intangible purposes. 
To deal however with the heritage of a city, means, according to the instructors in 
the Office of Monument Protection in Krakow, also to recognize change and development 
since the city is inhabited by people “who have requirements and expectations towards 
a city”. Jacek Purchla thus states in the interview that the “existing philosophy” about the 
protection of urban ensembles is not applicable anymore: “Because it is not a single 
monument, just one small wooden church hidden somewhere in the mountains, but it is a 
living city. It is the core, the dynamic organism which requires different instruments.” He 
thus refers to the UNESCO Recommendation on the Historic Urban Landscape, which was 
adopted in 2011 and which admits that “conservation has become a strategy to achieve a 
balance between urban growth 
and quality of life on a sustainable basis.”87 Purchla asserts that “the greatest challenge in 
the 
 
case of cities like Krakow is of course to follow the change and to protect the spirit and 
the 
 
character of the historic 
center.”88 
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One attempt to do so in Krakow is the Cultural Park (park kulturowy), a resolution from 
the Krakow City Council, published in 2010, which concerns only the Old Town and Wawel 
Hill, so not the entire UNESCO area with Stradom and Kazimierz. The Cultural Park seeks to 
 
 
85 National Heritage Board of Poland, “Dziedzictwo dla młodych,” http://www.nid.pl/idm,988,dziedzictwo-dla- 
mlodych.html (accessed 30 January 2013). Google translation of the website into English:”Cultural heritage is what 
each of us individually or in a larger group wants to preserve and pass on to the next generation.” 
86 Cf. National Heritage Board of Poland, “dobre przykłady,” http://www.zabytek.pl/wolontariat/page/org/przyklady 
(accessed 30 January 2013). 
87 UNESCO. “Records of the General Conference, 36th session, Paris, 25 October - 10 November 2011, v. 1: 
Resolutions; 2012: Recommendation on the Historic Urban Landscape,” 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0021/002150/215084e.pdf#page=52 (accessed 7 December 2012). 
88 Purchla, interview by Sina Wohlgemuth.
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“maintain and shape the cultural landscape and historical character of the public space in the 
area.”89 The main focus still lies on the protection of the “historical splendor”90 which is 
supposed to be achieved through regulations about what is allowed to be done with the 
buildings and what not. It is striking however that the citizens are included in the protection 
process by admitting: “we will not reach these goals without cooperating with you - property 
owners, entrepreneurs and citizens of Krakow - who live and work in the city center, creating 
the international image and brand thereof.”91 Moreover, by stating that “visitors will be 
able to leave Krakow with the conviction that in a special way we care about their heritage”, 
the Municipality perceives Krakow’s heritage as belonging to everyone but that especially 
the local level is responsible for it. 
To conclude, even though, citizens are not directly included in the decision-making 
processes and there are no sufficient heritage education programs for  young people, 
the perception of the use and function of the heritage considers to a certain degree the role 
of the citizens. 
 
3.2 Citizens’ perception of the heritage in Kazimierz 
 
“Quite often one can see a difference, a kind of a gap between the decisions made by the 
Municipality and the opinions of the citizens.”92  In reference to this quote by Jacek Purchla, 
this section highlights the citizens’ perceptions of the UNESCO heritage in Krakow’s Kazimierz 
district. The main value aspect highlighted in the UNESCO documentations was the 
continuity of Krakow in regard to its layout and function; in Kazimierz however the 
development was different. 
Kazimierz’s development differs from that of Krakow by way of its continuity and 
ownership. The demographic structure in Kazimierz has thus changed dramatically in the last 
century. In the interwar years, Jews made up 25% of Krakow’s population, most of them lived 
in Kazimierz where the Jewish population amounted 76%.93  Because of the Holocaust and 
anti-Semitic attitudes in Poland during Communist rule – especially the nation-wide purge 
on 
Jews  in  1968  which  caused  many  Jews  to  leave  their  jobs  in  public  functions  and  to 
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89 Google translation into English of: Municipality of Krakow, “Uchwała Rady Miasta o utworzeniu Parku 
Kulturowego,” 
http://www.krakow.pl/polecamy/8620,artykul,uchwala_rady_miasta_o_utworzeniu_parku_kulturowego.ht
ml (accessed 30 January 2013). 
90 Translation of: Municipality of Krakow,”Park Kulturowy Stare Miasto,” http://krakow.pl/parkkulturowy (accessed 
30 January 2013). Original: “Nie osiągniemy jednak tych celów bez współpracy z Państwem – właścicielami 
nieruchomości, przedsiębiorcami i krakowianami, którzy żyją i pracują w ścisłym centrum Krakowa, tworząc jego 
międzynarodową wizytówkę i markę.” 
91 ibid. 
92 Purchla, interview by Sina Wohlgemuth. 
93 Cf. Murzyn, Kazimierz, 108.
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emigrate94   –  only  a  few  hundred  Jews  live  in  Krakow  today  and  not  all  of  them  in 
Kazimierz.95  Despite of the destructive force of the war towards human beings, the urban 
fabric of Kazimierz has survived as the heritage scientist Monika Murzyn remarks; “The 
saved heritage of the quarter has thus become largely a disinherited patrimony, a heritage 
without heirs.”96  As a neglected and empty place, Kazimierz was a rough and 
dangerous 
neighborhood that was unsafe at night.97  There was hence the problem to figure out 
what 
 
should happen with the property. The Jewish communal buildings became nationalized after 
the Second World War and since the most vacancies were in Kazimierz, Krakow’s underclass 
appropriated the buildings in accordance with communist pro-tenant housing laws that 
gave the people primary rights to the residences.98  The city policies neglected Kazimierz – 
in general Jewish topics were taboo during Communism99  – it was thus not even 
prevented to 
shot a war movie in Kazimierz that eventually destroyed buildings as Jack Kugelmass and 
Annamaria  Orla-Bukowska  mention.100    Consequently,  the  buildings  lost  their  former 
meanings after the war; Murzyn indicates that the inscription on the UNESCO heritage list 
also did not help a lot in changing the image and the destruction of the area.101 
At the end of the 1980s however, a new interest in Jewish culture arose. Young 
Jewish Poles organized themselves in underground groups in order to learn about their 
Jewish roots that their parent’s generation had had to hide;102  also young catholic Polish 
people had an interest in knowing about Jewish culture that had been kept away from them 
for decades. So they paid attention to it among others through unofficial lectures, exhibitions 
and underground press.103 
 
 
3.2.1   Agents of the revitalization of Kazimierz since the 1980s 
 
The revitalization of Kazimierz, towards the end of the 1980s, occurred thanks to civic 
initiatives and to investments of foreign Jewish foundations. For the aim of this paper, 
the 
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perceptions about the meanings of Kazimierz’s heritage of some of the agents who have 
been 
 
 
 
 
94 Cf. Konstanty Gebert, “Jewish Identities in Poland: New, Old, and Imaginary,” in Jewish identities in the new 
Europe, ed. Jonathan Webber, 161–7 (London, Washington: Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 1994), 162. 
95 Cf. Agata Mucha, interview by Sina Wohlgemuth, 3 December, 2012, Krakow. 
96 Murzyn, Kazimierz, 120. 
97 Cf. ibid.; Kugelmass and Orla-Bukowska, “’If You Build it They Will Come’”: 320. 
98 Cf. ibid.; For a deeper insight into the history of Kazimierz with the special focus on the After-War Years, see ibid., 
317–24. 
99 Cf. Gebert, “Jewish Identities in Poland”: 163. 
100 Cf. Kugelmass and Orla-Bukowska, “’If You Build it They Will Come’”: 320. 
101 Cf. Murzyn, Kazimierz, 122–6. 
102 Cf. Gebert, “Jewish Identities in Poland: New, Old, and Imaginary”: 163. 
103 Cf. Kugelmass and Orla-Bukowska, “’If You Build it They Will Come’”: 340.
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involved in this revitalization process are opposed to those meanings and purposes of 
the values and purposes of UNESCO heritage management in Krakow. 
The academic efforts in bringing Jewish culture again to the fore have already been 
mentioned. As a representative of this group, I interviewed Annamaria Orla-Bukowska, a 
Polish-American scholar who came in the beginning of the 80s to Poland in order to research 
Polish-Christian and -Jewish relations during the Second World War. In 1986, she was one of 
the first students taking Hebrew lessons in the newly founded research center on Jewish 
culture, which developed to the now renowned Jewish Studies Department of the 
Jagiellonian University Krakow. 
Out of this non-Jewish academic circle came also the idea to build the Center for Jewish 
Culture, which hosts among others concerts, lectures and exhibition from and about Jewish 
artists. It opened after the completion of the renovation work for the building in 1993. The 
founder and director of the Center, Joachim S. Russek, is one of the interviewees.104 
Another agent who offered me insights on the development of the Polish interest in 
Jewish culture is the respected Jewish Studies Professor Jonathan Webber. He also first came 
to Poland in the 1980s and started summer schools for Polish students to rediscover the 
forgotten Jewish heritage in the Polish countryside around Krakow. The findings resulted in 
the formation of the Galicia Jewish Museum. The Museum was founded in 2004 and acts as a 
“neutral place”, as he describes it, for getting in contact with Jewish culture. 
The event that attracted the attention to Jewish culture and heritage among the 
wider society and which had a significant impact on the perception of Kazimierz was the 
Jewish Culture Festival. The idea for organizing a festival in the end of the 1980s about 
modern aspects of Jewish culture came out of an “authentic fascination with Jewish 
culture,”105 as the founder of the Festival, Janusz Makuch, formulates it. Robert Gądek, one 
of the project managers,  and  Paweł  Kowalewski,  the  volunteer  coordinator,  give  me  
insights  on  the significance of the festival by highlighting aspects of Jewish life. 
After the growing interest of non-Jewish people in Kazimierz’s Jewish culture, the small 
remaining Jewish community was given a space to meet and interact by the initiative of the 
Prince of Wales. In 2008 the Jewish Community Center (JCC) thus opened, which stands for 
“building a Jewish future in Krakow”, as is also its slogan. As an open place it welcomes 
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Jewish people from all backgrounds as well as interested non-Jewish people to practice 
a 
communal life and to learn about Jewishness. The director of the JCC, Jonathan Ornstein, as 
 
104 Joachim S. Russek, interview by Sina Wohlgemuth, 11 April 2012, Krakow. 
105 Janusz Makuch, “The Jewish Cultural Festival: between two worlds,” in Reclaiming memory: Urban regeneration 
in the historic Jewish quarters of Central European cities, ed. Monika Murzyn-Kupisz and Jacek Purchla, 43–9 
(Krakow: International Cultural Centre, 2009), 46.
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well as the volunteer coordinator, Agata Mucha, shared their visions about the aspects 
of 
 
Jewish culture on which to build a Jewish future. 
 
The heirs of the heritage of Kazimierz as well as the functions of the buildings have 
accordingly changed in the last century.  Jewish buildings have been given back to the official 
Jewish community of Krakow, some others have been restored by non-Jewish civic initiatives 
and new buildings appeared. The municipality is according to the interviewees very 
supportive in giving money to projects. Therefore it is interesting to analyze how the values 
and functions of the heritage are perceived by civic agents in Kazimierz. 
 
 
3.2.2   Citizens’ uses and functions of the UNESCO heritage in Kazimierz 
 
Documents and regulations are the main guidelines for the UNESCO heritage management at 
the level of the municipality. On the citizens’ level however those regulations are perceived 
as restrictive. Annamaria Orla-Bukowska thus refers to the disintegrated state of the 
buildings between  1938  and  1992,  because  the  State  Treasury  did  not  invest  in  
renovating  basic facilities such as telephone lines, indoor plumbing or electricity. Only some 
cosmetic changes on the façades were done. The positive effects of the UNESCO inscription 
on the city center were thus not perceived likewise in Kazimierz before 1990, since other 
needs were more urgent. Moreover, the regulations were perceived as restriction since 
they hindered essential changes.106  Jonathan Webber describes a further opinion about 
the UNESCO regulations, namely that they hinder free choice of the conception of the 
building. For the decision of a venue for the Galicia Jewish Museum, Webber and his co-
founder Chris Schwarz abandoned their original idea of founding it in Szeroka Street, the core 
of the Jewish district, in order to avoid too many bureaucratically procedures: 
When we found out that we would have a much freer hand. The museum on 
Dajwór Street now has got quite a large modern façade with glass. And you 
couldn't really do that in Szeroka Street. What we maybe could, but we didn't 
try, because you have to go through so many conservatoral applications, we 
decided not to bother.107 
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They thus renovated a ruined mill, “a completely neutral place”, close to Szeroka Street in 
accordance with the needs for their museum. The founders of the Center for Jewish Culture 
however were looking for a symbolic place for their center. So they renovated a former Beit 
ha-midrash, a “house of study” where Jewish students learned about the laws of 
Judaism.108 
Today the Center is in a certain way still a house of learning about Judaism, albeit 
not 
 
106 Cf. Annamaria Orla-Bukowska, interview by Sina Wohlgemuth, 6 December 2012, Krakow. 
107 Jonathan Webber, interview by Sina Wohlgemuth, 12 December 2012, Krakow. 
108 Cf. Jewish Encyclopedia, “Bet ha-midrash,” http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/3191-bet-ha-midrash 
(accessed 30 April 2012).
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primarily for Jewish people, rather for all interested people. The historic function was 
thus kept – not by the regulation of laws – but out of an own decision about the right place 
that is in accordance with the individual civic initiative’s mission. 
Another function that the heritage in Kazimierz has, is to produce legitimacy for the 
present-day missions of the initiatives. Kazimierz’s Jewish surrounding thus functions in 
order to create a feeling of continuity. Agata from the JCC emphasizes: “[to be situated in 
Kazimierz] is very important from the historical point of view and it gives a link between the 
past and the present. So it is very important that among old synagogues there is this very 
new building and it shows the community and that the community still exists.” So, even 
though, the JCC itself is not in one of the historic Jewish buildings but in a newly 
designed and modern building, the connection to the historic surrounding is considered 
being important for 
(re-)building a Jewish life in Kazimierz, “because you don't start from zero,”109  as Jonathan 
 
Ornstein, the director of JCC, asserts. Moreover, Paweł also underlines the synergy between 
the festival and the place: “Kazimierz looks like it looks thanks to the festival (…) and the 
festival looks like it looks thanks to Kazimierz.” The place thus has a certain atmosphere that 
gives the mission its character: “There is some kind of energy here. (…) All the musicians 
who are coming here to the festival say that their music sounds different here, it is kind like 
a magical, special atmosphere and that this place has a soul.”110 
Furthermore, the tangible heritage is used as a tool to learn about intangible aspects 
of 
 
Jewish culture. Hence, through workshops, the volunteer coordinators want their volunteers 
to discover what a Jewish space is by showing them the signs of Jewishness in Kazimierz. 
Annamaria Orla-Bukowska also organizes “walking lectures” in the context of University 
excursions. During those lectures, she takes them among others to the synagogues and let 
her students discover the meanings of the architecture, that there is a separated section for 
women but that this section is more open in the Reform synagogue than in the Orthodox 
synagogue because the Reform synagogue has a greater support for gender equality for 
example. Orla- Bukowska hence takes the architecture to make intangible meanings 
tangible: “We stay in Jozepha street and I say: ‘The right hand side is Catholic the other 
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Jewish. Very far away? No!’ It is to show that the cultural pluralism already drifted in 
people, in buildings, in the 
closeness of  things.”111  Heritage is thus used for educational purposes. In the case of 
Kazimierz, it gives people the opportunity to learn about the modern role of Jewish 
culture that  used  to  be  an  integral  part  of  the  Polish  and  European  society,  as  
Robert  Gądek 
 
 
109 Jonathan Ornstein, interview by Sina Wohlgemuth, 10 December 2012, Krakow. 
110 Paweł Kowalewski, interview by Sina Wohlgemuth, 7 December 2012, Krakow. 
111 Orla-Bukowska, interview by Sina Wohlgemuth.
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highlights, “People are unaware that there is still Jewish culture going on in Europe and that 
it is still part of mainstream culture.”112 One purpose of dealing thus with Jewish heritage is 
to fight stereotypes and to reintroduce Jewish culture into the mainstream society, to show 
that it is still alive. 
Through their cultural programs, the institutions seek to let people experience the 
presence of Jewish culture in Kazimierz. That is the authenticity of Kazimierz for Gądek and 
Russek; hence not the origin of the stones themselves but the intention to make people 
discover the “real” culture. Regina Bendix examines the concept of authenticity and refers 
first to the dual meaning of the Greek term authentes, which means on the one hand “one 
who acts with authority” but also “made by one’s own hand”113. The focus of the contested 
concept of authenticity lies, according to these definitions, with the ownership and the 
unique production of items, which means in this context that the civic initiatives create their 
own Jewish culture. 
Since authenticity does then not exist but is always a creation, Regina Bendix develops 
this debate for situations nowadays and stresses authenticity as “a quality of experience: The 
chills running down one’s spine during musical performances, for instance, moments that 
may stir one to tears, laughter, elation.”114 
That the involvement with tangible heritage can also be used as a work of reconciliation is 
 
shown by Jonathan Webber’s efforts to reinstall a forgotten cemetery in a Polish village. As a 
Jewish scholar he went to a village where before the war the Jews numbered 35% of the 
population; “but there was no sign of anything Jewish there.” With support from the village 
catholic priest, the mayor and teacher as well as in cooperation with the villagers, he managed 
to restore the cemetery. “It was a challenge for diplomacy. Me coming along (…) and saying 
to them that I have come in an atmosphere of peace and constructive collaboration to let you 
have access to the Jewish past of your village.” This topic of working together on remembering 
something that has been forgotten is in the core of what heritage is about: taking something 
from the past and give meaning to it in the present. 
The volunteer programs also aim at getting people involved in Jewish culture, who 
may not have been in contact with it before but who are interested in learning more. 
Paweł thus says that the purpose of volunteering is “to give someone something and to learn 
something from someone.” Agata emphasizes that the programs make it possible “to meet 
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with people (…) and to make friends.” Volunteering in Kazimierz thus facilitates access to 
Jewish culture 
for non-Jewish young persons. Since they create the opportunity to communicate and to 
help 
 
 
112 Robert Gądek, interview by Sina Wohlgemuth, 16 April 2012, Krakow. 
113 Cited in Regina Bendix, In Search of Authenticity (Madison: Wisconsin, 1997), 14. 
114 ibid., 13-4.
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each other, these volunteer programs are a first step into an active and open civil society. 
Moreover, they are also the first step for a cosmopolitan society in the sense as the 
sociologist Ullrich Beck and the political scientist Edgar Grande defines it, in which people 
incorporate other cultural practices as their own through which one learns more about 
oneself and about 
the other.115 So, even though the volunteer programs are mainly based on the institutions 
they 
 
can develop a sense for social responsibility that might go beyond cultural encounters to 
the 
 
care taking of other people’s 
needs. 
 
Heritage management in Kazimierz is consequently closely linked to people’s involvement 
and ideas. Citizens started out of their own interest to revive aspects from the past. The 
initiatives get financial support from the Municipality, the content and their structure 
however was chosen independently. Joachim Russek thus concludes: “We have to do it by 
ourselves, and it has much more sense. Then you feel tight to an institution or you fell tight 
to an infrastructure when you are sharing also the responsibility.” 
 
 
 
 
4.    Conclusion 
 
 
“Heritage is about more than visitors, audience and consumption. It is about more than 
access to economic resources. It is about people, collectivity and individuals, and about their 
sense of inheritance from the past and the uses to which this sense of inheritance is 
put.”116  The analysis of the handling of Krakow’s UNESCO heritage has however revealed 
some dissonance since different agents ascribe to the same objects different meanings and 
uses.117 
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The authorized heritage discourse that Laurajane Smith detects in the official heritage 
management can also be observed in Krakow. Legal documents and expert opinions as well 
as a coherent presentation of the UNESCO heritage are present. However, it is to note that 
the Municipality does not work against the citizens, on the contrary, the financial 
support is given, the priorities and backgrounds are just different. The persons responsible 
for the protection of the UNESCO heritage in Krakow thus have the perspective of art 
historians and conservators   by   fulfilling   their   professional   task   in   following   UNESCO   
and   other governmental recommendations. The civic initiatives in Kazimierz on the 
other hand are  
 
 
 
115 Cf. Ulrich Beck and Edgar Grande, Das kosmopolitische Europa: Gesellschaft und Politik in der zweiten Moderne 
(Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2007, c2004), 28. 
116 Iain J. M. Robertson, “Introduction: Heritage from Below,” in Heritage from below, ed. Iain J. M. Robertson, 1–23 
(Farnham, Burlington: Ashgate Pub. Company, 2012), 1. 
117 Cf. John E. Tunbridge and Gregory J. Ashworth, Dissonant heritage: The management of the past as a resource in 
conflict (Chichester: J. Wiley, 1996), 20.
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guided  by  their  own  ideals  and  identifications  with  the  heritage.  What  is  lacking  is 
consequently, the inclusion of those dissonant perceptions of the heritage. 
The official representation of Krakow’s heritage thus only perceives the Jewish heritage of 
Kazimierz as a supplement, whereas the Christian heritage is prioritized since it seems to fit 
better into the coherent argumentation of the value for the Christian majority society 
in Poland. The civic initiatives on the contrary aim at making Jewish heritage again part of 
the Polish-Catholic society. Another dissonance lies in the observance of the regulations 
that result from UNESCO World Heritage Convention. In order to assure that the 
Convention is not just a paper that gives prestige to the city, but that it is also a practical 
instrument for all the heirs without being perceived as a restriction, UNESCO practices 
should be more accessible and citizen-friendly. 
Moreover, the research exemplified that tangible heritage in Kazimierz is used as a symbol 
to transport intangible meanings and messages. This intangible use of the tangible heritage is 
only possible thanks to the fact that the Jewish tangible heritage, such as the synagogues 
and the urban layout, was kept intact and restored. The synergy effect of the creation of 
meanings through buildings is worth a consideration for the creation of further management 
programs. Hence, the development of Kazimierz has shown that heritage only exists when 
people choose to care for it, when it thus has some meaning in the lives of the people. 
To conclude, in order to challenge the AHD and to include the perceptions of citizens, 
tangible heritage needs to be conceptualized in accordance with its intangible aspects. 
Since the conservation of tangible heritage requires special skills, people feel more attached 
and get more easily involved in the intangible aspects. By combining thus tangible and 
intangible heritage as is done already on the citizens’ level, a bigger community can thus, as 
Smith asks 
it,118 be involved in the negotiation about the understanding of self and other. 
 
 
 
 
 
118 Cf. Laurajane Smith, “Discussion”: 393.
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